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Taxation of Closely-Held
Corporations: The Partnership
Option and the Lower Rate of Tax
Neil Brooks *
Introduction
PURPOSE
Tax theoreticians and policy-makers have agreed for at least
the past forty years that tax theory provides no justification
for imposing a separate tax on the income of corporations.
However, most have also conceded that there are compelling
practical reasons for such a tax, including, the administrative
difficulty of attributing undistributed corporate income to
shareholders for the purpose of taxing it at their individual
marginal rates, the convenience of raising revenue by taxing
the thoroughly documented profits of a small number of
corporations, the difficulty of changing a system of tax to
which the economy has adjusted, and the well accepted
convention of indirectly taxing non-residents by taxing the
profits of domestic corporations in which they have an interest.
The arguments for and against some form of separate
corporate income tax, with or without dividend relief, will not
be reiterated in this paper.' Instead, the paper addresses the
narrower issue of whether, whatever the method of taxing
corporations generally, special provision should be made for
closely-held corporations. Corporations vary in size from the
incorporated proprietorship, in which a single shareholder is in
all respects the owner of the business, to the multinational
corporation, in which shareholders are little more than passive
* Neil Brooks is an Associate Professor at Osgoode Hall Law School, Toronto,
Canada.
1. For a careful review of the recent Australian literature see R. Krever,
'Companies, Shareholders and Tax Reform' (1985) 20 Tazation in Australia
163; see more generally, C.E. McLure, Jr., 'Corporate Tax Integration for
Australia: Pros and Problems' in J.G. Head, ed. Tazation Issues of the 1980s
(Sydney: Australian Tax Research Foundation, 1983), chap. 12.
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investors. Also, corporations embrace widely differing
shareholder structures and business circumstances. Some are
simply incorporated pocketbooks, others carry on diverse
business activities in which there is a need for huge capital
investments. Finally, compounding the difficulties of imposing
a single separate tax on corporations, corporate income bears
no relationship to the income of its shareholders. High-income
individuals often own small corporations, low-income
individuals are often shareholders in large corporations. Little
wonder then, as the Canadian Government lamented in its 1971
Proposals for Tax Reform, 'it has always been difficult to
design a tax system that can be applied appropriately to all ...(the) different types of corporations and corporate relations'.
Although the drafters of most modern income tax statutes
differentiate between widely-held and closely-held
corporations for a number of purposes, only those implicit in
the following two questions will be discussed in the paper: (1)
Should closely-held corporations be given the option to be
taxed in the same manner as partnerships? (2) Should a lower
rate of corporate tax be imposed on the first slice of a
corporation's earnings (for example, the first $100 000) in
order to reduce the tax burden on closely-held corporations
relative to widely-held corporations? Small business has a
litany of complaints against the tax system, but these are the
two most significant general tax policy issues remaining for
closely-held corporations.3  Two preliminary matters will be
clarified in this introduction: the definition of the term
'closely-held' corporation, and the type of analysis raised by
the two questions posed.
2. Canada, Hon. E.J. Benson, Minister of Finance, Proposals for Tax Reform
(Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1969), at 45, para. 4.4.
3. Two other general corporate tax issues usually discussed in the context of
closely-held corporations but that will not be reviewed in this paper are:
(1) whether there should be, and if so the design of, a tax on accumulated
profits; and, (2) how to prevent dividend-stripping or, as it is called in the
United States, bailouts. One reason these issues are not dealt with in this
paper is that they have been the subject of systematic treatment in countless
publications. For Australia see, in particular, Y.F.R. Grbich and B. Cooper,
Undistributed Profits Tax: A Critical Analysis (Sydney: Taxation Institute,
Research and Education Trust, 1979); and R.W. Parsons, 'An Australian
View of Corporations Tax' 11967 British Tax Review 14. Secondly, these
two problems are to a large extent being finessed in modern tax systems.
The first issue only arises in income tax systems in which the individual
marginal tax rates are higher than the corporate tax rate. But increasingly,
top individual marginal rates are being lowered to about equal to or even
less than the corporate tax rate. The second issue arises because of the tax
advantages of extracting corporate earnings in the form of capital gains
instead of dividends. But increasingly, the individual tax rate on dividend
income is being reduced and, with some exceptions (notably Canada), the tax
rate on capital gains is being increased.
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DEFINITION OF CLOSELY-HELD CORPORATION
The term closely-held corporation is not used here in any
precise sense, but simply as a generic term to refer to
corporations that are variously called 'close corporations', 'one-
person corporations', 'family corporations', 'small firms', or
'incorporated partnerships'. In most contexts, the term refers
to corporations whose voting shares are held by a single
shareholder or a closely-knit group of shareholders, whose
shares are not publicly traded, and in which management and
ownership are substantially identical. Normally, closely-held
corporations are incorporated by entrepreneurs who wish to
conduct their business essentially as sole proprietorships or
partnerships but who wish to realise the advantages of
incorporation, in particular, limited liability. In other contexts,
the term is used simply to refer to a small business firm,
whether measured in terms of income, assets or persons
employed.
Although the term closely-held corporation is increasingly
used in many areas of law regulating corporate activities, there
is no reason why it should be defined the same in each area.
Ultimately one of the important goals of the commercial legal
structure is to further the growth and development of small
business.' However, the countervailing interests in each
subject area are likely to be different. Thus, for example, the
interests at stake in determining when the public interest
requires that a securities offering be registered, or when a
corporation should be free to regulate its internal affairs
without regard to the normal conventions of company law,
might have little relevance to the interests at stake in providing
special tax treatment to small firms. Moreover, in this article,
the term might have a different meaning in relation to each
question posed. The characteristics of a corporation that
should be entitled to elect to be taxed as a partnership might
be quite different than the characteristics of a corporation that
should be entitled to be taxed at a low rate of tax.
TYPES OF ANALYSIS AND SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
The second preliminary matter that needs clarification is the
type of analysis required to answer each of the questions
posed. The most significant conceptual advance in tax policy
analysis in recent years has been the development of the tax
expenditure concept and the recognition of the full
implications of the fact that income tax acts (indeed all tax
statutes) are composed of two analytically distinct kinds of
provisions: technical tax provisions and tax expenditure
4. See H.J. Haynsworth, 'The Need for a Unified Small Business Legal
Structure' (1978) 33 Business Lawyer 849.
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provisions. Technical tax provisions establish the basic
structural elements of the tax system: the units to be taxed,
the tax base, the rate structure, the accounting period and the
rules of procedure. They are designed solely to raise revenue
(or more accurately to reduce private spending) in an
equitable, economically efficient, and administratively simple
manner.
In addition to technical tax rules, tax acts frequently contain
a myriad of rules designed to provide implicit subsidies to tax-
filers who alter their behaviour in ways that the government
wishes to encourage or those deserving of relief for some other
reason. These kinds of provisions have become known as tax
expenditures. They take the form of tax deductions, tax
credits, lower rates of tax, or provisions that allow tax to be
deferred. Tax expenditures cannot be understood or evaluated
using traditional tax criteria such as equity, neutrality and
simplicity. Indeed, their explicit purpose is to change people's
behaviour from what it would be in a tax-free world. They
must be evaluated using budgetary criteria - the same criteria
used in evaluating direct government spending programs:
target-efficiency, cost-effectiveness, distributional incidence,
and so on.5
In these terms, the question of whether closely-held
corporations should be allowed to elect to be taxed like a
partnership is essentially a technical tax policy issue. The issue
must be resolved by assuming the basic structure of the tax
system in relation to partnerships and corporations generally
and then attempting to resolve the proper classification of
closely-held corporations by reference to traditional tax
criteria. The method of analysis can be clarified by
contrasting the normal tax treatment of partnerships with that
of corporations. In most income tax systems partnerships are
not treated as separate taxpaying entities. Although, for
administrative reasons, most tax systems require the income of
partnerships to be computed at the partnership level, the
income of the partnership is notionally passed through each
year to the individual partners, whether or not they actually
withdraw the income from the partnership. On the other
hand, in most income tax systems the corporation is treated, to
some degree at least, as a separate taxpaying entity. So the
issue can be restated: In a technical tax system in which
partnerships are taxed on a pass-through basis and corporations
are taxed at least in part on a separate entity basis, how should
closely-held corporations be taxed?
To anticipate my conclusion on this issue, the tax policy
case for taxing closely-held corporations as partnerships, that is
on a pass-through instead of an entity basis, can be simply
5. See generally, S.S. Surrey and P.R. McDaniel, Taz Ezpenditures (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1985).
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stated. First, there are no theoretical, only pragmatic, reasons
for taxing corporations on an entity basis. Second, none of the
pragmatic reasons for imposing an entity-basis tax on
corporations apply to closely-held corporations. Furthermore,
if closely-held corporations are not allowed to elect to be taxed
on a partnership basis the corporate tax system will needlessly
distort the decision as to which legal form a taxpayer uses to
carry on business and will reduce risk-taking. An additional
argument for a partnership election is that it will benefit small
businesses by increasing their access to tax expenditures.
I also argue, more generally, that if a tax system provides
two models for taxing entities, the pass-through model and the
separate-entity model, entities should not be classified for
purposes of determining which model applies to them on the
basis of their private-law form or even the nature of the legal
relationships created between its owners and third parties.
Instead, they should be classified on the basis of criteria that
relate to the reasons for distinguishing between them for tax
purposes. These reasons relate largely to administrative
considerations.
The question of whether closely-held corporations should be
taxed at a lower effective rate than widely-held corporations
raises a budgetary issue not a tax policy issue. Should small
businesses be subsidised by the government in the form of a
special low rate of corporate tax? This question can be
divided analytically into three more specific questions: (1) Is
there a need to subsidise small businesses? (2) If so, what
policy instrument should be used? (3) If the tax system is to
be used to provide such a subsidy, how should the subsidy be
designed? Again, to anticipate my conclusion, I argue that
even if a positive response is given to the first two questions,
the low rate of tax is an inefficient and inequitable way of
providing a subsidy to small business. In making this
argument I also make a more general point; namely, that
although most incentive programs can be written as a tax
expenditure or a direct spending program, almost invariably a
direct spending program is to be preferred. The use of the tax
system to deliver a subsidy imposes severe constraints on the
design of the subsidy program and threatens the tax system's
revenue raising functions.
OUTLINE OF PAPER
The last two parts of the paper analyse the arguments for a
partnership election and a lower rate of tax for closely-held
corporations. The next four parts review the history of these
issues in the United Kingdom, United States, Canada and
Australia. This review is not intended to be an exercise in
social history or comparative jurisprudence. It is a
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straightforward description of how these issues have arisen and
a review of the arguments and concerns that have been
expressed in these countries for and against these two forms of
special treatment for closely-held corporations. Some of these
countries have had a good deal of experience grappling with
these issues. The United States, for example, has had a
partnership election for closely-held corporations since 1958.
The election has been subject to numerous evaluations.
Canada has had a rich experience with trying to target a lower
rate of corporate tax on closely-held corporations that need
their retained earnings for expansion. Indeed, throughout the
1960s and 1970s the issue of whether, and if so how, small
businesses should be subsidised through the tax system has
preoccupied tax policy-makers in Canada.
Although the review of the history of the corporate tax in
each country concentrates on the tax treatment of closely-held
corporations, in places a detailed review of the general
development of the corporate tax system was necessary. The
problems of closely-held corporations can only be understood
against the background of the more general corporate tax
system. Also, since Australia has recently partially integrated
its income tax on corporations and shareholders, the history of
the general development of the corporate tax system in these
other jurisdictions might be of some interest. In particular, it
is somewhat interesting to note that in spite of the fact that an
unintegrated corporate tax system is referred to as the
'classical' system, each of these countries initially adopted some
form of integrated system. And, with the exception of the
United Kingdom, which adopted the classical system in 1965
explicitly to encourage corporate retentions (an integrated
system was re-introduced in 1972), each adopted the classical
system for reasons unrelated to the economic or even
conceptual reasons that have been given by commentators to
justify such a system. Another general point that the review
highlights is the extent to which these countries borrowed and
relied upon each other's experiences as they contended with
the almost intractable policy issues posed by the corporate tax.
United Kingdom
The United Kingdom has a lower rate of corporate tax for the
first £100 000 of a corporation's income. This dual corporate
rate structure was introduced in 1972. Although a partnership
election for small firms has been debated from time to time,
particularly since 1965, it has never been enacted.
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1803 TO 1965: THE INTEGRATED SYSTEM
The genesis of the taxation of corporations and shareholders in
the United Kingdom can be traced to Addington's Income Tax
Act of 1803.6 Addington viewed the income tax as being a
levy solely upon individuals; however, as part of his plan for a
comprehensive system of taxation at source, he imposed a tax
on the income of corporate bodies to act as a withholding tax
on dividends. When dividends were paid to security holders,
since tax had already been paid at the corporate level, they
were received tax-free. Aside from the application of tax
principles, it is not surprising that corporations were not
treated as separate taxpaying entities under the early English
income tax since companies were regarded at that time as
being more in the nature of partnerships than separate
entities.8  A clear statement of this early conception of the
corporate tax was given by the Royal Commission on the
Taxation of Profits and Income:
Corporation Taxation ... began as part of a tax system which
contained only income tax and virtually no progression. In
that setting it was a form of taxation at source, the idea
being that the income was taxed as soon as it reached the
6. Income Tax A ct, 1803 (UK), 43 Geo. 3, c. 122.
7. See generally, A. Farnsworth, Addington: Author of the Modern Income Tax
(London: Stevens and Sons Ltd., 1951), at 119-20; S. Reamonn, The
Philosophy of the Corporate Tax (Dublin: Institute of Public Administration,
1970), pt. II, chap. 1; E.R.A. Seligman, The Income Tax (New York:
McMillan, 1914), at 89-96. Corporate bodies subject to Addington's tax
were not of course limited liability companies, which were not known until
the mid-1800s, but chartered and other statutory corporations. The Joint
Stock Companies Act (UK), 7 & 8 Vict., L. 110-11, which allowed for the
incorporation of companies by a process of registration, was not passed until
1844; corporations were not given limited liability until the Limited Liability
Act, 1855 (UK), 18 & 19 Vict., c. 133; and, the first modern companies act
was the Companies Act, 1862 (UK), 25 & 26 Vict., c. 89. See L.C.B.
Gower, Gower's Principles of Modern Company Law, 4th ed. (London:
Stevens and Sons, 1979), at 41-50.
8. Indeed, as the United Kingdom Income Tax Codification Committee noted,
the first edition of Lindley on Companies, the leading treatise on the subject,
treated company law as a branch of partnership law and was entitled, A
Treatise on the Law of Companies considered as a branch of the Law of
Partnership: See United Kingdom, Financial Secretary to the Treasury,
Income Tax Codification Committee, Report, vol. 1, Cmd. 5131 (London:
HMSO, 1936), at 62. In the early cases on the taxation of dividends judges
frequently noted that corporations were treated in effect like partnerships
under the Act. See Bradbury (H.M. Inspector of Taxes) v The English
Sewing Cotton Company, Limited (HL) 19231 AC 744, 769-70; 8 TC 481,
518-19 per Lord Phillmore ('the Act of 1842 has apparently proceeded on
the idea that for revenue purposes a joint stock company should be treated
as a large partnership, so that the a ment of Income Tax by . company
would discharge the quasi-partners.' ) Indeed, in an early tax case it was
stated that a corporation simply paid the income tax as an aent of its
shareholders. See Brooke v Commissioners of Inland Revenue (CA 118 LTR
321, 326, 328; 7 TC 261, 273 per Swinfen Eady, LJ and Scrutton J at 276.
The analogy was subsequently disapproved of by Viscount Cave in
Commissioners of Inland Revenue v John Blott (HL) 119211 2 AC 171, 201; 8
TC 101, 136.
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hands of the corporation and the corporation recovered the
tax for itself when distributing the income among the
members. On that view it was only natural not to assess the
dividend over again in the hands of the shareholders.9
To implement his scheme for taxing corporations and
corporate distributions, Addington provided in his Act that the
profits of corporations, fraternities, fellowships, companies or
societies were to be computed 'before any dividend shall have
been made thereof to any other person' and that all other
persons 'shall allow out of such dividends a proportionate
deduction in respect of the duty so charged'.' 0 In spite of its
obscurity, the wording of this section was repeated when the
income tax, which had been repealed after the Napoleonic
Wars, was revived by Peel in 1842.11 Also, with only slight re-
wording, it was re-enacted as General Rule 20 in the
consolidating Act of 1918.12 It remained the key provision in
the taxation of corporate distributions until the corporate tax
was reformed in 1965."
9. United Kingdom, Royal Commission on the Taxation of Profits and Income,
Final Report, Cmd. 9474 (London: HMSO, 1955), at 15, para. 50. See also
the following description by a group of members, including the well known
public finance scholar, A.C. Pigou, of the Royal Commission on the Income
Tax: 'The income tax is not a corporation tax. It is a tax upon the
incomes or profits of individuals and though for convenience it is assessed in
the first instance upon companies in which they hold interests the amount of
it is always adjusted to the income not of the corporation but of the
individual shareholders. It is true that when a company receives profits they
are taxed at the standard rate, but it is universally recognised that the
reason for this is not that the company as such is liable to income tax but
that it is impracticable to tax the separate profits at the rates to which the
separate shareholders to whom they ultimately belong are respectively liable.'
United Kingdom, Royal Commission on the Income Tax, Report, Cmd. 615
(London: HMSO, 1920), at 164.
10. Income Tax Act, 1803 (UK), 43 Geo. 3, c. 122, s.127.
11. Income Tax Act, 1842 (UK), 5 & 6 Vict. c. 35, s.54.
12. Income Tax Act, 1918 (UK), 8 & 9 Geo. 5, c. 40, Sched. E., s.20.
13. Farnsworth, in his thoroughly documented work establishing that Addington,
not Pitt, was the originator of the modern income tax, notes that 'Section
127 of the 1803 Act is an interesting example of the ease with which the
basic provisions of that Act have been able to be adapted to the complex
operations of modern industry and finance ... this simple rule of the 1803 act
has, in virtually unaltered language, been effective to deal with a type of
company then quite unknown'. See Farnsworth, supra note 7, at 119-20.
The provision gave very little clue as to how the law was to be
administered, and apparently two methods of declaring dividends developed.
Under one method, a dividend was declared to be payable with a 'deduction'
for the standard rate of tax. In England, the standard rate was a flat rate
that was fixed annually in the Finance A ct. The corporation withheld from
the gross dividend the tax appropriate to that amount. Thus, if the
corporation declared a 100 pounds dividend payable with tax deducted, and
the rate of standard tax was 30 per cent, the shareholder actually received
only 70 pounds. The corporation notionally retained 30 pounds to reimburse
it for the tax it had paid on the earnings from which the dividend was paid.
The shareholder included the total declared dividend in income, the
100 pounds, but then received a tax credit for the 30 pounds withheld at the
corporate level.
Instead of declaring a dividend to be payable with deduction of tax, a
corporation might declare the dividend to be 'free of tax'. In this case the
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Three details of the early United Kingdom taxation of
corporate distributions are significant. First, the rate of tax
that the corporation could withhold, and that the shareholder
received credit for, was not the rate in force when the
corporate-source income was earned, but the rate in force
when the dividend was paid.14 Second, the tax withheld at the
corporate level was refundable if shareholders did not pay tax
either because their incomes were too low or because they
were tax-exempt. Third, shareholders receiving a dividend
were credited with tax at the standard rate even though the
corporation might not have paid any tax on the earnings out of
which the dividend was paid. This could be the case if the
earnings were foreign-source income and were entitled to the
foreign tax credit or if the earnings were sheltered from tax at
the corporate level by a tax incentive measure.'5
So long as only one flat standard rate of tax was imposed on
both individuals and corporations, and dividends were exempt
from tax, there was no reason to treat closely-held corporations
shareholder was deemed to have received the actual dividend paid but then
had to 'gross it up' at the standard rate to arrive at the amount included in
income. Thus a dividend of 100 pounds 'free of tax' would be included in
total income at 143 pounds if the standard rate was 30 per cent (since that
amount, when reduced by the tax, would leave 100 pounds). The
shareholder would then receive a credit for the amount of tax withheld at
the corporate level.
The Royal Commission on the Income Tax considered in 1920 whether the
payment of dividends 'free of tax' should be made illegal. It was submitted
to them that this method of paying dividends was misleading, and because
the 'gross up' procedure required of shareholders was confusing it undoubtedly
lead to a loss of revenue. The Commission, however, concluded that such a
method of paying dividends should remain legal, in part because it obscured
the high rate of British tax paid by foreign shareholders. But they went on
to recommend that all dividend declarations should clearly state: (a) the
gross amount of distribution, (b) the income tax applicable therefor and (c
the net amount payable by the company to the shareholder. (The Royal
Commission on the Income Tax, supra note 9, at 39.) This recommendation
was implemented by the Finance Act, 1924 (UK), 14 & 15 Geo. 5, c. 21,
s.33.
14. Although this was always the practice, it was given statutory sanction in
1927, see Financial Secretary to the Treasury, Income Tax Codification
Committee, Report, supra note 8, at 64.
15. However, this procedure was complicated by what was called 'the net United
Kingdom rate' arrangements. Under these arrangements, if a corporation
paid the United Kingdom tax at below the standard rate because of the
foreign tax credit, shareholders who paid tax at the standard rate received
credit for the full rate. However, tax-exempt and low-income shareholders
only received repayment for the amount of United Kingdom tax actually
paid.
When England was considering adopting an imputation system in 1971, after
adopting the classical tax system in 1965, one of the main reasons they did
not simply return to the pre-1965 system was because of the unsatisfactory
and complex resolution of the problems that arose when the corporation had
not paid tax at the full standard rate on its earnings. See United Kingdom,
Chancellor of the Exchequer, Reform of the Corporation Tax, Cmnd. 4630
(London: HMSO, 1971), at 2, paras 5 and 6; United Kingdom, Board of
Inland Revenue, 'The Choice Between Alternative Systems' in United
Kingdom, Select Committee on Corporation Tax, Report, HC 622 (London:
HMSO, 1971), at 2-3. For a summary of the pre-1965 position, see
Australian Treasury Dept., Company Income Tax Systems (Treasury Taxation
Paper No. 9) (Canberra: AGPS, 1974), App. C., at 43-4.
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any different than other corporations. All corporations were
taxed, in effect, like partnerships. Low-income taxpayers who
did not pay tax at the standard rate were disadvantaged by
incorporating because they had to pay tax at the corporate
level and then apply for a refund when the income was
distributed. However, because few low-income individuals
would be likely to carry on an incorporated business, and these
individuals would be likely to form a vocal interest group, this
presumably was never felt to be a pressing problem.
In 1910 the United Kingdom's income tax system
underwent its most dramatic change: a Super-tax was imposed
on individuals with high incomes." Corporations, however,
continued to be taxed at the flat standard rate. The adoption
of a graduated individual tax did not increase the pressure for
concessionary treatment for closely-held corporations. Indeed,it had precisely the opposite effect. Although the Act was not
explicit on this point, the courts soon held that dividends had
to be included in a shareholder's income for purposes of the
Super-tax.' 7  To avoid the Super-tax, high-income shareholders
thus had an inducement to earn and retain profits in
corporations. Consequently, pressure to treat corporations as
partnerships, in order to tax retained corporate earnings at
individual Super-tax rates, came from revenue officials. Rules
for 'close corporations', which imposed an extra tax on excess
retentions and attributed certain earnings directly to
shareholders, were introduced in 1922.18
The United Kingdom corporate income tax rate was levied
at the standard individual income tax rate until 1965. Since
dividends were excluded from tax at the standard rate, the
corporate income tax was completely integrated with the
individual tax during this period. However, beginning in
1915, and for most subsequent years, in addition to the income
tax a separate profits tax was levied on corporate income."
16. Finance (1909-10) Act, 1910 (UK), 10 Edw. 7., c. 8, s.66. For a brief
description of the political considerations leading up to the introduction of
graduation see B.E.V. Sabine, A History of Income Tax (London: George
Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1966), chap. 8; for the definitive treatment see F.
Shehab, Progressive Taxation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1953).
17. If the dividend was declared free of income tax, the shareholder had to
include in income not only the dividend received but had to gross it up to
also include in the income the income tax paid at the corporate level. For a
discussion of the series of cases that dealt with the various issues that arose
out of the need to reconcile the Super-tax with the treatment of dividends
see, Financial Secretary to the Treasury, Income Tax Codification Committee,
Report, supra note 8, at 63-9 and Reamonn, supra note 7, at 43-6.
18. Finance Act, 19tt (UK), 12 & 13 Geo. 5., c. 17, s.21.
19. The following is a brief summary of these taxes: (1) From 1915 to 1920 an
excess profits tax of 50 per cent was imposed on all business profits to help
finance the war. See Sabine, supra note 16, at 152. (2) From 1920 to 1924
a profits tax of five per cent was imposed only on corporations in order to
attempt to capture some of the expected post-war boom period profits, but
was justified in part on the grounds of the advantages that incorporation
bestowed on companies and the fact that corporations, unlike unincorporated
businesses, were not liable to surtax. See Sabine, supra note 16, at 162, 166;
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During most of the periods in which these profits taxes were
imposed, corporations were thus paying tax at rates in excess
of the standard individual rate, and since the profits taxes
were not credited to shareholders when dividends were paid,
there was an element of 'double tax' on corporate-source
income. But, in spite of the imposition of a corporate profits
tax, until 1955 there appears to have been little or no pressure
to change the basic scheme for taxing corporations, and in
particular, little pressure to allow closely-held corporations to
be taxed as partnerships, or to provide a special low rate of tax
for small businesses.20  In large part this was no doubt due to
the fact that since the surtax did not apply to corporations, and
since the various profits taxes were for most periods quite low,
often applied to both incorporated and unincorporated
businesses and frequently contained a large exemption,' most
see also Chancellor of the Exchequer, Corporation Taz, (mnd. 8456 (London:
HMSO, 1982), at 124. (3) From 1924 until 1937 corporations only paid
income tax at the standard rate. (4) From 1937 until 1946 the National
Defence Contribution, which was in effect a profits tax, was imposed at a
rate of five per cent. It was imposed on all businesses whether or not
incorporated. As its name implies its purpose was to finance the rearmament
programme. See Sabine, supra note 16, at 192. (5) From 1939 until 1946
an excess profits tax was imposed on all business profits at a rate of 60 per
cent. (6) From 1946 until 1965 a profits tax was imposed on corporations.
From 1946 until 1958 this tax was imposed at a differential rate. In order
to restrain inflation and to encourage productive investment in the form of
ploughed-back profits, undistributed profits were taxed at a much lower rate
than distributed profits. In 1946 distributed profits were taxed at a rate of
12.5 per cent while undistributed profits were only taxed at a rate of five per
cent. By 1955 these rates were 30 and three per cent respectively. In 1958,
following the recommendations of the 1955 Royal Commission on Profits and
Income, the differential rate was abolished and a flat rate, 10 per cent profits
tax was imposed. For a description of this profits tax and its rationale see
the Royal Commission on the Taxation of Profits and Income, Final Report,
supra note 9, chap. 20. For a summary of the objectives of the 1958
changes and the empirical evidence of its effects see Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development, Company Taz Systems (Paris:
OECD, 1973), at 73-87. A short history of the various profits taxes is
given in Reamonn, supra note 7, at 41-3 and United Kingdom, Chancellor of
the Exchequer, Corporation Taz, supra note 19, at 124.
20. The Royal Commission on the Income Tax, Report, supra note 9, had almost
nothing to say about that taxation of corporations. In 1927 the Committee
on National Debt and Taxation, Report, Cmd. 2800 (London: HMSO, 1927),
at 154-5, in discussing generally the effect of taxation on incentives to take
risks and investment, noted the important difference between a private joint
stock company which 'is virtually a partnership with limited liability' and a
public company. However, it did not recommend any specific tax changes in
recognition of this difference in economic function. Indeed, one of the first
discussions I found of the need for a lower rate of tax for small business was
contained in an article written in 1954. The author argued that since a high
rate of tax disadvantages small more than large companies because of the
necessity for small companies to rely on retained earnings for expansion, there
should be a lower rate of tax for small corporations. D. Walker, 'Some
Economic Aspects of the Taxation of Companies' (1954) 22 The Manchester
School 1.
21. For example, in 1955, profits of 2000 pounds or less were exempt from the
profits tax, which meant that most small firms did not pay the tax. See
Royal Commission on the Taxation of Profits and Income, Final Report,
supra note 9, at 165, para. 556.
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business people were better off tax-wise if they incorporated. 2
Moreover, the various profits taxes could usually be avoided
by paying salaries to owner-employees.
The first careful scrutiny of the corporate tax was made in
1955 by the Royal Commission on the Taxation of Profits and
Income. 3 However, the only significant alternative to the then
existing system that the Commission considered was merging
the corporate income and profits taxes into a single tax and
then providing a dividend tax credit to shareholders equal to
the standard rate of tax or the actual tax paid by the
corporation, whichever was lesser.24 They ultimately rejected
this scheme on the grounds that it would be too complicated.
The only changes the Commission recommended in the
corporate tax system were that the profits tax should be levied
at a single rate (beginning in 1946 undistributed profits were
taxed at a much lower rate than distributed profits) and that
the £2000 exemption from the profits tax should be repealed.
With respect to this latter recommendation, the Commission
stated simply that they could see no case for retention of the
exemption (which in effect established a dual rate of tax for
the profits tax) and that doing away with it would remove the
incentive for owners of a single business to establish a number
of separate companies so that each could benefit from it.27
However, in recommending the elimination of the exemption
they dealt briefly with two arguments that apparently were
frequently made for its retention, and that were subsequently
to be made as justifying both a low rate of profits income tax
and a partnership election for small businesses. First,
proponents had argued that a lower rate of tax should be
imposed on small businesses since 'financial institutions
consider the small company a bad credit risk' and therefore it
is 'forced to rely on its own profits to expand its fixed and
working capital'. The Commission gave what has become the
standard policy response to this argument; namely, that even if
this were true 'a blunt tax relief of this kind would help the
small and static business as much as the small expanding one
and ... [there is] no reason, even on economic grounds, why the
small static business should not be subjected to the same tax
system as the large companies'.
22. See D.A. Chaffey, 'Tax-Saving Remuneration to Directors' 19631 British Tax
Review 156; and P. Bird, 'The Incorporation of Small Businesses: Effects of
the Finance Act, 1965' 11965 British Tax Review 393 (over a wide range of
income small businesses are sh own to pay less tax if they were incorporated).
23. Supra note 9, at 13-18 and chap. 20. For a summary and commentary see
A.R. Ilersic, 'The Royal Commissions' Views on Corporate Taxation' (1955) 3
Canadian Tax Journal 347.
24. Supra note 9, at 161, para. 545.
25. Id., at 161, para. 546.
26. Id., at 164-6. For a brief description of the profits tax see supra note 19.
27. Id., at 165, para. 557.
28. Id., at 166, para. 558.
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Second, supporters of the exemption had argued that since
smaller companies were more nearly akin to partnerships than
to public companies, and since individual partners did not pay
surtax on profits under £2000, small companies should not pay
profits tax on such amounts. In responding to this argument,
the Commission observed that 'the individual or the
partnership assumes corporate status voluntarily, presumably
because there are practical advantages in doing so, and as we
have said elsewhere, it is over-simplifying the picture to
equate profits tax and surtax'.2 9  Although I will deal with the
arguments for partnership treatment later it might be noted
here that these arguments by the Commission were
disingenuous. It is never an answer to tax equity and
neutrality concerns that the taxpayer voluntarily assumes a
course of action that results in higher taxes. And while it is
true that the Commission had earlier stated that the profits tax
could not be equated to the surtax, it was to make a point
precisely opposite to the implicit point being made here. Their
previous position was that the profits tax was an inadequate
counterpart for the surtax.o
1965 TO 1972: THE CLASSICAL SYSTEM
No change was made to the corporate income tax for over ten
years. But then, in 1965, the United Kingdom departed
radically from over 150 years of tradition and adopted a
'classical's corporate tax system. The introduction of a
separate corporate tax by the newly elected Labour government
came as no surprise. Nicholas Kaldor, a well-known economist
with close ties to the Labour Party, had urged adoption of a
separate corporate tax in his Memorandum of Dissent to the
Final Report of the Royal Commission on the Taxation."
Kaldor became a special advisor to the Chancellor when
Labour formed the government in 1964. The corporate tax
that was enacted in 1965 did not differ appreciably from the
one he had recommended in his Memorandum of Dissent."
29. Id., at 166, para. 559.
30. Id., at 16, para. 53.
31. See A.R. Prest, 'The Select Committee on Corporation Tax', [1972] British
Tax Review 15, at 16, n.2 where he protests this 'highly idiosyncratic use of
language, given the very different system of taxing companies which operated
in the UK long before other countries adopted any form of corporate income
taxation'.
32. G. Woodcock, H.L. Bullock, and N. Kaldor, 'Memorandum of Dissent' in
United Kingdom, Royal Commission on the Taxation of Profits and Income,
Final Report, eupra note 9, at 354-424.
33. See N. Kaldor, Reports on Taxation, vol. 1 (London: Duckworth, 1980), at
xi-xii. Kaldor later wrote a long memorandum defending the 'classical
system' which he submitted to the Select Committee on the Corporation Tax
that was appointed by the Conservative government in 1971 to consider
which form of corporation and shareholder tax integration the UK should
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But not only had the Labour Party been committed to
introducing a separate corporate tax, but the Conservative
government itself was studying a similar reform of the
corporate tax system in the early 1960s."
The Labour government reformed the corporate tax for the
following reasons:ss First, considerable simplification could be
achieved by integrating the corporate profits and income tax
into a single income tax. Second, there was a strong feeling
that a reform was needed to correct the perceived anomaly that
with increasingly generous investment allowances, and
therefore a widening divergence between corporate profits
reported for tax purposes and commercial profits, more
shareholders were receiving credit for the standard rate on
dividends even thouPh the corporation had not paid tax at this
rate on its earnings.8 Third, and most importantly, the Labour
government adopted the particular reform that they did, a
separate corporate tax system, because they wanted the system
to favour retentions over dividends in order to promote savings
and investment." The retention of corporate profits would be
favoured not only by increasing the tax on dividend
distributions (by no longer offering a credit at the standard
adopt. See United Kingdom, Select Committee on Corporation Tax, Report,
espra note 15, at 248.
34. See Sabine, supra note 16, at 239-40.
35. Id., at 242-3. See Reamonn, supra note 7 at 172-8, 235-43 for a review
of the debate, both in the press and Parliament. For an article giving the
economic justifications for the tax see the Right Honourable James Callaghan,
M.P., Chancellor of the Exchequer, 'The New United Kingdom Tax Structure
in Relation to the Needs of the Economy' (1965) 5 European Taxation 212.
36. In 1963 the Comptroller and Auditor General examined the financial records
of a number of large companies and estimated that the amount of revenue
lost because corporations could deduct tax at the standard rate from
dividends paid out of its profits, even though the corporation might not have
paid tax at that rate on its profits, was substantial. See United Kingdom,
Comptroller and Auditor General, Civil Appropriations Accounts, Classes i-v,
1962-3 (London: HMSO, 1963), at x. A year later the Committee of Public
Accounts also commented unfavourably on this aspect of the UK corporate
tax system. See United Kingdom, Committee on Public Accounts, Fourth
Report, Sessions 1963-64 (London: HMSO, 1964), at 4-6. As a matter of
interest, the Committee's analysis of this problem - the treatment of
corporate tax preferences in an integrated system - can only be described as
rudimentary. For example, in disapproving of the practice, the Committee
simply stated: 'The Treasury stated that they regarded this anomaly as an
incidental consequence of the investment allowance system, which was
considered to be an important instrument of economic policy. Your
Committee cannot, however, agree that this judgement either justifies or
disposes of a loss to the Revenue which cannot apparently be quantified but
is clearly substantial. They consider it their duty to draw the attention of
Parliament to the situation that exists under the law as it now stands,
including the risk that tax avoidance may develop and the prospect that,
with the further encouragement of industrial development by means of
investment allowances these repayments are likely to increase both in area
and in scale'. (Id., at 6.) Compare this analysis to C.F. McLure, Jr., Must
Corporate Income Be Taxed Twice? (Washington DC: The Brookings
Institute, 1979), chap. 4.
37. In Mr Callaghan's words the classical system would provide 'a strong
incentive to all companies to plough back more of their profits for expansion'.
United Kingdom, House of Commons Debates, 6 April 1965, at col. 255.
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rate) but also by lowering the tax on retentions. Even though
the change was revenue neutral, under the pre-1965 system the
combined income and profits tax rate on corporations was
56.25 per cent, the corporate tax rate under the new system
was only 40 per cent.
No special concessions for small business were made when
the classical system of corporate tax was adopted. This was
one of the criticisms of the new system. For example, a
prominent economist, Prest, suggested that as 'insurance against
some of the more serious possible consequences of the new
system' small companies should be given the option of being
taxed as if they were partnerships.38 However, the government
did not seem to feel the need for relief for small businesses,
nor did the political pressure appear to be too strong.
Generally, the criticism of the 1965 Budget changes from the
point of view of small businesses were directed more at the
changes related to 'close companies' (the rules taxing the excess
accumulated earnings of small corporations) than the switch to
the classical corporate tax system. Perhaps the need for relief
was not felt to be great since the corporate tax rate (40 per
cent) was in fact less than the individual standard rate (42.5
per cent). If the corporation reinvested its earnings, the tax
position of small corporations was better, in most cases,
relative to the tax position of unincorporated businesses than
under the pre-1965 system." If the corporation distributed its
earnings then there would be double tax and the effective rate
would be much higher than the standard rate. However,
generally it is the small business that is reinvesting its earnings
that has the strongest claim, and is able to generate the most
political sympathy, for tax relief.
1972 TO 1986: DIVIDEND RELIEF AND THE LOWER
RATE OF TAX
The classical tax system was unacceptable to the Conservative
government that was elected in June 1970. In his 1971 budget
speech, the Chancellor of the Exchequer announced the
government's intention to reform the structure of taxation so as
to remove the discrimination against corporate distributions.
38. A.R. Prest, 'The Capital Gains Tax and the Corporation Tax', (London:
Department of Economics and Business Studies Woolwich Polytechnic, 1967),
at 17. Prest continues to argue for partnership treatment for closely-held
corporations, see A.R. Prest, Public Finance in Theory and Practice, 5th ed.
(London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1975), at 372-3, 375.
39. See Bird, esupra note 22.
40. In 1972 the Conservative government wished to stimulate the development of
capital markets and to encourage corporations to raise money by issuing new
shares rather than by way of self-financing. See Chancellor of the
Exchequer, Reform of the Corporation Tax, supra note 15, at 7, para. 1. In
both 1965 and 1972 the United Kingdom tax system was changed largely to
alter the relative tax burden on dividends and retentions. There has been,
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The government issued a Green Paper 4 1 in which it set out two
alternative bases for removing such discrimination, the 'split
rate' system42 and the 'imputation' system.43  The government
eventually adopted the imputation system," even though this
was not their initial preference. However, what is more
interesting for the purposes of this paper is the treatment of
small business in the ensuing debate. The government, neither
in its announcement of the proposed corporate tax changes, nor
in the Green Paper, made any mention of special treatment for
small businesses under the new regime. However, the tax
treatment of small businesses arose frequently throughout the
hearings of the Select Committee of the House of Commons to
which the Green Paper was referred. In particular, what
appeared to concern witnesses who addressed this issue was
that if, as suggested in the Green Paper, the corporate rate was
to be raised from 40 to 50 per cent, and then reduced to 20
per cent on distributed profits, small companies that needed to
retain their earnings for expansion would be considerably
disadvantaged. Two alternatives were put forth to deal with
this problem: either small businesses should be taxed at a lower
rate of tax on their retained earnings or they should be given
the option of being taxed like a partnership.
The Inland Revenue agreed that under the new system small
companies that needed to retain their earnings for expansion
would be considerably disadvantaged. They summarised the
argument made by a number of witnesses: 'This is a problem
which affects small companies, whether close or not, but
particularly those which have no ready access to the capital
market. These companies have to plough back their profits for
expansion and as a result they are likely to be relatively low
distributors and so to benefit less than some other companies
not unexpectedly, an on-going debate in the United Kingdom over whether
tax discrimination against undistributed profits helps investment. For a
summary of some of the studies see OECD, supra note 19.
41. Reform of the Corporation Taz, supra note 15.
42. Under this system, distributed profits would be liable to corporation tax at a
lower rate than undistributed profits.
43. Under this system, all corporate profits would be subject to the same rate of
tax, but part of the tax on the distributed profits would be available to be
set as a credit against the shareholder's own tax liability.
44. Finance Act, 1972 (UK), 1972, e. 41.
45. See, for example, the following memoranda by J.F. Chown, published in the
Select Committee on Corporation Tax, Report, espra note 15, at 76, para. 7,
('An increase in the rate of corporation tax on undistributed profits from 40
per cent to 50 per cent could adversely affect the smaller close company.
Consideration should be given either to a reduced rate on (say the first
10,000 pounds of profits) or an option for a smaller company to be taxed as
a partnership. The United States has both.') by the Unquoted Companies
Group, App. 20, at 229; by the National Federation of Building Trades
Employers and Federation of Civil Engineering Contractors Joint Working
Party, App. 23, at 278-81 (suggesting the possibility of the partnership
election on a lower rate of tax for small companies); by the Confederation of
British Industry, App. 23, at 286 (arguin that all unquoted companies
should be taxed at 40 instead of 50 per cent).
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from the distribution relief which will be available under the
new system'." They noted, however, the following objections
to the two rate system: (1) It would require complicated rules
to prevent corporations from splitting into several small
companies. (2) The lower rate would advantage large
companies as well as small companies in a year in which their
profits were low or they had qualified for substantial capital
allowances. (3) It would assist not only small expanding firms
but also small static firms. The Inland Revenue was also
unsympathetic to the need for a partnership election. In
particular they argued that complex rules were not needed to
provide such election since close companies could effectively
achieve the same result by paying out large director's
48remuneration.
In spite of the reservations of Inland Revenue, the Select
Committee concluded that there was a strong case for
providing some special relief to small businesses when the new
imputation system was introduced but that, '[t]his is a political
problem and a political answer will have to be found for it'."
In addition to an inquiry into the corporate tax, in 1971 the
government also established a Committee to inquire specifically
into the problems of small firms. The Committee (Bolton
Committee),o whose recommendations were intended to
provide a basis for future government policy with regard to
small firms, devoted a central position among its
recommendations to issues relating to taxation.51 Among other
things, it recommended that members of all close companies be
allowed to elect, by unanimous decision of the shareholders, to
be taxed as partnerships. The Committee gave two reasons
for this recommendation. First, they reasoned that provisions
for such an election followed from the premise that the choice
of business status should not be determined by tax
consequences. Secondly, and more significantly, they reasoned
that a partnership election should be available so that losses
realised by a company could be offset against the shareholder's
personal income. In particular, they noted that this would
assist in attracting private capital to the small business sector.53
46. The Board of Inland Revenue, 'The Choice Between Alternative Systems',
supra note 15, at 8, para. 17.
47. Ibid.
48. See Select Committee on Corporate Tax, Report, supra note 15, at 180,Questions 733-5.
49. Id., at xix-xx, para. 41.
50. United Kingdom, Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, the Committee
of Inquiry on Small Firms, Small Firms (Chairman: J.E. Bolton), Cmnd. 4811
(London: HMSO, 1971).
51. For a review see M.A. Pickering, 'Tax and the Small Firm' I1972] British
Tax Review 163.
52. See Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, Small Firms, supra note 50,
at 220, para. 13.58.
53. Id., at 219, para. 13.58.
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Inland Revenue apparently made its usual objection to the
partnership election; namely, that it could be achieved without
any complication simply by paying out all the company profits
as director's remuneration. However, this point does not deal
with the ability to deduct losses from the shareholder's income.
Also, as pointed out by a commentator, an explicit partnership
election simply carries to its logical conclusion the policy
implemented by the removal of the restrictions upon the
payment of directors' remunerations."
In response to concerns expressed by both the Select
Committee on Corporate Tax and the Bolton Committee, when
the government introduced its new tax system it proposed a
special 'small companies rate'. In a White Paper issued when
the legislation was introduced the government explained the
case for this special rate as follows:
The Select Committee drew attention to the problems of
small companies which because of their size found it more
difficult to raise capital than larger companies, and
therefore required to retain more of their profits. Such
companies, they pointed out, benefit less from the reduction
in the rate of tax on distributed profits than they would
lose, on paying the higher rate of tax on their retentions.
The government have decided therefore that small
companies will be charged to corporation tax on their
income at a lower rate.""
Under the proposed legislation, companies with taxable
profits in the year of up to £15 000 paid tax on retained
earnings at 40 per cent instead of 50 per cent. However, the
benefit of the lower rate was to be taxed back when the
profits of the business exceeded £15 000. The tapering
provision applied to corporations with profits between f15 000
to £25 000 so that companies with profits over f25 000 derived
no benefit from the low rate of tax."
Providing the low rate of tax for small firms seemed to
diminish any urgent need to amend the tax system further to
deal with closely-held corporations. However, in 1981, in a
consultative document on 'A New Form of Incorporation for
Small Firms', the possibility of a partnership election for tax
purposes for any new form of corporate entity specially
adapted to the small family firm was raised, although not
54. See Pickering, supra note 51, at 169.
55. Finance Act, 1972 (UK), s.95. See Chancellor of the Exchequer, Reform of
Corporation Taz, supra note 15, at 9, para. 26. For the debate in the
House of Commons, see United Kingdom, House of Commons Debates, 26
June 1972, at cols. 1487-1503.
56. For an explanation see J. Chown, 'Small Companies' [19731 British Tax
Review 194.
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discussed in detail. 7  The suggestion was approved by two
commentators."
The government did not review the problem of corporate
tax again in a comprehensive way until 1982. In that year,
largely in response to a series of liquidity crises in United
Kingdom industry during the 1970s," and the economic
distortions caused by the corporate tax, particularly in a period
of inflation, the government released a Green Paper on
corporation tax.60 It dealt primarily with the economic effects
of corporate tax concessions, the effects of inflation on the
corporate tax base, and possible alternative tax bases, and not
with the structural problems of corporate distributions.
However, it did examine briefly the small companies rate of
corporation tax.61 In particular, it defended the then existing
system both against those who argued that the phase-out
provision should be repealed and those who argued that the
lower rate should be made more generous.
At the time of the Green Paper, in 1982, corporations with
earnings under £80 000 paid tax at a low rate of 40 per cent.
If their earnings were greater than £80 000 they paid tax at a
rate of 52 per cent on the excess. To withdraw the benefit of
the small companies relief from larger corporations,
corporations earning between £80 000 and E200 000 paid an
additional rate of tax which brought their marginal tax rate up
to 60 per cent. The main criticism of the United Kingdom
phase-out provision is that it imposes a relatively high
marginal rate of tax as relief is withdrawn over the phase-out
band of corporate income. It is sometimes argued that this is a
disincentive for companies to increase pretax profits within the
phase-out band and an incentive for them to increase directors'
remuneration or to undertake wasteful or unnecessary
expenditures if they are within that band. However, the
authors of the Green Paper argued that a vanishing relief
provision is the most cost-effective way of providing relief to
small businesses. They noted that if the first slice of the
income of all corporations qualified for the lower rate, the
57. United Kingdom, Secretary of State for Trade, A New Form of Incorporation
for Small Firms, Cmnd. 8172 (London: HMSO, 1981), at 20, para. 5.2; at
35-6, para 33; and Annex C: 'Taxation'.
58. See J Chown, 'The future of Corporation Tax' t1981] British Tax Review 30
at 40; R. White, 'The Changing Face of Taxation - Corporate Tax' 119811
British Tax Review 349, at 350- R White, 'The Green Paper on Corporation
Tax - An Initial Review' [1982 British Tax Review 79, at 81.
59. See J.A. King and M.A. King, The British Tax System, 3rd ed. (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1983), at 162.
60. Chancellor of the Exchequer, Corporation Tax, supra note 19. See Generally,
M.T. Summer, 'The Reform of Corporation Tax: An Economic Perspective on
the Green Paper' 119821 British Tax Review 292; 'Symposium on Corporation
Tax' (1982) 3 Fiscal Studies 102.
61. Chancellor of the Exchequer, Corporation Tax, supra note 19, chap. 16.
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lower rate would have to apply to a smaller slice of income or
the corporate tax rate generally would have to be increased.
Some commentators had suggested that the relief to small
businesses should be made more generous by making the
corporate tax rates even more progressive. The government
rejected this suggestion for a number of reasons: (a) the
problem of associated corporations would become more
important, (b) the revenue loss would have to be made up by
raising rates on larger corporations, and (c) the increased
disparity between the rates of company and personal taxes
would lead to more avoidance activities.
In response to the Green Paper, in 1984 the United
Kingdom embarked on a program of base broadening and rate
reduction for corporations.62 The main rate of corporate tax is
being progressively reduced from 50 to 35 per cent by the
financial year 1986.63 For the transitional period, the small
companies rate is fixed at 30 per cent for the first f100 000 of
income." The tapering provision will be applied to profits
between £100 000 and £500 000.
Some commentators have suggested that once the main rate
of corporation tax reaches 35 per cent it is unlikely that the
small companies rate will be retained. * However, since the
imputation credit compensates for corporate tax of 30 per cent,
the effect of reducing the small business rate to 30 per cent is
that there is no effective corporation tax on the distributed
profits of small businesses. Thus the tax system has been
transformed for such corporations from a partial imputation
system to a full imputation system. This might be a position
that the United Kingdom government would like to retain.
United States
The United States Internal Revenue Code provides both a
partnership election for closely-held corporations and a lower
rate of corporate tax. The partnership election was adopted in
1958. In 1982 the election was significantly liberalised and
now over 20 per cent of the tax-filing corporations take the
election. As a result of the recent tax reform efforts in the
United States the top individual rate will fall below the
corporate tax rate. Because of this, commentators are
predicting even more extensive use of the partnership election.
62. See generally, J. Chown, 'The 1984 Budget, the Finance Bill and Corporate
Finance' 1984) 5 Fiscal Studies 73; J. Edwards. 'The 1984 Corporation Tax
Reform' (1984) 5 Fiscal Studies 30; M. Gammie, 'Has Nigel Lawson Really
Reformed Business Taxation' (1984) 5 Fiscal Studies 82.
63. Finance Act, 1984 (UK), s.18(1).
64. Id., s.20(1).
65. See R. Bramwell, T. Ivory and G. Brannan, Tazation of Companies and
Company Reconstructions, 3rd ed. (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1985), at 7.
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A graduated corporate tax structure was introduced in 1936
as part of a package of tax changes initiated by President
Roosevelt to attack concentrations of corporate wealth. The
graduation in the corporate tax rates was substantially
increased in 1975 for the express purpose of assisting small
business. A number of the recent base broadening, rate
reduction tax reform proposals have recommended that a single
low rate of tax be imposed on corporations. However, the
recently enacted Tax Reform Act has retained the graduated
rate structure for corporations.
1913-1936: THE INTEGRATED SYSTEM
In the first United States income tax, which was imposed
during the Civil War and expired in 1872, all mercantile and
industrial corporations were taxed in the same manner as
partnerships. The Act provided that 'gains and profits of all
companies' were to be the income of 'any person, entitled to
the same, whether divided or otherwise . In 1894, when
Congress re-imposed the income tax, both corporations and
individuals were taxed at a rate of two per cent. Integration
was achieved by excluding dividends from income. This tax
was short-lived. In the year following its enactment, in the
infamous case of Pollock v. Farmers Loan and Trust
Company," the Supreme Court found that income tax was a
'direct tax'. They therefore held it to be invalid because it was
not apportioned to the states according to representation, as
required by the Constitution.
In 1909, anxious to re-enter the income tax field, Congress
imposed a one per cent 'excise' tax on corporate net income.
By enacting the tax in the form of an excise tax, Congress
hoped to avoid the constitutional infirmity of an income tax.68
Four years later, after the ratification of the Sixteenth
Amendment to the Constitution," Congress passed the modern
66. A flat rate tax was imposed upon financial and public utility corporations,
however, shareholders received a credit for the tax withheld by the
corporation. For a description of the early United States tax acts see W.A.
Sutherland, 'A Brief Description of Federal Taxes on Corporations since 1861'
(1940) 7 Law and Contemporary Problems 266, at 266-8, 275; E.R.A.
Seligman, The Income Tax (New York: MacMillan, 1921), at 515; K.K.
Keenan, Income Taxation: Methods and Results in Various Countries
(Milwaukee: Burdich & Allen, 1910), chap. 12; and, J.S. Seidman Seidman's
Legislative History of the Federal Income Tax Laws, 1861-1938 (New York:
Prentice-Hall, 1938).
67. (1895) 157 US 429; (1895) 148 US 601.
68. This tax was held constitutional in Flint v. Stone Tracy Company (1910) 220
US 107 on the grounds that it was not a direct tax but an excise tax on
the privilege of doing business in a corporate capacity. Generally on the tax
see Keenan, supra note 66, chap. 13.
69. See US Constitution, amend. XVI., adopted February 25, 1913, giving
Congress the power to 'collect taxes on incomes from whatever source
derived, without apportionment among the several states, and without regard
to any census and enumeration'.
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income tax. A one per cent 'normal' tax was imposed on both
corporations and individuals. In addition a surtax was imposed
on personal income ranging from one per cent on income
between $20 000 and $25 000, to six per cent on income above
$500 000. The 'double' taxation of corporate distributions was
prevented by providing that dividends were excluded from
income subject to the normal one per cent personal rate, but
not from income subject to the surtax rates. Thus, in effect,
corporate-source income bore the normal individual tax rate
when it was earned by the corporation and the individual
surtax rate when it was distributed.
The scheme adopted during the Civil War, of taxing
individual shareholders on their pro rata share of the net
income of corporations, seems not to have been considered
when the income tax was re-imposed in 1913, even though,
unlike the income tax passed in 1893, the individual rates
exceeded the corporate tax rate. A number of factors might
explain this: First, the precedent for imposing a separate tax on
corporations had been established in 1909. Second, the 1913
income tax appears to have been modelled on English law,
under which the income tax was imposed at the corporate
level. Third, by 1913, because corporations had become so
common and their financial structures so diffuse, perhaps the
administrative difficulties of taxing individual shareholders on
their pro rata share of accumulating corporate income seemed
self-evidently insurmountable. Finally, perhaps there was a
concern that an attempt to tax shareholders on income that
they had not received would be unconstitutional. 0  Although
the reasons for not adopting partnership treatment seem
reasonably obvious, it is less clear whether Congress intended
to impose a separate tax on corporations or only to use the
corporation as a convenient vehicle for collectin. at source the
tax on an individual's corporate-source income. As initially
70. The partnership method of taxing corporations under the Civil War income
tax was held Constitutional in Collector v. Hubbard (1870) 12 Wall. (US) 1.
However, in spite of this, there was some concern that the decision would
not be followed. For an exchange of views see T.R. Powell, 'The Stock
Dividend Decision and the Corporate Nonentity' (1920) 5 Bulletin of the
National Tax Association 201 (arguing that the decision could stand in spite
of aspersions cast upon it by Mr. Justice Pitney's opinion in Eisner v.
Macomber (1920) 252 US 189, 217-19, with A. Ballentine, 'Corporate
Personality in Income Taxation' (1921) 34 Harvard Law Review 573, at 586
('the method sustained by the court in the Hubbard case would not be
sustained today, at least in the case of large and active business corporations
employing large capital').
71. The 1909 Act might appear to be premised on assumption that the
corporation should be a separate taxpaying entity. However, it has been
explained on the grounds that it was the only constitutional way, before the
16th amendment, that the US federal government could impose what was in
effect an income tax. See Committee of the National Tax Association on
Federal Taxation of Corporations, 'Preliminary Report' (Chairperson: R.M.
Haig) in National Tax Association Proceedings of the Thirty First Annual
Conference on Taxation (Columbia: National Tax Association, 1939) 547, at
576 [hereinafter 'Preliminary Report'].
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enacted in 1913, the corporate tax operated almost as a perfect
withholding tax." The corporate tax was one per cent and
when it was distributed it was exempt from the one per cent
normal tax rate. However, this near perfect scheme of
integration was short-lived. During World War I two
additional taxes were imposed on corporations: a capital stock
tax and an excess profits tax. Neither of these were creditable
when dividends were paid to individuals. Then, more
significantly, for a period in 1917 a special four per cent tax
was imposed on retained corporate earnings. Moreover, after
1919 the corporate tax rate always exceeded the individual
normal tax rate available for dividend credit. By 1936, for
example, (when the dividend credit was repealed) the corporate
rate was 13.75 per cent, while the normal individual rate was
eight per cent.
Since corporate tax rates throughout this period were
considerably less than the individual supertax marginal rates of
taxation, most incorporated small businesses were not
disadvantaged compared to unincorporated businesses. There
appears to have been little discussion of the need for allowing
small corporate firms to be taxed as partnerships or of
providing a low rate of tax for closely-held corporations.
Indeed, in the early 1920s the expressed concern about the
need to equalise the tax burden on unincorporated and
incorporated firms sprang from just the opposite concern: the
tax advantage of incorporated over unincorporated firms. This
concern, over the unfair competitive advantage enjoyed by
incorporated firms, was usually expressed along with a more
general concern about retained corporate earnings escaping the
individual surtax rates. The method most frequently urged for
equalising the tax on corporations and unincorporated
businesses was the imposition of a general undistributed profits
74tax on corporations.
By the mid-1930s, however, the corporate tax rate was
considerably greater than the normal individual tax rate
(although still much lower than the high individual surtax
rates). Therefore, there was some pressure to provide relief
72. It was not a perfect withholding tax since it was not refundable to low-
income shareholders who were not subject to the normal tax, and, unlike the
British income tax, the tax collected at the corporate level was not included
in the shareholder's income for surtax purposes (in this respect there was
what might be described as over-integration).
73. For a chart comparing the rates of tax on corporations and the normal rates
on individuals available for dividend credit for the period 1913-36 see
'Preliminary Report' supra note 71, at 587.
74. See T.S. Adams, 'Federal Taxes U on Income and Excess Profits' (1918) 8
American Economic Review (Supp. 25; 'Immediate Future of the Excess-
Profits Tax' (1920) 10 American eview (Supp.) 15; 'Fundamental Problems
of Federal Income Taxation' (1921) 35 Quarterly Journal of Economics 527.
See also F.R. Fairchild, 'Suggestions for Revision of the Federal Taxation of
Income and Profits' (1920) 10 American Economic Review 789 and 'Federal
Taxation of Income and Profits' (1921) 11 American Economic Review 158.
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for small business. In 1935, Roosevelt proposed, and Congress
enacted, a graduated corporate profits tax to replace the flat
rate corporate profits tax. The flat rate was replaced with
rates graduated from eight per cent on net income below
$2000, through three brackets to a maximum rate of 15 per
cent on the excess over $40 000. The measure was justified, in
the main, as one for assisting small business. But the
government also saw the measure as an integral part of its
determination to halt the growth of large corporations. That
is, it was justified, in part, as an anti-monopoly measure. The
government also argued that since the income of large
corporations was more stable than that of small corporations,
the measure would result in greater stability of income tax
receipts. 75
A number of criticisms were made of the graduated
corporate rate structure:76 it would penalise corporations with
fluctuating earnings; it was unfair since a corporation's income
is not necessarily an accurate measure of its profitability; and,
it was arbitrary since the definition of a 'small' corporation
would vary from industry to industry. However, in general
the graduated rates appear to have been strongly defended.
The arguments were well summarised by Bowen: 'First ... small
businesses are peculiarly dependent upon the reinvestment of
earnings as a source of funds for development and expansion
Second, the earnings of small businesses tend to fluctuate
from year to year more than big businesses ... Third, the
taxation of income tends to increase risks more for small
businesses than for large (because of the restrictions on the
deductibility of losses) ... Fourth, small companies usually
operate under conditions of intense competition (and are thus
unable to pass an income tax forward) ... Fifth, small business,
unable to afford expensive legal and accounting advice, find
,77difficulty in interpreting complex tax laws and regulations ...
1936 TO 1958: EVENTS LEADING UP TO THE
PARTNERSHIP ELECTION
In an historic address in 1936, President Roosevelt sought to
initiate a series of radical tax proposals.78  Basically, the
President called for repeal of the regular corporate-level tax
and repeal of the exclusion of dividends from the normal tax
75. See generally, A.G. Buehler, The Undistributed Profit# Tax (New York:
McGraw-Hill, 1937), at 241.
76. See id., at 242-7, 262-3.
77. H.R. Bowen, 'The Taxation of Small Business' in National Tax Association,
Proceedings of the Thirty-Ninth Annual Conference on Taxation (Sacramento:
National Tax Association, 1946) 394, at 396-7.
78. For a text of President Roosevelt's March 3, 1936, address, see 1939-1 C.B.
668. For relevant excerpts see 'Preliminary Report', supra note 71, at 582-
3.
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base of individual shareholders. He also proposed the
imposition of an undistributed profits tax on corporations that
would be severe enough to compensate for the amount of tax
that would be collected if the corporation had made a complete
distribution to shareholders. This undistributed profits tax
would be imposed on earnings regardless of the motive of their
retention. The President's proposals appeared to have had a
number of purposes: to force large corporations to distribute
more of their earnings and thus assist in breaking-up large
concentrations of economic power; to prevent high-income
individuals from avoiding the individual surtax by
accumulating profits in corporations; 79 to relieve the double tax
burden on small businesses if earnings were distributed; and, to
equalise the tax burden between incorporated and
unincorporated business.o
Although the House of Representatives adopted the
President's proposals, the Senate modified them considerably.
At the end of the day, the corporate tax remained, a modest
undistributed profits was imposede' and the dividend credit for
individual shareholders was repealed. Thus, somewhat
paradoxically, instead of the corporate tax being abolished, as
was Roosevelt's intention, its status as a separate tax was
strengthened.
This brief history reveals that in the United States the
adoption of a separate tax on corporations did not reflect a
carefully thought out and articulated policy judgment, as did
the adoption of the classical tax system in the United Kingdom
in 1965. The most plausible explanation for it seems to be that
the government initially intended to use the corporate tax as a
means of collecting the income tax from individuals.
However, a series of ad hoc measures, motivated by a desire to
raise revenue and to prevent the corporation from being used
as a device to avoid high personal surtax rates, resulted
eventually in a classical tax system. 8 2
79. At this time the United States had both an accumulated earnings tax and a
personal holding company tax for this purpose, but neither of these were felt
to be sufficiently effective by the government.
80. For a discussion of the fascinating politics of these tax reform proposals see
Buehler, supra note 75; S. Ratner, Taxation and Democracy in America (New
York: John Wiley, 1967), at 472-4; G.E. Lent, The Impact o the
Undistributed Profits Tax 1936-37 (New York: AMS Press, 1968); G.
Graham, 'The Undistributed Profits Tax and the Investor' (1936) 46 Yale
Law Journal 1; H. Hendricks, 'The Surtax on Undistributed Profits of
Corporations' (1936) 46 Yale Law Journal 19.
81. Only to be repealed in 1938, see Revenue Act of 1938, chap. 289, 52 Stat
447.
82. For a similar explanation see the 'Preliminary Report' supra note 71, at 576;
see also C.S. Shoup, 'The Dividend Exclusion and Credit in the Revenue
Code of 1954' (1954) 8 National Tax Journal 136, at 137; ('Congress ... (in
1936) was much more concerned over the escape of undistributed profits from
full axation than it was over extra taxation of distributed profits; indeed
there is some evidence that the extra taxation was almost a by-product of
the confusion over the issue of taxing undistributed profits').
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After the changes made in 1936, and throughout the 1940s,
there was considerable discussion about integrating the
corporate and shareholder tax. Although a few commentators
attempted to justify a separate corporate tax,83 most public
finance theorists were of the opinion that it had no rational
basis and were exploring ways of integrating it with the
personal income tax.84  The now well-known methods of
integrating the corporate and personal tax were all considered
at length including abolishing the corporate tax and taxing
capital gains at normal rates either when realised" or on an
accrual basis,86 and providing various forms of dividend relief.
83. See G. Colm, 'Conflicting Theories of Corporate Income Taxation' (1940) 7
Law and Contemporary Problems 281 (discussing sympathetically the benefit
justification for corporate tax and the role of the corporate tax as a
technique for economic control) and P. Studenski, 'Towards a Theory of
Business Taxation' (1940) 48 Journal of Political Economy 621 (explaining
eight theoretical justifications for business taxation, most of which relate in
some way to the benefits received by corporations).
84. See 'Preliminary Report', supra note 71, at 588-95.
85. Henry Simons was the best known advocate of abolishing the corporate tax
and simply taxing all capital gains when they were realised. H.C. Simons,
Personal Income Taxation: The Definition of Income as a Problem of Fiscal
Policy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1938), at 168-9 and Federal
Tax Reform (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1950). His proposal was
considerably more sophisticated than it is commonly given credit for, and
even in the broad outlines sketched by Simons, included a scheme for
allowing taxpayers to include accruals of gain or loss in their income as they
saw fit (subject to final reconciliation at death, of course), an averaging
scheme that would be applied against as well as in favour of the taxpayer, a
general policy of using changes in exemption levels rather than tax rates in
order to vary revenues in accordance with fiscal needs, and a proposal to
allow unincorporated enterprises to be treated like corporations for tax
purposes. Simons felt that one of the most significant advantages of his
proposal was the assistance it provided to small, growing enterprises. See
Federal Tax Reform, id., at 139 and 'Federal Tax Reform' (1946) 14
University of Chicago Law Review 20, at 60-3. In spite of its simplicity and
elegance, even contemporary commentators were skeptical of Simons' proposal
because it allowed shareholders to postpone their tax liability. See, for
example, H. Groves, Postwar Taxation and Economic Progress (New York:
McGraw Hill, 1946), at 60. But for a favourable review see W. Vickery
'Book Review' (1950) 3 National Tax Journal 187. However, even though
the proposal appears to fly in the face of the general tax principles so
passionately expounded by Simons, it seems quite consistent with his
libertarian philosophy. The following quote from the draft of his book on
tax reform is particularly illuminating: '...there should be no levies on
business or concerns as such. The impact of taxes should be kept as far as
possible from the concern of enterprise, and from the sphere in which
operating and investing decisions are made. This means that taxes should
fall on the natural person or family as a consumer and saving unit or
household, where their effect will be concentrated on consumption and saving
and largely removed from productive enterprise and management. If - God
forbid - we must tax shareholders qua shareholders, lets do it plainly,
directly and straightforwardly and give our good sense a chance to cry out
against the folly.' 'Federal Tax Reform' (1946) 14 University of Chicago
Law Review 20, at 60.
86. Committee on Taxation of the Twentieth Century Fund, Facing the Tax
Problem (Director: C. Shoup) (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, Inc.,
1937), at 477-83. Commentators noted that this method was not perfect
integration since it did not take into account the character of the income
earned by the corporation (for example, some of the income earned by the
corporation might have been tax-exempt at the personal level). Moreover,
it was argued that it was not a practical alternative because of the difficulty
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However, the method of integration of most interest in the
present context is the partnership method. Most commentators
noted that the partnership method was the ideal way of
integrating the corporate and shareholder tax. However, the
familiar objections to it were enumerated: the difficulty of
allocating undistributed earnings among various classes of
shares (the problem most frequently noted was that funds
allocated to common shares in one year might be distributed in
a later year to preferred shareholders); the difficulty of
allocating undistributed earnings among shareholders who may
have changed during the year; the difficulty of allocating
income through holding corporations; the administrative
problem of annually revising the basis of stock held by
shareholders; the problem of adjusting annually reported
income if a change were made in a corporation's reported net
income for an earlier year as the result of an audit, amended
return or litigation; and the unfairness of shareholders having
to pay tax on income they have not received."
In spite of these concerns, the first commissioned study of
the problem, a study commissioned by the National Tax
Association and chaired by Professor Haig,88 recommended that
'in the effort to reach corporate profits for personal income tax
purposes the use of the partnership method should be extended
to the limits of its legal and administrative possibilities'.89
Furthermore, the Committee was of the opinion that 'the
number of corporations to which the partnership method can
be applied without involving formidable administrative
difficulties is far greater than is generally realised and includes
all but a few thousand, perhaps, of our larger corporations'.o
Most commentators doubted if it would be practical to
require all, or even most large corporations to report their
income as if they were partnerships. However, they were
virtually unanimous in suggesting that a partnership election
of obtaining valuation figures for all beneficial interests, and because of the at
least questionable constitutionality of taxing shareholders on accrued but
unrealised income. See Committee of the National Tax Association on
Federal Taxation, 'Final Report' (Chairperson: R.M. Haig) in National Tax
Association Proceedings of the Thirty-second Annual Conference on Tazation
(Columbia: National Tax Association, 1940) 534, at 545-7 [hereinafter 'Final
Report']; Federal Tax Reform, supra note 85, at 74-8. However, Carl Shoup
has remained convinced that the idea is not only the ideal solution but is
also practical. See C.S. Shoup, 'The Dividend Exclusion and Credit in the
Revenue Code of 1954' (1954) 8 National Tax Journal 136, at 146 and 'The
White Paper Accrual Accounting for Capital Gains and Losses' (1970) 18
Canadian Tax Journal 96.
87. See Personal Income Taxation, supra note 85, at 190-4; Groves, supra note
85 at 56; R.E. Paul, Taxation for Prosperity (New York: Bobbs-Merrill,
1947), at 360, R. Goode, The Corporation Income Tax (New York: John
Wiley, 1951), at 185; 'Final Report' supra note 86, at 555.
88. 'Final Report', supra note 86.
89. Id., at 555.
90. Id., at 506.
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should be available for small corporations," even though, as
some authors noted, because of the high individual rates it
would not significantly benefit small businesses.
Apparently, the Treasury Department had been considering
giving small corporations the option of being taxed as
partnerships as early as 1929.9 The first published account of
the details of such a proposal was included in a study on the
corporate tax by Goode, which he did for the Treasury in
1946." Goode reviewed the administrative reasons commonly
given as to why corporations generally could not be treated for
tax purposes as partnerships. He used these reasons to assist in
defining a class of small corporations that could be provided
with such an election because the administrative problems
could be overcome. Among other restrictions, he noted that
corporations entitled to the election should be restricted to
those with a limited number of individual shareholders and
only one class of shares.9"
The Treasury continued to study the option, and in 1949 it
presented an even stronger case for its adoption. It concluded
that partnership tax treatment for certain small corporations
would equalise the tax burden on small incorporated and
unincorporated businesses and might increase the flow of new
equity capital into small corporations." Also, in 1950, the
National Tax Association's Committee on the Federal Corporate
Net Income Tax (Chairperson: H.M. Groves) noted that there
were strong grounds for providing small and closely-held
corporations with partnership treatment.
In 1954, the administration, as part of a major tax reform
effort, proposed that corporations with a small number of
active shareholders should be able to elect to be taxed as
91. See Groves, supra note 85, at 58, 105; Paul esupra note 87, at 373; J.W.
Devine, 'Taxing Corporations as Partnerships' (1948) 26 Taxes 506.
92. See, in particular, J.K. Butters, 'Should the Profits of Small Corporations Be
Taxed Like Partnership Earnings' in R.G. Blakey et al., How Should
Corporations Be Taxed? (New York: Tax Institute, 1947) 72; Goode, supra
note 87, at 186-90; Bowen, supra note 77, at 394.
93. See J.L. Weiner, 'Legislative Recognition of the Close Corporation' (1929) 27
Michigan Law Review 273.
94. R.B. Goode, The Postwar Corporation Tax Structure (Treasury Department,1946). The full text of those parts of the work that relate to a partnership
election for small corporations are reproduced in J.E. Eustice and J.D. Kuntz,Federal Income Taxation of S Corporations, rev'd. ed. (Boston: Warren,
Gorham & Lamont, 1985), App. B.1, at A-24.
95. Id., at 20. In justifying the election, Goode simply noted that in closely-
held corporations 'the corporations and its stockholders are substantially an
economic identity': Ibid.
96. Division of Tax Research, US Treasury Department Taxation of Small
Business (Washington: Division of Tax Research, US Treasury Department,1949).
97. National Tax Association, Committee on the Federal Corporate Net Income
Tax, 'Final Report' (Chairperson: H.M. Groves) in National Tax Association,
Proceedings of the Forty-Third Annual Conference on Taxation (Sacramento:
National Tax Association, 1951) 54, at 61-2.
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partnerships." In justifying the proposal President Eisenhower
simply noted that, 'small businesses should be able to operate
under whatever form of organisation is desirable for their
particular circumstances, without incurring unnecessary tax
penalties'." Although the Senate approved the President's
proposal, it was not passed by the House of Representatives
and was subsequently abandoned in conference. The
legislation that had been proposed by the administration was
straightforward, although in some respects more restrictive
than subsequent legislation. 00 In particular, under the proposal
only new corporations could take the election and all
shareholders had to be actively involved in the business. Both
of these requirements were abandoned in subsequent
legislation, but at the cost of considerable increased
complexity. Also, under the proposal, and again unlike the
legislation that was eventually enacted in 1958, if a corporation
took the election, it was to be taxed almost exactly as a
partnership.0 1
1958 TO 1986: THE PARTNERSHIP ELECTION
The possibility of allowing closely-held corporations to elect to
be treated as partnerships was raised again in 1957 when
Congress was considering a wide range of legislative changes
designed to encourage the growth of small business. The
measure that was eventually passed was inserted in the tax
legislation almost as an after-thought by the Senate Finance
Committee after a member inquired about the demise of the
1954 proposal. However, instead of building upon the
partnership election that the Senate had passed in 1954, the
Committee used as its model, legislation that had been
prepared for the House of Ways and Means Committee in
1957, but which that Committee had decided not to proceed
with. Thus, the legislation was quite different to the straight-
forward partnership election recommended in 1954.
The Finance Committee gave two principal reasons for the
adoption of the provision: first, the legislation would permit
greater flexibility for business people in selecting their form of
98. For a brief review of legislative history of the partnership election in the
United States see Eustice and Kuntz, eupra note 94, chap. 1; J.A. Moore
and R.C. Sorlien, 'Adventures in Subchapter S and Section 1244' (1959) 14
Taz Law Review 453, at 456-7; R. Anthoine, 'Federal Tax Legislation of
1958: The Corporate Election and Collapsible Amendment' (1958) 58
Columbia Law Review 1146, at 1148-50.
99. President's Budget Message of January 21, 1954, 100 Cong. Rec. 567, at
571, reprinted in Eustice and Kuntz, esupra note 94, at 1-5.
100. The legislation was contained in s.1351(a) which was inserted in H.R. 8300,
83rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1954), reprinted in Eustice and Kuntz, supra note 94,
App. B.2.
101. It was contemplated that the partnership rules of the Act would apply to
corporations except as varied by regulation.
410 AUSTRALIAN TAX FORUM
business organisation by minimising differences in tax
consequences; and second, the provision would encourage the
growth of small business by eliminating double taxation on
income derived by shareholders of closely-held corporations
and by allowing such shareholders to deduct from their
individual income their share of losses incurred by the business
102activity.
The rules for allowing corporations to elect to be taxed as
partnerships were contained in Subchapter S of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954 (sections 1371 through 1379) and thus
corporations making the election became known as 'Subchapter
S Corporations'?.1 0 The conditions for making and maintaining
a Subchapter S election were originally very restrictive. They
included the following: (1) The corporation could not have
more than ten shareholders. (2) The corporation could not
have more than one class of stock. (3) Basically, all
shareholders had to be individuals. (4) All shareholders had to
be US residents. (5) All shareholders, including new
shareholders, had to consent to the election. (6) No more than
a specified portion of the corporation's receipts (normally 20
per cent) could be derived from enumerated types of passive
investment income. (7) The corporation could not receive
more than 80 per cent of gross receipts from sources outside
the US. However, no limitations were placed on the
capitalisation or net worth of electing corporations (presumably
because of the unlikelihood of large businesses making an
election in view of the high individual marginal tax rates).
When an election was made, the corporation was not taxed
as a partnership, although it is often referred to as a
partnership election. Instead, the corporation computed its
income under the normal rules applicable to corporations.
Distributions of current earnings and profits that were received
by shareholders during the year were taxed as dividends in the
ordinary manner. Then, any income remaining undistributed
at the end of the year was attributed to shareholders, each of
whom paid tax on their rateable share. With one exception,
this share was taxed as dividend income in the shareholder's
hands, although it was not eligible for the dividend credit.
102. S. Rep. No. 1983, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 87, reprinted in 1958-3 CB 922,
1008.
103. Prior to 1982, the legislation referred to a corporation that met certain of
the requirements for electing to be taxed pursuant to Subehapter S as a
'small business corporation' and a corporation that actually elected to be
taxed pursuant to those provisions as an 'electing small business
corporation'. However, in part because other provisions in the IRC also
referred to small business stock, most commentators referred to an electing
small business corporation as a 'Subchapter S corporation'. In 1982
Congress sought to remove any confusion caused by using similar terms in
the Code by referring to corporations electing under Subchapter S as 'S
corporations'; all other corporations are to be referred to as 'C
corporations': IRC, sa.1361(a)(1) and 1361(a)(2).
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The one exception was long-term capital gains. These retained
their capital gain character in the shareholder's return.
The corporation's net operating loss for an election year
could also pass through to the shareholders and be deducted by
them as a loss attributable to a trade or business.1 o' To prevent
last-minute transfers of stock for the purposes of redistributing
loss deductions, losses were allocated to shareholders on a daily
basis. That is, shareholders were given a loss pass-through
which corresponded to their pro rata share of the corporation's
net operating loss attributable to the length of the period that
they held stock in the corporation. Thus, if shareholders sold
their stock halfway through the taxable year they would be
allowed one half of the loss which they would have received
had they held the stock for the full year. The purchaser of the
stock would be entitled to the remaining portion of the loss.
This method for allocating losses might be contrasted with that
used for allocating undistributed taxable income. All income
for the year was attributable to those who owned the shares at
the end of the fiscal year.
Although generally welcomed by the tax community, the
Subchapter S election was subject to considerable criticism.
Commentators felt that the requirements for making the
election were much more restrictive than necessary to
accomplish its objectives, that the legislation was too complex
and consequently expensive to comply with, and that it was
replete with traps for the unwary. Aside from technical
deficiencies, the basic criticism of the proposal was that it did
not conform closely enough with the tax treatment of
partnerships. A year after its enactment, Caplin, later to be
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, wrote: 'Despite only one
year's experience under these provisions, Congress would bejustified in striking it from the Code as bad law, not worthy
of retention even in modified form'.s06
104. However, losses were deductible only to the extent they exceeded the
shareholder's basis in stock and debt held in the corporation.
105. M. Caplin, 'Subchapter S vs. Partnership: A Proposed Legislative Program'
( 1959) 46 Virginia Law Review 61, at 81. See also R. Anthoine, 'Federal
ax Legislation of 1958: The Corporate Election and Collapsible
Amendment' (1958) 58 Columbia Law Review 1146, at 1175 ('at best, it is
highly questionable whether the electing corporation has any proper place in
a tax law that is already extremely complex'); J.D. Driscoll, 'Subchapter S
- Its Role in the Tax Law', K.R. Price, 'Subchapter S - Some Policy
Questions', and F.A. Nicholson, 'Report on Subchapter S' in United States,
Committee on Ways and Means, Tax Revision Compendium: Compendium of
Papers on Broadening the Tax Bate (Washington: GPO, 1959), vol. 3, at
1723, 1731, 1741 (respectively); E.S. Cogen and C.H. Schmidt, 'Subchapter
S: A New Concept in the Tax Status of Business Associations' (1959) 44
Cornell L.Q. 560; C.B. Lowrie, 'Subchapter S After Three Years of
Operations' (1962) 18 Tax Law Review 99 and 'Subchapter S After Tax
Years of Operation: An Analysis of its Advantages and Defects' (1965) 22
Journal of Taxation 166 ('Subchapter S should not be repealed. Despite its
defects and complexity it has granted desirable relief and positive
advantages to taxpayers who have been able to utilise its provisions').
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Throughout the 1960s and 1970s the Subchapter S rules
were subject to continual evaluation. In the mid-1960s, the
Section of Taxation of the American Bar Association and the
Treasury Department undertook a joint study of Subchapter S.
Their work culminated with the submission of a joint proposal
to Congress as part of the Treasury Department's 1969 Tax
Reform Studies and Proposals.10 The aim of the reform was
to tax Subchapter S corporations as much like partnerships as
possible. Ultimately very few of the provisions were
incorporated into the Tax Reform Act of 1969.107 In 1970 the
Section of Taxation of the American Bar Association formed a
special Committee on Subchapter S Corporations and it
continued to participate in a joint project with Treasury
Department officials. Although several bills were introduced
into Congress, little became of them.108 Then, in 1977, the
staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation began a study of
Subchapter S. It published a tentative set of recommendations
in May 1979, which were extensively commented on by the
Treasury Department, members of the subcommittee of the
A.B.A. Section of Taxation and members of the Federal Tax
Division of the AICPA, among others. On April 30, 1980, the
staff of the Joint Committee released a report containin its
recommendations for restructuring the Subchapter S rules.'
In 1982, Congress adopted the Subchapter S Revision Act
which incorporated essentially all of the staff
recommendations."x0 The legislation had three major results.
106. US Treasury Dept., Technical Explanation of Treasury Tax Reform
Proposals (1960), reprinted in J.S. Eustice and J.D. Kuntz, Federal Income
Taxation of Subchapter S Corporation, 1st ed. (Boston: Warren, Gorham &
Lamont, 1982), App. B.16.
107. On the 1969 proposals see S.W. Rosenkranz, 'Subchapter S: The Presidential
Proposals' (1969) 55 American Bar Association Journal 1181; W.J. Fischer,
'Proposals to Revamp Subchapter S' (1971) 49 Taxes 407; J.H. Landon, 'An
Approach to Legislative Revision of Subchapter S' (1971) 26 Tax Law
Review 799; J.S. Pennell, 'Subchapter S - The Need for Legislation' (1970)
24 Tax Lawyer 249; S.W. Rosenkranz, 'Subchapter S - An Illusory
Promise?' (1971) 6 Georgia Law Review 109.
108. See R.A. Shaw, 'Subehapter 5: The Maturation of an Immature Statute' in
Proceedings of the Twenty-Fourth Annual Tulane Tax Institute (Baton
Rouge: Claitor's Publishing, 1975) 372. However, in 1976 a number of
largely technical amendments were made. For a summary see Eustice and
Kuntz, esupra note 94, App. B.13.
109. Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation, Staff Recommendations for
Signification of Tax Rules Relating to Subehapter S Corporations, 96th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1980), reprinted in Eustice and Kunts (1st ed.), supra note
106, App. B.17. A comparative summary of the recommendations of the
Joint Committee Staff, the comments of the Treasury Department Staff and
the Section of Taxation task force can be found in G.G. Chang,
'Recommendations for restructuring of Tax Rules Relating to Subchapter S
Corporations: A Comparative Summary' (1981) 34 Tax Lawyer 403.
110. Pub. L. No. 97-354, 96 Stat. 1669 (1982). For detailed analysis see M.N.
Newmark and D.M. Lang, 'The Subchapter S Revision Act of 1982' (1983)
37 Tax Law 93; and G.E. Doven and A.M. Hess, 'The Subchapter S
Revision Act: An Analysis and Appraisal' (1983) 50 Tenn. L. Rev. 569. As
the above short summary of the events leading up to the passage of this
Bill makes clear, one notable aspect of its passage was that it was
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First, the eligibility requirements are materially liberalised.
The permitted number of shareholders is increased to thirty-
five. Although the one class of stock limitation remains,
differences in voting rights are ignored."1 ' New 'safe harbour'
rules ensure that debt which the Treasury reclassifies as equity,
and consequently treats as a second class of shares, is not
mistakenly issued." 2  In addition, the excessive passive income
receipts rules are greatly diminished in importance. Second,
the distribution rules are changed so that instead of being
treated as a dividend distribution, most types of corporate
income passes through directly to shareholders. Thus, the
treatment of Subchapter S corporations conforms much more
closely with the partnership model. Third, numerous technical
deficiencies of the rules are corrected; for example, the
termination rules are considerably eased in order to remove a
number of traps for the unwary.
Notwithstanding that the amendments moved in the
direction of treating Subchapter S corporations more like
partnerships, the leading commentators have argued that the
rules could go considerably further in assimilating the
treatment of these two kinds of entities. "s Simply by way of
example, even under the new revisions, 'S corporations', as
they are now called, are: limited in the number of shareholders
they can have (thirty-five); limited in the type of shareholders
(basically shareholders have to be resident individuals); and,
limited in the type of capital structure they can have (basically
they are limited to one class of shares). Yet, none of these
restrictions are imposed on partnerships.
developed by the collegial efforts of not only various government
departments, the congressional staffs and the Treasury, but also private
organisations, most notably the tax bar. In this respect it follows a pattern
established in the recent technical reforms of the instalments sales and
bankruptcy rules in 1980. See J.S. Eustice, 'Cancellation of Indebtedness
Redux: The Bankruptcy Tax Act of 1980 Proposals - Corporate Aspects'
(1980 36 Tax Law Review 1- MD . Ginsberg, 'Future Payment Sales After
the 1980 Revision Act' (1981) 39 New York University Institute of Federal
Taxation 43.
111. This liberalisation makes sense since the purpose of the rule suggests that it
should only be directed at classes of stock which have different dividend and
liquidation rights.
112. Under the proposal, straight debt, debt that has no voting rights, a fixed
interest rate and a fixed amount of redemption, will never be considered a
second class of stock for purposes of Subchapter S even if it is reclassified
as equity for other purposes.
113. See, in particular, Eustice and Kuntz, epra note 94, at 1.40-1.65; J.S.
Eustice, 'Subchapter S Corporations and Partnerships: A Search for the Pass
Through Paradigm (Some Preliminary Proposals)' (1984) 39 Tax Law
Review 345; G.E. Coven and A.M. Hess, 'The Subchapter S Revision Act:
An Analysis and Appraisal' (1983) 50 Tennessee Law Review 569.
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1936 TO 1986: THE LOWER RATE OF TAX
The United States adopted a graduated corporate rate structure
in 1936, with rates ranging from eight to 15 per cent.1" From
1938 to 1950 the benefit of graduation was 'recaptured' from
firms with incomes over $25 000. This was done by applying
a flat rate to all taxable income, including the first $25 000, on
firms with income in excess of $25 000. In order to ease the
large jump in tax liabilities that a company might face by
earning just over $25 000, the full flat rate was phased in over
a certain income range.
In the Revenue Act of 1950, the recapture provision was
repealed and the four step graduated rate structure was
replaced by one with just two steps. This dual corporate rate
structure remained in effect from 1950 until 1975. Over this
period the first $25 000 of a corporation's income was taxed at
rates ranging from 22 to 30 per cent, while income over
$25 000 was taxed at rates ranging from 42 to 52.8 per cent.
Then, beginning in 1975, a series of amendments were made
to the graduated rate structure to make it even more
favourable to small business. By 1984, the rate structure had
five brackets: the first $25 000 was taxed at 15 per cent; the
next $25 000 at 18 per cent; the next $25 000 at 30 per cent;
the next $25 000 at 40 per cent; and taxable income over
$100 000 at 46 per cent. All of the changes made in increasing
the graduation of the rate structure over this period were made
for the express purpose of encouraging growth in small
business.""
As part of a series of revenue raising measures, the Deficit
Reduction Act of 1984 reintroduced a provision to recapture
the benefit of graduated rates from large corporations. The
Act imposed a five per cent tax on corporate income in excess
of $1 million up to $1405 million. Thus the full $20 250 of
tax benefit from the graduated rate was recaptured from large
corporations.
Graduated corporate income tax rates seem firmly
entrenched in the United States tax system and over the past
thirty-five years there has been little pressure to remove them.
However, in the past two years a number of the proposals
made in the base broadening, rate reduction tax reform
movement sweeping the United States have called them into
114. See text, esupra note 75. Before this date the corporate tax applied at a
flat rate, however a small exemption was generally allowed. For a listing
of the corporate tax schedules over the years see J.A. Pechman, Federal
Tax Policy, 4th ed. (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1983), Table
A-6.
115. See, for example, United States Senate, 95th Congress, 2d. Sess., Committee
on Finance, Revenue Act of 1978 (Report No. 95-1263) (Washington: GPO,
1978), at 118-9. Reducing the impact of the tax laws in the selection of a
form of organisation for operation of a small business was also a frequently
stated rationale for increasing graduation.
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question. The Treasury Department, in its far-reaching 1984
tax reform proposals, Tax Reform for Fairness, Simplicity and
Economic Growth, recommended that the corporate tax base be
defined more comprehensively and that the corporate tax rate
be reduced to a flat 33 per cent. The Treasury gave a number
of reasons for recommending the abolition of the graduated
corporate rate structure:116 (1) The concept of ability to pay,
which justifies the graduated rate for individuals, is irrelevant
in the case of corporations because corporate income is either
reinvested or paid out to shareholders. Moreover, high-income
individuals can own small corporations and low-income
individuals commonly own shares in large ones (for example,
through pension plans). (2) If the corporate tax rates remain
about equal to the top individual marginal rate there will be no
need for complex and often ineffective rules to limit the use
of corporations to avoid the higher individual rates. (3) A
flat corporate rate would also render unnecessary the complex
and often ineffective rules designed to prevent the use of
multiple corporations in order to maximise income taxed at the
lowest rates. (4) Small corporations can, in any event, avoid
the flat corporate tax rate and double taxation of dividends by
electing pass-through treatment as an S corporation. (5)
Preferential rates for small corporations would be unnecessary
under the Treasury's proposals since the base broadening
measures would substantially increase the competitiveness of
small business.
Two other well-known tax reform proposals were being
discussed about the same time as the Treasury proposals were
published. One would have abolished the graduated rate
structure, the other would have retained it. The Bradley-
Gephart proposals would have imposed a flat 30 per cent
corporate rate.117  The Kemp-Kasten proposals would have
retained a dual corporate rate structure: 15 per cent on the first
$50 000 and 30 per cent on the excess. 18
The small business lobby in the United States strenuously
objected to the Treasury's proposals to repeal the graduated
corporate rate scheme. Small business lobby groups typically
argued that unlike bigger businesses that can issue securities to
raise money to fund growth, small business must get much of
their capital from retained earnings, and so lower tax rates are
needed to even things up. Also they noted that under the
present law, many small corporations paid tax at rates lower
than 33 per cent, which meant that the Treasury plan would
116. United States Treasury Department, Treasury Department Report to the
President, vol. 2 (Chicago: CCH, 1984), at 128-9.
117. S. 1421, 98th Cong. 1st Sess. (1983), ss.101-102.
118. H.R. 6165, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984), s.102.
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substantially increase the tax burden on many small
businesses."'
In May 1985, the President published his proposals for tax
reform.12  Yielding to the pressure from small business he
recommended retention of the graduated corporate tax rates.
He explained:
The proposal retains a modified graduated rate structure for
small corporations in recognition of the fact that complete
elimination of the graduated rate structure would
dramatically increase effective tax rates for many smaller
corporations, thus nullifying the positive effects, for such
corporations, of the proposed reduction in the maximum
marginal rates.'
The President proposed that the corporate tax be imposed
under the following schedule: (1) 15 per cent on taxable
income up to $25 000; (2) 18 per cent on taxable income
between $25 000 and $50 000; (3) 25 per cent on taxable
income between $50 000 and $75 000; and (4) 33 per cent on
the excess. To phase out the benefits of the graduated rates
for corporations with taxable income over $140 000, an
additional five per cent tax would be imposed on corporate
taxable income in excess of that amount and up to taxable
income of $360 000. Both the House of Ways and Means
Committee1 22  and the Senate Finance Committee'
recommended the adoption of a graduated corporate tax rate
structure similar to that proposed by the President.
Finally, in the Tax Reform Act of 1986, effective for
taxable years beginning on or after July 1, 1987, a three-
bracket graduated corporate rate structure was adopted: (1) 15
per cent on taxable income up to $50 000; (2) 25 per cent on
taxable income between $50 000 and $75 000; and (3) 34 per
cent on the excess. Thus the structure reduces from five to
three the number of corporate income tax brackets, and lowers
from 46 to 34 the tax rate applicable to large corporations.
The benefit of graduated rates is fully phased out for
corporations with more than $335 000 of taxable income
(compared to $1 405 000 under present law).
119. See, for example, J.H. Birnbaum, 'Small Business Sees Itself as Victim and
Lobbies Against Abolishing Graduated Tax Rates System', The Wall Street
Journal, 5 March 1985, at 64.
120. United States, The President's Tax Proposals to the Congress for Fairness,
Growth, and Simplicity (Chicago: CCH, 1985).
121. Id., at 119.
122. United States, House Ways and Means Committee, Tax Reform Bill of 1985
(Washington: GPO, 1985), at 231-3.
123. United States, Joint Committee on Taxation, Summary of H.R. 3838 (Tax
Reform Act of 1986) As Reported by the Senate Committee on Finance
(Washington: GPO, 1986), at 21-3.
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Canada
Like the other countries in this survey, Canada initially had an
integrated corporate tax system. It was the first to change to
the classical tax system, in 1926. In that year it also enacted a
partnership election for closely-held corporations to alleviate
fears about the effect of the change on small businesses. The
election was repealed, without explanation, in 1932. Although
the partnership election has been recommended for adoption in
Canada on a number of subsequent occasions, it has never been
re-enacted.
Canada adopted a lower rate corporate tax in 1949. It came
under considerable criticism during the tax reform debate in
the 1960s. It was replaced, therefore, in 1972 with a small
business credit that attempted to target the tax relief provided
by the lower rate of corporate tax at small business firms that
used their retained earnings for expansion. Throughout the
1970s and 1980s the small business credit was subject to
continuous amendment: first in an effort to simplify it, then
in an effort to re-target it, and finally in an effort to simplify
it once again. By 1986 the Canadian small business credit has
an effect very analogous to a lower rate of corporate tax. The
attempt to target the relief was largely a failure.
1917 TO 1926: THE INTEGRATED SYSTEM 124
The corporation was not viewed as a separate taxpaying entity
in the provincial corporate tax acts passed in the late
nineteenth century. Although a tax was imposed on profits at
the corporate level, corporate distributions were exempt from
tax at the shareholder level. In 1917, when the Canadian
124. See generally, J.R. Allan, The Income Tax Burden on Canadian Stockholders
(Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 1966), chap. 2; J.R. Petrie, The
Tazation of Corporate Income in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto
Press, 1952), chap. 2; A.K. Eaton, 'Recent Developments in Corporate
Taxation in Canada' (1950) 3 National Tax Journal 75; J.H. Perry, Taxes,
Tariffs and Subsidies: A History of Canadian Fiscal Development (Toronto:
University of Toronto, 1955), vols 1 and 2, in particular, at 213-22, 408-
21; Canada, Royal Commission on the Taxation of Annuities and Family
Corporations, Report (Chairperson: W.C. Ives) (Ottawa: King's Printer,
1945), at 52-60 Ihereinafter Ives Commission); W.H. Wynne, 'Taxation of
Corporations in Canada' (1941-42) 27 Bulletin of the National Tax
Association, at 66 and 98; J.H. Perry, 'Development of the Canadian
Corporation Income Tax' (1951) 58 Canadian Chartered Accountant 3, and
Canadian Tax Foundation, Report of the Fourth Tax Conference, 1950
(Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 1950), at 16; J.R. Petrie, 'Some
Special Aspects of the Corporation Tax', in Canadian Tax Foundation,
Bulletin to Members, Nov., 1950, at 1-8, and (Sept.-Oct. 1950) 17 Tax
Policy 1.
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Government first imposed a tax on individual and corporate
income, it followed this basic approach."2
Individuals were subject to what was called a 'normal' flat
rate of four per cent and a graduated surtax at rates ranging
from two to 25 per cent on personal income in excess of$6000. Corporate earnings were taxed at the normal flat rate
of four per cent. When corporate income was distributed it
was exempt from the individual normal rate, but taxed at the
surtax rates.126 Furthermore, corporations were entitled to the$3000 basic exemption that was available to married persons.
Two details might be noted about the scheme: First, dividends
were excluded from the normal individual rate if they were
paid by a corporation liable to taxation, whether or not the
corporation actually paid tax on its distributed earnings at the
normal rate. Consequently, in modern jargon, tax preferences
were flowed through. Second, dividends subject to the surtax
did not have to be grossed-up by the amount of tax paid at the
corporate level. Thus, for high-income taxpayers dividend
income received preferential tax treatment.
This almost perfect scheme of integration began being
eroded the year after enactment. In 1918 the corporate tax
125. However, the government appeared to be ambivalent about whether
corporations should be treated as separate taxpayers. In commenting on
the exemption of dividend income from the individual normal tax rate the
Minister of Finance, the Honourable Sir Thomas White, stated: 'I have
always thought it was a mistake to assume that there is double taxation
when a company is assessed and when its shareholders are also assessed.
My honourable friend knows that a corporation in law is different from any
or all of its shareholders ... Therefore, it has never appealed to me very
strongly that a corporation should not be assessed and that its shareholders
should not be likewise assessed. But while I believe that the time will
come when in dealing with legislation of this kind a corporation will be
assessed in respect of its income and its individual shareholders will be
assessed in respect to their incomes, we have not probably progressed to the
point yet where we could give that doctrine the effect which I think it
should have'. Canada, House of Commons Debates, 2 August 1917, at
4072.
126. The details of the Canadian scheme for integration, like so many other
aspects of the first Canadian income tax system, were borrowed directly
from the United States Internal Revenue Code. In explaining the new
Canadian system, the Minister of Finance, the Honourable Sir Thomas
White stated: 'In the United States they have an income tax called the
normal tax to be paid by corporations and joint stock companies. They
provide - and we have similarly provided - that, while the shareholders of
these companies are subject to the supertax, the amount of the normal tax
upon dividends shall be deducted from their income'. Canada, House of
Commons Debates, 2 August, 1917, at 4074. The extent to which Canada
borrowed from the United States can be seen by comparing the wording of
the Canadian deduction for dividends with that of the United States.
Section 5(b) of the Federal Revenue Law, 1916 (US) provided: 'For the
purpose of the normal tax only, the income embraced in a personal return
shall be credited with the amount received as dividends upon the stock or
from the net earnings of any corporation, joint stock company or
association, trustee or insurance company, which is taxable upon its net
income as hereinafter provided'; Section 3(1)(b) of the Income War Taz
Act, 1917 (Can.) read: 'For the purpose of the normal tax, the income
embraced in a personal return shall be credited with the amount received as
dividends upon the stock or from the net earnings of any company or other
person which is taxable upon its income under this Act'.
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rate was raised to six per cent, but the normal individual rate
remained at four per cent. Thus, the offset allowed at the
personal level was no longer sufficient to compensate fully for
taxes paid at the corporate level. This discrepancy continued,
with variations in magnitude, until 1926, when the dividend
exemption from the normal tax rate was repealed altogether.
The chief reason given by the government for the dramatic
change in 1926 was the need to equalise the tax burden on
earned and unearned (dividend) income.12 7
1926 TO 1949: A CLASSICAL CORPORATE TAX SYSTEM
AND EXPERIMENTING WITH A PARTNERSHIP
ELECTION
When the government adopted a separate corporate tax in 1926,
concern was expressed about its effect on small businesses. In
response, the government agreed to introduce a partnership
election for 'family corporations'. Mr. Boivin, speaking on
behalf of the Minister of Finance, explained the rationale of
the change: 'The government proposes to remedy ... the
discrimination against small corporations ... placing in the bill a
clause ... giving to these corporations the opportunity of
making their own option of paying their taxation as joint stock
companies or as individual partnerships, as they may desire'.128
The provision providing for the election was straightforward." 9
A family corporation was defined as a corporation 75 per cent
of the stock of which was owned by the members of one
family, at least one of whom took an active part in the
business; or, a corporation 80 per cent of the stock of which
was owned by persons actively employed in the business, or by
them and their families.'30  The section providing for the
election then simply stated that the shareholders of a family
corporation could elect to be taxed as a partnership and 'each
shareholder shall then be deemed to be a partner and shall be
127. A Member of Parliament, speaking on behalf of the Minister of Finance,
justified the full taxation of dividends by stating: 'I maintain in the House
and I will maintain it on any platform in the country that a man works
eighteen hours a day in order to earn $10,000 should not pay one cent
more in income tax, than a man who does not one tap of work and who
receives $10,000 in dividends from the Canadian Pacific or the Bank of
Montreal'. George H. Boivin, Canada, House of Commons Debate#, 27 May
1926, at 3771.
128. Id., at 3792.
129. When legislative draft-persons refer to the good old days, it is undoubtedly
sections like this that they are recalling. The measure was only four short
subsections long. A key term in the provision, 'family members', was
undefined, the number of shareholders who had to make the election was
not stipulated and the manner or time of making the election was not
provided for. A residual subsection provided: 'The decision of the Minister
upon any question arising under this section, including any question as to
the application of the term "family" shall be final and conclusive'. Income
Tax War Act, R.S.C. 1927, c. 97, s.22(4).
130. Id., s.2(d).
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taxable in respect of the income of the corporation according
to his interest as a shareholder'.'x In 1930, to prevent non-
residents from escaping the corporate level tax, the provision
was amended to provide that the corporation had to pay tax on
any income accruing to the benefit of non-resident
shareholders.'a It appears that the government did not think
many corporations would take the election. Mr. Boivin said in
the House:
I am still of the opinion that most of these small
corporations will take advantage of the law as it stands and
continue to pay their taxes as corporations, and not as
partnerships. If they pay their taxes as corporations, they
will pay nine per cent on their entire earnings, it is true,
but the individual partners will pay taxes only on what they
withdraw from the company. The surplus that remains in
the company is not taxed over and above the nine per
cent.""
In 1932, without any explanation in the House of Commons,
the measure was repealed. A number of years later the Royal
Commission on the Taxation of Annuities and Family
Corporations suggested that the measure had been repealed
because a large number of corporations had qualified and the
election was seen as 'an unwarranted departure from the
principle of double taxation of corporate profits'.3 4
Even though relief from the separate corporate tax was
provided small businesses, the Canadian Manufacturing
Association and other business groups pressured the
government after 1926 for more general relief from double
taxation.'35  For example, a representative of the Canadian
Manufacturers' Association, in reviewing the 1926 Budget
before the Canadian Tax Conference of the Citizen's Research
Institute said:
The most drastic change was that which cancelled the
exemption from normal tax of dividends from Canadian
companies, the new provision requiring shareholders in
Canadian companies, to pay to the full on their dividends
regardless of the fact that the companies themselves have
already paid income tax.
It is hoped that the government will see fit to abolish
double taxation in the next budget.'36
131. Id., s.22.
132. Ibid., as amended by S.C. 1930, 20-21 Geo. V, c. 24, s.5.
133. Canada, House of Commons Debates, 27 May 1926, at 3792.
134. Ives Commission, supra note 124, at 69.
135. See Perry, supra note 124.
136. Id., at 23.
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By 1931 their petitions seemed to reach the government. In
that year, R.B. Bennett, the Prime Minister and Minister of
Finance, in a rather complicated budget resolution, proposed
that dividends up to one-half of the taxpayer's income be
exempt from tax. An acrimonious debate followed in which
the opposition members accused the Prime Minister of
attempting to benefit primarily himself and his friends. It was
alleged that Bennett personally would save $25 000 a year in
taxes.13 s Bennett withdrew the proposal along with all other
tax amendments proposed in the budget, including a substantial
rate reduction for high-income taxpayers.s'
The issue of double taxation was taken up again by the
Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations, which
reported in 1940.140 The Commissioners expressed concern
about the double taxation of corporate-source income and
noted in particular that it discriminated against the corporate
form of or anisation and resulted in undue reliance upon debt
financing. The report went on to make a rather vague
recommendation for removing double taxation by providing for
a tax credit at the shareholder level. 4 2  The need to raise
revenue for the War precluded any action on the Commission's
recommendation.
The issue of allowing closely-held corporations to elect to
be taxed as partnerships arose again in 1945 in the course of
the hearings of the Royal Commission on The Taxation of
Annuities and Family Corporations (Ives Commission)."3 The
Commission was established to inquire into, among other
things, the tax problems faced by owners of family
corporations when a major shareholder died. Under the
separate corporate tax system, in which corporate rates were
lower than top individual rates, there was a strong inducement
for closely-held corporations to retain their earnings. In this
situation, when the majority shareholder died, it was alleged
that often the combined effect of the succession duties and
income tax liabilities required family members to sell the
137. Canada, House of Commons Debate*, 1 June 1931, at 2176.
138. Id., 16 July 1931, at 3854-6.
139. See generally, R.B. Bryce, Maturing in Hard Times: Canada's Department of
Finance Through the Great Depression (Kingston: McGill-Queen's University
Press, 1986), at 104-5.
140. Canada, Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations, Report,
(Ottawa: King's Printer for Canada, 1940). The Commission's terms of
reference included a direction to examine the equity and efficiency of the
tax system.
141. Id., Book I, at 213; Book II, at 153.
142. Id., Book II, at 153. For a detailed description of the background
surrounding the Commission's recommendations on taxation, and an
acknowledgement of the reliance placed on American commentators on
corporate tax see Wynne, supra note 124.
143. Ives Commission, supra note 124.
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business. One of the solutions to this problem that the
Commission considered, and which several witnesses suggested,
was the re-introduction of a partnership election for family
corporations. In this way, the accumulating income of the
corporation would be taxed each year as it was earned at the
shareholder's rates. Thus there would not be a large bunching
problem at death when income was withdrawn to pay the
succession duties. For two reasons the Commission did not
think this was a satisfactory resolution of the problem. First,
the Commission stated that, since such a large proportion of
Canadian corporations were family or closely-held corporations(the Commission estimated that about 30 per cent of Canadian
companies would be entitled to take such an election if the
1926 provisions were re-introduced), 'it would seem an
unwarranted departure from the principle of double taxation of
corporate profits to grant a single tax basis to them unless it
was a part of a basic change in the whole field of taxation of
corporate profits'." Second, they noted that in periods of
high individual marginal tax rates such a solution would result
in many closely-held corporations paying much higher taxes.
In 1945, the corporate rate was 40 per cent, the top personal
rate was 85 per cent. Thus the Commission concluded that,
'[t]he adoption of the old "family corporation" principle would,
in many cases, prevent a company from retaining a reasonable
proportion of its earnings for unforeseen contingencies and for
the normal growth and expansion of the business"' 5 and that it
'might well act as a serious limitation on the development of
Canadian business'."
1949 TO 1972: DIVIDEND RELIEF AND A LOWER RATE
OF TAX
After World War II, the business community renewed its
agitation for relief from double taxation. In 1945, the Minister
of Finance, the Right Honourable J.L. Ilsley, promised at a
Dominion-Provincial Conference on Reconstruction that if the
federal government were given exclusive occupancy of the
personal, corporate, and succession tax fields, it would
eliminate a portion of the double taxation corporate-source
income. Even though it did not obtain such agreement at the
conference," in 1949, as part of a major tax revision effort,
the government responded to the pressures for both relief from
double taxation in general and relief for small business in
particular. Shareholders were given a tax credit equal to ten
per cent of the amount of their dividend income as a way of
144. Id., at 69.
145. Id., at 70.
146. Ibid.
147. See Allan, supra note 124, at 16-17.
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partially compensating them for the tax paid at the corporate
level. Small businesses were given the benefit of a lower rate
of tax of ten per cent on their first $10 000 of corporate
income.
The primary purpose of enacting a dividend tax credit was
to provide an incentive for corporate investment."1 4  The
dividend relief took the form of a dividend-received credit
instead of a withholding type arrangement, that is, a gross-up
and credit arrangement. This method was used because it was
simpler and because it was felt that it would be easier to
justify making it non-refundable, particularly to non-
residents.'" This last point was particularly significant since it
was estimated that over 60 per cent of dividends paid by
Canadian companies went to non-resident shareholders. o
As first enacted, the credit was limited to dividends paid to
common shareholders, apparently on the assumption that the
incidence of the corporate income tax fell only on the common
shareholders. It was later extended to preferred shareholders
because of the technical difficulties of distinguishing between
the two classes of shares, uncertainty about the incidence of
the corporate tax, and the desire to accomplish the related
objective of the credit which was to encourage equity
148. In introducing the credit the Minister of Finance, the Honourable D.C.
Abbott, explained: 'Today we find governments in this country as well as
in most other countries, taxing away at least a third of corporate profits.
In addition, the personal income tax rates apply in full to what is
distributed out of the remaining two-thirds. The tax may be as high as
80 per cent upon distributions to shareholders. It seems to me that under
a system of private enterprise which depends for its existence on a steady
flow of venture capital we cannot afford to neglect the implication of this
defect in our tax system, which has been accentuated by the increase in
both corporate and personal tax rates'. Canada, House of Commons
Debates, 22 March 1949, at 1799.
In addition he explained: 'My second proposal introduces a measure of
reform which has long been a declared objective of this government. I refer
to the removal of double taxation of corporate profits ... As a first step in
dealing with this problem I am proposing that parliament should allow
individuals a credit against their personal income tax equal to 10 per cent
of the dividends they receive from common shares of Canadian taxpaying
corporations': Ibid.
149. See Eaton, supra note 124, at 76.
150. Note, 'Corporate Profits and Dividends under the Income Tax Act', Report
of the Fourth Tax Conference, Dec. 1950 (Toronto: Canadian Tax
Foundation, 1950), at 11. The inadequacies of the dividend -received credit,
including the fact that it was less equitable than a gross-up and credit
arrangement, were well-recognised. However, at a meeting of the Canadian
Tax Foundation, after considering a number of alternative proposals in what
was obviously a spirited debate, the members concluded that the dividend-
tax-credit to Canadian shareholders '... was at least as satisfactory a
method of dealing with the problem at this stage as any other so far
considered: that it had the advantages of simplicity, flexibility, low-revenue
cost, and neutrality as regards non-residents; and that it was an
encouraging first step which should go forward': Id., at 12. The merits of
the dividend-received credit were still being debated in 1971. For a
defence of the dividend-received credit over a gross-up and credit
arrangement see Ontario, Hon. W. Darcy McKeough, Taxation of
Corporations and Shareholders (Ontario Proposals for Tax Reform in
Canada III) (Toronto: Department of Treasury and Economics, 1970).
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investment.15 1 In 1953 the dividend tax credit was increased to
20 per cent and in 1957 it was extended so that it could
offset any personal tax liability (as originally enacted it could
only be applied against personal tax liability incurred on the
dividend income). Otherwise, the design of the credit
remained essentially unchanged from 1949 to 1972.
In addition to the dividend tax credit, a dual rate structure
for corporations was introduced in 1949. The corporate rate
on the first $10 000 of corporate profits was set at ten per
cent; the rate on the excess was set at 33 per cent. When the
dual rate was introduced an interesting trade-off was made.
Before the introduction of the dual rate the corporate tax rate
had been 30 per cent. In order to make the change revenue
neutral, when the lower rate of ten per cent was introduced
the basic rate was increased by three percentage points to 33
per cent. Thus, even though the lower rate of tax applied to
all firms, overall small firms gained (it was estimated that all
firms earning under $77 000 would gain), while the burden on
large firms was increased. In introducing the proposed change
the Minister of Finance indicated that it was designed to
encourage the growth of small businesses by leaving them more
income after tax for reinvestment.153
When coupled with the ten per cent dividend tax credit, the
low rate for small business achieved almost complete
integration for small businesses with profits less than
$10 000.154 Thus, the dividend tax credit served two purposes:
First, it encouraged Canadian investment in Canadian
companies in a general way by increasing the after-tax value
of dividends and thus the value of Canadian shares. Second,
in conjunction with the dual corporate rate, it provided a
measure of tax structure balance by roughly equating the tax
151. See Eaton, supra note 124, at 77.
152. The Minister of Finance, the Honourable Mr. Abbott, justified the increase
on the basis that it was a second step in removing double taxation on
corporate source income and that it would further encourage Canadians to
invest in Canadian equities. Canada, House of Commons Debates, 19
February 1953, at 2128.
153. The Liberal Minister of Finance, the Honourable Mr. Abbott, justified the
measure in the following terms: 'The house will at once recognise this as
tax relief for small businesses and will, I trust, be heartily in accord with
the policy. Our country as a whole owes a great deal to the small family
type of business. They have to struggle along, grow and develop in
competition with large and well financed corporations whose activities may
be nation-wide. My own belief is that small businesses should be
encouraged and it seems to me that a useful way to do this is to lower the
tax and take less out of the funds they need for growth and expansion'.
Canada, House of Commons Debates, 15 November 1949, at 1798.
154. Contrary to assertions by the government, see Abbott in Debates, id., at
1799, the integration was not perfect. The 10 per cent tax imposed on
small businesses was greater than the 10 per cent credit on dividends paid
that shareholders received. For example, a corporation with income of $100
would pay tax of $10. If it distributed all of its after-tax earnings, $90,
its shareholders would only be entitled to a credit of $9. Thus an element
of double tax remained even for small businesses.
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position of small incorporated businesses with their
unincorporated counterpart.
The rate of tax on small businesses and the amount of
taxable income eligible for the low rate were increased from
time to time. By 1971, when the system underwent radical
reform, the standard corporate tax rate was 50 per cent and the
lower corporate tax rate was 21 per cent on the first $35 000
of taxable income.
After 1949 there appears to have been no pressure for
partnership treatment of small corporations. In large part this
was no doubt due to the fact that, because of the reduced rate
on small business, and the dividend tax credit most business
people paid less tax if they were incorporated. Indeed, most
commentators were positively opposed to the idea. Prior to the
1949 amendments, a discussion group of the Canadian Tax
Foundation, in considering the same problem addressed by the
Ives Committee, recommended, on balance, the creation of a
new type of company having a right of election similar to that
enjoyed by the 'family corporation' as it existed prior to 1933.
However, they suggested that at the existing high rates of
individual tax this alone would not be an effective solution to
the problems of small businesses.'5s Petrie, a leading
commentator and Director of Research at the Canadian Tax
Foundation, concluded in his exhaustive study of the Canadian
corporate tax that compulsory partnership treatment for
closely-held corporations was unacceptable since it would
expose the retained earnings of growing small corporations to
highly progressive rates of personal income tax.' 7 He also
rejected optional partnership treatment for closely-held
corporations on the grounds that it would create inequities
between those corporations that elected such treatment and
those that did not.1fe
155. See D. Ivor, 'The Present Status of the Corporation Income Tax' (1957) 4
Canadian Tax Journal 112, at 118-9 ('It is difficult to see why the private
corporation should be taxed in a way that is different from the partnership
or the sole proprietorship. However, as mentioned previously, recent
Canadian legislation ... has in almost every case, placed the private
corporation in a preferred position to other forms of organisation insofar as
income taxation is concerned').
156. See M. Douglas, 'Tax Treatment of Closely-Held Corporations' in Canadian
Tax Foundation, Report of the [Second Tax Conference, Nov. 1948
(Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 1949) .
157. See The Taxation of Corporate Income in Canada, supra note 124, at 289-
90. He quoted Professor Butters with approval, who stated: 'Probably
there is a general agreement that such a tax policy would be intolerable.
Butters, supra note 92, at 79.
158. The Taxation of Corporate Income in Canada, supra note 124, at 290 ('If
the plan were made optional, the corporations concerned would presumably
select the tax basis more favourable to them. The very principle underlying
a plan to allow certain companies to choose a method of taxation which
allows the shareholders to select one tax that is lower than another violates
all canons of tax equity and tax neutrality').
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1967: THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON TAXATION
The issue appears not to have been canvassed again until the
Royal Commission on Taxation (Carter Commission) reported
in 1967.'59 The Carter Commission, whose report is widely
regarded as one of the most comprehensive and detailed
blueprints for tax reform, proposed a radical plan for tax
reform in Canada based upon a comprehensive tax base. One
of its major recommendations was the integration of the
corporate and shareholder tax. The Commission did not
recommend integration be achieved by the partnership method,for all of the familiar reasons: (1) 'A complete and
theoretically consistent allocation of the year's income would
require that the various persons who had held the shares of the
company for varying periods during the year would be
allocated their share of the year's income. This would be
extremely difficult.' (2) 'The final order or priority of the
rights of individual shareholders would have to be settled every
year for the sharing of the year's income among them. This
might be contrary to contractual arrangements already in
existence.' (3) Liquidity problems would be created for
shareholders deemed to have received substantial amounts of
income in a year in which it was not possible for the
corporation to pay out cash. (4) The partnership option would
not provide an acceptable basis for the taxation of income
flowing to non-residents.'60
Instead of full partnership treatment for corporations, the
Carter Commission recommended the optional allocation of
retained earnings to shareholders. Under the Commission's
scheme of integration: (1) A withholding tax of 50 per cent of
taxable earnings would be imposed on corporations. (2)
Shareholders would include all dividends in income, grossed-up
to account for the corporate tax paid, and then receive a tax
credit for the corporate tax paid. (3) Resident shareholders
would also include in their income each year, at the
corporation's election, their share of the corporation's
undistributed income for the year, grossed-up to account for
the corporate tax paid, and then receive a tax credit for the
corporate tax paid. (4) The adjusted cost basis of the shares
would be written up by the amount of allocated retentions.'
Even though the Commission recommended nearly full
integration of corporate and shareholder tax, it recommended
159. Canada, Royal Commission on Taxation, Report, vol. 4 (Chairperson:
Kenneth L.M. Carter) (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1966) [hereinafter Carter
Commission].
160. Id., at 45.
161. For a brief description of the scheme see id., at 7-8; for details see id., at
49-81. For an argument that this less ambitious approach to integration
still entails most of the problems of full integration by the partnership
method see McLure, supra note 36, at 160-6.
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that certain small corporations be allowed to elect to be taxed
as partnerships, for two reasons."s2  First, under the
Commission's proposed system of integration, corporations
would have to pay a withholding tax at a rate of 50 per cent,
which would later be refunded to the shareholders. In
recommending the partnership option the Commission noted
that the 50 per cent corporate withholding tax might cause
liquidity problems for small corporations whose shareholders
were in lower income tax brackets. Second, under its proposed
system of integration the Commission recommended that losses
not be passed through to shareholders but instead simply be
carried forward to be applied against corporate income.
Under the partnership option losses could be allocated to
individual shareholders.
Essentially, a corporation that made the election would be
taxed like a partnership. However, to ensure that the provision
could be easily administered, and to prevent abuses, the
Commission proposed that the following restrictions be
imposed upon the ability to take the election: the election
would have to be approved by 90 per cent of the shareholders;
the income of the corporation for the taxation year in which
the election was made could not exceed $200 000; only
corporations with 15 or fewer shareholders could take the
election; all shareholders would have to be resident in Canada;
and, an election could only be made if the corporation had
distributed all of its prior year's income.
The Commission also recommended that the low rate of tax
for small businesses be abolished. It opposed it as a form of
assistance for small businesses for the following reasons:16 4 (1)
Even though its rationale was to assist small businesses, it was
only available to small businesses that were incorporated. (2)
Even though non-profitable small businesses might be in
greater need of assistance, the subsidy was only available to
profitable small businesses. (3) Even though its purpose was to
assist businesses to expand, it was received by corporations that
used their increased profits for purposes unrelated to the
business or to increase the amount of distributions to
shareholders. (4) Even though the low rate was intended to
subsidise small firms that had difficulty raising outside capital
for expansion because of imperfections in the capital market, it
was available to firms irrespective of the value of their assets,
gross sales, or the income or wealth of their owners. (5) It
applied to the first $35 000 of corporate income regardless of
the magnitude of the total income of the corporation. (6) By
reducing the tax on low-income corporations in perpetuity it
tended to cushion the market pressures on inefficient and
162. Carter Commission, supra note 159, at 68-70, 91.
163. Id., at 60.
164. Id., at 270-3 and App. I, at 703-24.
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declining firms. (7) The concession created many potential
avenues for abuse; in particular, it was largely responsible for
the complex associated-corporation legislation.
The Commission considered a number of alternatives to the
dual rate of corporate tax as a means of assisting small
businesses. They did not consider that the partnership option
that they had recommended would be 'a sufficient amelioration
of the serious results of complete withdrawal of the low rate of
corporation tax'165 because 'in most cases the net result of this
option would be an increase in the overall tax burden'.166
Also, they noted that 'corporations whose shareholders are all
employees or possibly directors effectively have this option
available to them now in their ability to fix levels of
remuneration'. 17 With some considerable reluctance they
recommended that within certain stringent restrictions, new
and small businesses should be allowed a 100 per cent write-
off for certain capital assets. The available write-off would be
limited to $250 000 over a ten-year period. 68
Unlike many other recommendations in its report, the
Commission's recommendations with respect to small businesses
met with approval, or at least resignation. For example, in
commenting on the reaction to the abolition of the dual rate
one commentator noted 'most people recognise defects in the
dual rate and are prepared to consider abolition with or
without a substitute'. It is interesting to speculate why the
Carter Commission's proposal to abolish the dual rate provoked
so little response when, three years later, a similar proposal by
the government provoked so much adverse reaction that it
threatened the whole tax reform exercise.170 Perhaps, the
seemingly apathetic reaction of the small business community
to the Carter Commission proposals was simply due to the fact
that small business was not organised in 1967, or perhaps they
165. Id., at 719.
166. Ibid.
167. Id., at 718-9. However, they noted that it would be of advantage to small
corporations where the shareholders are not employees.
168. Id., at 276-82, 286-7. This suggestion by Carter - to provide an
accelerated capital cost allowance for new and small businesses - was never
seriously pursued in the ensuing tax reform debate largely because, while it
would assist small manufacturing firms, for example, it provided no
assistance to firms in the service industry which wished to expand. See
White Paper on Tax Reform: Summary of Public Hearings (Toronto: CCH,
1970), at 331-2.
169. E. Saunders, 'Tax Treatment of New and Small Business', in Canadian Tax
Foundation, Report of the Twentieth Tax Conference, Nov. 1967 (Toronto:
Canadian Tax Foundation, 1968), at 274. See also D.B. Fields; Id., at 279;
W.D. Goodman, 'Integration', Id., at 67; S.D. Thom, 'Taxation of
Corporations' in Canadian Tax Foundation, Report of the Nineteenth Tax
Conference, April 1967 (Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 1968) 48, at 57
('In the face of the obvious anomalies resulting from the present two-rate
schedule and the severe problems for government and taxpayer alike
encountered in maintaining the associated company concept, the
Commission's proposals are eminently superior').
170. See infra text, note 198.
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did not feel threatened because the Commission maintained
that small business did warrant some special attention.
The partnership election also met with general approval,
although, for many businesses it would not be significant since
it could be achieved, in effect, under the existing law simply
by paying salaries.172  One commentator referred to it simply as
'integration in a hurry'.17" The ability to pass out losses was
regarded as the most significant aspect of the election.174
Commentators noted that this aspect of the election would
stimulate investment in new and risky businesses.
1969: THE WHITE PAPER
Three years after the Carter Commission published its report,
the government published its own Proposals for Tax Reform
(White Paper).1 7" Although the proposals were not as far
reaching as those of the Carter Commission, they still
represented a substantial tax reform effort.177  The over-riding
objective of the White Paper proposals was to ensure that the
tax system facilitated economic growth by not interfering with
business decisions. With respect to the taxation of closely-held
corporations, the White Paper began with the assumption that
closely-held corporations competed with proprietorships and
partnerships. 7 Therefore, the principal objective of the
proposals in relation to small businesses was 'to design a system
that will produce the same tax on a Canadian whether he
carries on his business in his own name or whether he
, 17gincorporates it,.
To achieve this objective, the White Paper made three
significant recommendations in relation to small businesses.
First, closely-held corporations meeting certain requirements
would be given the option of being taxed as partnerships.8 0
171. See Saunders, espra note 169, and Fields, espra note 169.
172. D.R. Huggett, 'Integration' in Canadian Tax Foundation, Report of the
Twentieth Tax Conference, Nov. 1967 (Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation,
1968) 81, at 87 ('The Commission recognised that [abolition of the low rate
of corporate taxf might cause some problems to small businesses in that
there would be a time lag between the payment of the 50 per cent
corporate tax and the refund to the shareholders of the excess tax. This is
not a grave problem since most small businesses could eliminate the
corporate tax or reduce it by crediting the shareholders with salaries.').
173. Fields, supra note 169, at 282.
174. Id., at 283.
175. C. Shoup, 'Economic Implications' in Canadian Tax Foundation, Report of
the Nineteenth Tax Conference, April 1967 (Toronto: Canadian Tax
Foundation, 1968) 70, at 73-4.
176. Hon. E.J. Benson, Minister of Finance Proposals for Tax Reform (Ottawa:
Queen's Printer, 1969).
177. See generally, J.G. Head, 'Evolution of the Canadian Tax Reform' (1973) 1
Dalhousie Law Review 51.
178. Proposals for Tax Reform, supra note 176, at para. 4.19.
179. Id., at para. 4.20.
180. Id., at para. 4.21.
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Second, shareholders of closely-held corporations which did
not meet these requirements, or did not elect to be taxed as
partnerships, would be given credit for the full amount of the
tax paid by the corporation when profits were distributed.""'
Third, the lower the rate of tax on corporate income would be
abolished."" All corporate income would bear tax at a rate of
50 per cent.18s
Although it is clear from the White Paper that the details of
the 'partnership option' had not been thought through, it was
proposed that a corporation would qualify to be treated as a
partnership only if: " (1) It was a closely-held corporation
(basicall, a corporation whose shares were not widely
traded). 85 (2) All shareholders of the corporation signed an
election agreeing to be so taxed. (3) It was clear what portion
of the profits each shareholder would receive. (4) All
shareholders were individuals resident in Canada or
corporations incorporated in Canada. (5) All corporate
shareholders had the same fiscal year-end as the electing
corporation.
To foster discussion, the White Paper was referred to the
House of Commons' Standing Committee on Finance, Trade
and Economic Affairs, which held public hearings on the
proposals. It received over 500 briefs, mainly from business
organisations."' A large number of the briefs commented on
the White Paper's proposal that closely-held corporations be
given a partnership option. 87 The reaction to the proposal was
coloured by the fact that the government proposed partnership
treatment for closely-held corporations (which would include
wholly-owned subsidiaries of widely-held corporations) not
only as a way of equalising the tax burden on unincorporated
and incorporated small businesses, but also as an indirect way
of allowing related corporate groups to report their income on
a consolidated basis. On this latter issue, most business
groups argued that the government should have gone all the
way and allowed the filing of consolidated returns; however, in
the absence of this they supported the partnership election as a
means of allowin some form of consolidated reporting among
corporate groups. 8 However, those presenting briefs were
181. Id., at para. 4.24.
182. Id., at para. 4.30.
183. Id., at paras 4.24, 4.35.
184. Id., at paras 4.20 to 4.23.
185. Id., at para. 4.43.
186. See White Paper on Tax Reform: Summary of Public Hearings, supra note
168.
187. Id., at 327-9.
188. Proposals for Tax Reform, supra note 176, at para. 5.22.
189. Many briefs suggested, however, that unless the subsidiary was wholly-
owned, the partnership option would not be available to achieve consolidated
reporting either because some of the shareholders might be non-residents,
the subsidiary might have two classes of shares, a minority shareholder
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generally unexcited by the partnership method as an option for
small businesses. Most noted that the 50 per cent individual
tax rate, which was equivalent to the corporate tax rate, was
reached at only $24 000. Therefore, the election would be of
no benefit to shareholders in income brackets greater than this.
Furthermore, the election would provide no assistance to small
businesses which were attempting to retain capital for
expansion. One or two briefs noted that it would be of
assistance to start-up firms since it would allow them to offset
losses against their individual income; however, for some
reason this was not a point that was emphasised in the White
Paper, or even explicitly mentioned, and very few briefs
commented on it.
The second significant recommendation made in the White
Paper in relation to small business was that, for closely-held
corporations that did not satisfy the requirements for the
partnership election, or otherwise did not elect to be taxed as a
partnership, shareholders would receive a credit against their
individual tax liability for the full tax paid by the corporation
on distributed profits. Under this integration proposal:190  to
receive credit for the corporation tax, a shareholder would be
required to 'gross up' the dividend received by adding the
applicable portion of the tax paid by the corporation on the
distributed earnings;""1 the dividend tax credit was to be
refundable (thus low-income taxpayers would receive the full
amount of the credit); the credit could be claimed on both cash
dividends and stock dividends (thus corporations did not have
to pay out cash in order to give the shareholders the benefit of
the creditable tax); shareholders could claim the creditable tax
only on dividends that were paid from income upon which tax
had in fact been paid at the corporate level (thus if no tax was
paid at the corporate level because the corporation was able to
claim a tax expenditure, for example, no credit was given
when the income was distributed); and, the credit was to be
available only on dividends paid out of surplus that had been
earned by the corporation within two and one-half years of the
dividend distribution (in order to limit the amount of
might not consent, or the year-end of the subsidiary corporation might not
coincide with the year-end of the parent corporation. To meet some of
those concerns a number of briefs suggested that the option should be
allowed where non-resident shareholders undertake to file Canadian income
tax returns reporting their Canadian source income, and where the electing
shareholders agree to assume the tax liability in respect of income
allocatable to a minority shareholder who does not agree to sign the
election. See Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants, 'Submission to
the House of Commons Standing Committee on Finance, Trade and
Economic Affairs' in Canada, House of Commons, Standing Committee on
Finance, Trade and Economic Affairs, 28th Parl., 2d. Sess., Proceedings
(Chairperson: G. Clermont) (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1970), No. 49, App.
B-46, 91, at 136.
190. Proposals for Tax Reform, supra note 176, at paras 4.25 to 4.27.
191. Id., at para. 4.24.
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outstanding claims against the government). As an integral
part of its objective to make the tax system as neutral as
possible, the White Paper also proposed that shareholders of
closely-held corporations be required to include in ordinary
income the full amount of any capital gain realised from the
sale of the corporation's shares.
The White Paper proposed only partial integration for
publicly-held corporations.19 2  Shareholders were to be given
credit for only one-half the corporate tax paid on the income
from which the dividend was paid. The authors of the White
Paper apparently assumed that only one-half the corporate tax
was borne by shareholders. (the other half was shifted to
consumers) and therefore shareholders should be entitled only
to a credit for one-half the corporate tax paid on distributed
income. To compensate, in some sense, for the limitation on
the shareholder credit, only one-half of the capital gains from
the disposition of shares of widely-held companies were to be
taxed. Then, in a radical move, to prevent long accruals and
the bunching of capital gains the White Paper proposed that
shares of public corporations should be re-valued every five
years and the accrued gains taxed at that time.
The following criticisms were made of the White Paper's
integration proposals.9 s First, tax practitioners argued that the
distinction between closely-held and widely-held corporations
was too arbitrary to justify the significant distinctions with
respect to integration and capital gains tax. (Clearly many
closely-held corporations would be as large as widely-held
corporations and would be competing with them.) Second,
investors argued that the deemed realisation of publicly-traded
shares at five-year intervals would discourage long-term
investments in those securities. Moreover, controlling
shareholders of such corporations argued that such a rule
would force sales of large blocks of shares, force down the
market price of the shares and disrupt continuity of ownership
and management. Third, there was strong objection to the
washing out of corporate tax preferences when dividends were
paid. Finally, accountants and tax lawyers expressed concern
about the complications introduced by providing that the
dividend tax credit would only be available for corporate
income that had borne the corporate level tax and the rule that
the dividend tax credits on income earned in a year would be
lost if the income was not distributed to shareholders within
two and one-half years. In response to these criticisms the
192. Id., at paras 4.34 to 4.42.
193. See White Paper on Tax Reform: Summary of Public Hearings, supra note
168. See also, generally, S.E. Edwards, 'The White Paper: Corporations'
(1970) 18 Canadian Tax Journal 83; L.J. Smith, 'Taxation of Corporations'
in Canadian Tax Foundation, Report of the Twenty-Second Tax Conference,
Nov., 1970 (Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 1971), at 101.
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government considerably modified its integration proposals, as
described below. 94
It is significant that the White Paper had recommended a
partnership election even though it proposed full imputation
for closely-held corporations. The partnership election could
benefit small business in three ways: First, for low-income
shareholders it would obviate any liquidity problems posed by
having to pay the 50 per cent corporate tax and then not
receiving a refund, in effect, until the payment of dividends.
Second, it would allow owners of closely-held corporations to
pass out losses. Third, it would allow small businesses to
receive the same benefit from tax expenditures as sole
proprietors and partnerships. By way of elaboration on this
last advantage, under the White Paper's integration proposals
shareholders would only receive a dividend tax credit if the
distributed corporate earnings had in fact borne tax at the
corporate level. Thus if the corporation was entitled to claim a
tax incentive, its effect would be washed out when corporate
earnings were distributed because shareholders would have to
include the full amount of the earnings in income. Therefore,
tax incentives would benefit shareholders of closely-held
corporations only as long as the income was retained in the
corporation. However, by electing partnership treatment the
shareholders of closely-held corporations could derive the same
benefit from tax incentives as if they were operating as
partnerships.
In addition to the partnership election and integration, the
third major recommendation of the White Paper that directly
affected closely-held corporations was the abolition of the
lower rate of corporate tax.'95 The authors of the White Paper
gave two reasons for proposing the removal of the low rate of
corporate tax. First, consistent with their concern with a
neutral tax system, they noted that the low rate gave small
corporations 'a significant advantage over those persons with
similar incomes who did not or could not incorporate their
business'.'96  Second, the low rate encouraged taxpayers to
incorporate several corporations to take advantage of the low
194. In addition to the explicitly asserted criticism of the form of integration
recommended by the Carter Commission and the White Paper, there were
very likely two other explanations for the vociferous attacks on it. First,
most business people linked integration with the taxation of capital gains
and therefore perhaps felt that if they could get the government retreat on
integration it would also withdraw the capital gain's roposals Second
many of the business briefs opposing tax reform would have been prepare
by corporate managers not shareholders. Corporate managers might be
expected to oppose integration because it would place pressure on them to
increase pay-out ratios.
195. Proposals for Tax Reform, supra note 176, at paras 4.15 to 4.18. The dual
rate was to be removed by lowering the $35 000 limit by $7000 annually
over . five year period.
196. Id., at 47, para. 4.15.
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tax rate when for business purposes one corporation would
do.197
No aspect of the White Paper aroused so much political
opposition as its proposal to eliminate the lower corporate tax
rate without substituting an alternative incentive."' Large
corporations, investment firms, and boards of trade all joined
small business representatives in criticising the proposal. Many
briefs argued that the dual rate was the optimal way of
subsidising small businesses. Others admitted the defects in
the subsidy program but suggested that it should stay at least
until an alternative program was in place. Over 60 briefs
commented adversely on this proposal.
Before reviewing the House of Commons Committee's
recommendations, it is worth noting how well the White Paper
had achieved its objective, namely the neutrality of the tax
system, in this area. The logic and symmetry of the White
Paper is not always appreciated by tax commentators.
Basically, under the proposals, the tax system would be neutral
as to whether a person carried on a small business as a sole
proprietorship, partnership or as a corporation. If the business
was carried on as a corporation, the same tax would normally
be paid whether the owner left the earnings in the corporation
or extracted them either in the form of salary or as dividends.
Approximately the same tax would be paid whether the owners
extracted the corporate earnings every year or allowed them to
accumulate and then subsequently sold the business and
realised a capital gain. Finally, upon sale, the same tax would
be paid whether the owners decided to sell the company's
assets or its shares.
1971: THE PARLIAMENTARY COMMITTEE REPORTS
AND THE ONTARIO GOVERNMENT PROPOSALS
In view of the adverse reaction to the White Paper's
recommendations, the House of Commons Committee
recommended that half of the corporate tax be integrated for
all corporations, but that full integration be extended to
$50 000 of taxable income annually of closely-held
corporations." With respect to the partnership option, the
Committee noted that it would be a useful device and 'we
should like to see it extended as far as is consistent with our
197. Id., at 47, para. 4.16.
198. See White Paper on Tax Reform: Summary of Public Hearings supra note
168, at 331-40; J.J. MacIntyre and D.B. Fields, 'The White aper: Black
Looks from Small Corporations' (1970) 18 Canadian Tax Journal 131.
199. Canada, Standing Committee on Finance, Trade and Economic Affairs,Eighteenth Report: Respecting the White Paper on Tax Reform (Chairperson:
G. Clermont) (Ottawa: Queen's Printer for Canada, 1970), at 42.
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general recommendations for half integration'.20 0 Finally,
although the Committee agreed that the lower rate of corporate
tax was an inappropriate subsidy for small business, they
concluded that small business should obtain some form of tax
relief and encouraged the government to replace it with a more
appropriate tax subsidy.2  If the government could not
formulate a better plan, they recommended that the small
business incentive be available to a business with taxable
income of up to $35 000 and that when this figure was passed,
the relief be phased out under a notch provision so that it
would be withdrawn altogether when taxable income reached
$105 000.202
Two further significant proposals for taxing small business
were made at about the same time as the House of Commons
Committee reported. When the government's White Paper was
tabled the Senate referred it to its Standing Committee on
Banking, Trade and Commerce. This Committee also held
hearings and ultimately published a report of its
recommendations.203  Not surprisingly, given the make-up of
the Canadian Senate, their report was essentially a defence of
the status quo. They wrote a particularly strong defence of the
low rate of tax for small business. 20 ' After reviewing the usual
arguments about the importance of retained earnings to the
growth of small businesses and the importance of small
businesses to the economy, 20 they responded to both of the
White Paper's arguments against a low rate of corporate tax.
First, they argued that the fact that the credit did not benefit
unincorporated firms was of trivial consequence since
unincorporated business 'usually fall into the non-growth
category' and seldom compete against corporated firms.206
Second, they argued that the problem of the incorporation of
several related firms in order to obtain the benefit of the low
rate in each corporation was not as serious as the authors of
the White Paper had suggested. They argued that the broad
discretion that was given to the Minister of National Revenue
to 'associate' corporations whose existence had no business
purpose had largely solved the problem. 207  However, the
Senate Committee went on to make two recommendations as to
how the lower rate of tax could be better targeted. First, they
suggested that it should be restricted to the 'business' income
200. Id., at 49.
201. Id., at 52.
202. Id., at 53.
203. Canada, Standing Senate Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce,
Report on the White Paper Proposals for Tax Reform (Chairperson: Salter
A. Hayden) (Ottawa, 1970).
204. Id., at 65, para. 6 and Appendix 'The Small Business Corporation', at 79.
205. Id., at 79-80.
206. Id., at 81.
207. Ibid.
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of small business corporations. Second, to prevent large
corporations from benefiting from it, when a firm's net income
exceeded $100 000 they recommended that the low rate be
gradually withdrawn.2 0 s
In responding to the White Paper, the Ontario Government
also presented an alternative proposal for small business
taxation.2o9 Along with the two Parliamentary Committees, the
Ontario Government also felt strongly that small businesses
should be encouraged through the tax system. However, it
admitted that the dual rate structure had disadvantages. In
addition to disadvantages pointed out by others, the Ontario
Government emphasised the following points. First, the low
tax rate benefited high-income taxpayers proportionately more
than low-income taxpayers. 210  Second, the low rate(particularly a disappearing incentive) penalised success and
encouraged tax manipulation to keep income down in order to
avoid the higher rates. 21' Third, the low rate, or any incentive
based on a size of business test, discouraged mergers that
might increase efficiency through increased scale of
operations. 212 Finally, '[a]n incentive related only to business
earnings does nothing for the business which one might argue
needs it most - the business suffering losses or not yet
profitable. While it has the merit of being success related, it
may jeopardise success, by not becoming available early
enough in the life of a business'.
In place of the low rate of tax, the Ontario Government
proposed a small business incentive tax credit that would be
given directly to an individual investing in a small business.
Although this is not the place to describe and analyse it in
detail, it would have been a vastly superior instrument, in my
view, to the small business credit ultimately passed by the
federal government.2 14
208. Id., at 65, para. 6 and at 81-2.
209. Ontario, Hon. Charles MacNaughton, Treasurer and Minister of Economics,
Taz Reform and Small Business (Ontario Proposals for Tax Reform in
Canada II) (Toronto: Department of Treasury and Economics, 1970).
210. Id., at 18 ('it does not begin to provide any significant tax relief until
personal incomes exceed about $10,000 and becomes proportionately more
valuable as individual incomes increase').
211. Id., at 26.
212. Ibid., n.3 ('if four owner-operators each had a business of the maximum
qualifying size, then however sensible it might be for them to join together,
the tax cost would be $30,000 a year under the present option ... ').
213. Id., at 26.
214. For a description of, and suggestions for a number of improvements in, the
proposal, see J. Bossons, 'The Ontario Proposals for a Small Business Tax
Incentive' (1971) 19 Canadian Tax Journal 173. Policy instruments similar
to that proposed by the Ontario Government have subsequently been
enacted by many provincial governments.
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1972: TARGETING THE LOWER RATE OF TAX - THE
SMALL BUSINESS CREDIT 2 1
Following almost a decade of study, the government introduced
its tax reform legislation on 18 June 1971. The bill was passed
by the end of the year and made effective for 1972 and
subsequent years. 2 6  Determined to repeal the lower rate of
corporate tax, but yielding to pressure to provide some form of
general relief for closely-held corporations, the government
enacted a tax credit of 21 per cent of taxable income for
qualifying small businesses. 21  The effect of the credit is to
reduce the federal corporate tax rate for qualifying
corporations from 46 to 25 per cent. 218  Before examining the
details of the small business credit, the changes in the dividend
tax credit will be briefly reviewed. The combined effect of
the small business credit and the reformed dividend tax credit
was to completely integrate the corporate and shareholder tax
on distributions from income that qualified for the small
business credit.
Two important changes were made in the dividend tax
credit. First, it was increased from 20 to 33.3 per cent of
dividends paid.219  Thus, the credit offset 25 points of
corporate tax in the hands of the individual shareholders. For
most corporations this was about one-half of their corporate
215. For a general description of the small business credit and subsequent
developments see Symposium, 'The Small Business Credit' (1979) 1
Canadian Taxation (No. 2) 29; W.J. Strain, 'The Small Business Rules: "0
What a Tangled Web ... !"' in Canadian Tax Foundation, Report of the
Thirty-Fourth Tax Conference, 1982 (Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation,
1983) 53; B. Shinder, 'The Taxation of Small Business: An Historical and
Technical Overview (1984) 32 Canadian Tax Journal 1.
216. Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1952, c. 148, as amended by S.C. 1970-71-72, c.
63.
217. Id., s.125. The credit was actually set at 25 per cent in 1972 and then
reduced by one percentage point a year until it reached 21 per cent in
1976. The reduction in the credit paralleled the reduction in the corporate
tax rate from 50 per cent in 1972 to 46 per cent in 1976. Id., s.123(1).
218. Forty-six per cent is the basic federal corporate tax rate. The federal
government provides a tax credit of 10 per cent of a corporation's taxable
income earned in the year in a province. Each province then imposes its
own tax on corporations. In 1985 these rates varied from 10 to 16 per
cent, and three to 10 per cent on taxable income that qualified for the
federal small business credit. Consequently, the combined corporate tax rate
varied from province to province from 46 to 51 per cent. The combined
tax rate on income that qualified for the small business credit varied from
18 to 25 per cent.
219. Income Tax Act, S.C. 1970-71-72, c. 63, s.12. The dividend tax credit is
not expressed as a percentage of dividends paid in this section, but instead
as a percentage 3/4 in 1972) of the amount the shareholder has to gross
the dividend up y pursuant to e.82(1)(b) in including it in income. The
gross-up was 1/3 of dividends received. The dividend tax credit in the
federal income tax act was expressed as a percentage of this amount,
instead of the full amount, since the dividend tax credit has the effect of
lowering both the federal and provincial personal taxes. On the assumption
that the provincial individual tax rate was 33 1/3 per cent of the federal
tax payable, the dividend tax credit reduced federal taxes by 3/4 of the
gross-up and provincial taxes by 1/4 of the gross-up.
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tax paid, but for corporations that qualified for the small
business credit, whose effective corporate tax rate would be
about 25 per cent, it essentially eliminated the corporate tax on
distributed earnings (by giving the shareholders full credit for
all corporate taxes paid). Second, the post-1972 dividend tax
credit was made taxable by introducing a gross-up technique
for dividends received by individuals. The gross-up technique
required shareholders to include in their income an amount
approximating the pre-tax earnings of the corporations to
which the dividend tax credit applied.
In view of the criticism the government received about its
integration proposals made in the White Paper, a number of
characteristics of the dividend tax credit that it had
recommended there were not included in the legislation: no
distinction was made between public and private corporations
in applying the dividend tax credit; the dividend tax credit was
extended to shareholders whether or not the corporate tax was
paid; it was not made refundable; and, the proposed
requirement that earnings be paid out within two and one-half
years in order to be creditable was dropped.
The small business tax credit, while providing a subsidy to
small businesses, was designed to meet the criticisms that both
the Royal Commission on Taxation and the White Paper had
made about the lower rate of tax. Therefore, the
characteristics of the small business credit can be understood
most easily by reviewing the criticisms that were levelled
against the dual rate structure, and examining how the small
business credit was designed to meet those criticisms. The
effect of all of the changes was to more selectively target the
subsidy. As the government noted in its explanation of the
new provision, 'The changes ... will limit the incentive to
smaller Canadian-controlled corporations that require, and in
fact use, the tax savings to invest in their businesses or to pay
dividends to shareholders'.2 20
First, the major criticism that was levelled against the lower
rate of tax was that it was available to all corporations
regardless of their size. Therefore, the small business credit
was restricted in three ways in order to target it at small firms.
First, it was not available to public corporations. Presumably
this reflects a judgment that if a corporation is able to raise
financial capital by offering an issue of shares to the public
there is no need to provide it with a subsidy so that it can
retain more of its earnings for expansion. Second, the credit
was available only on the first $50 000 (the 'business limit')
(raised in 1974 to $100 000, in 1976 to $150 000, and in 1982
220. Canada, Hon. E.J. Benson, Summary of 1971 Taz Reform Legislation(Ottawa: Department of Finance, 1971), at 37.
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to $200 000)221 of a corporation's earnings. Third, when a
corporation had accumulated $400 000 (the 'total business
limit') (raised in 1974 to $500 000, in 1976 to $750 000 and in
1982 to $1 million)... of business income that had benefited
from the credit it was no longer eligible for the credit.
Accumulated business income was measured by a concept
called the cumulative deduction account.223
A second perceived problem with the lower corporate tax
rate was that a corporation benefited from it regardless of
what type of income it earned. Thus, for example, investment
income earned by a corporation frequently benefited from the
low rate of tax even though earning passive investment income
was clearly not the kind of activity that the low rate was
designed to subsidise. Therefore, in 1972 the small business
credit was restricted to a qualifying corporation's 'income from
active business carried on in Canada'. 2 The expression 'active
business' was not defined in the legislation, but left for the
courts to determine.
Third, firms benefited from the lower rate even though
they did not use their retained earnings in order to expand
their operations. Therefore, the Act attempted to regulate the
uses for which funds, that had benefited from the credit, could
be employed.2 Basically, the retained profits that had
benefited from the small business credit had to be used for
'the purpose of gaining or producing income from an active
business'. If the corporation made an 'ineligible investment',
an investment not made for the 'purpose of gaining or
producing income from an actual business', it was subject to a
special refundable tax of 50 per cent. This was 25 per cent
more than if an eligible investment had been made and thus
the effect was to temporarily recapture the small business
credit. When a corporation disposed of an ineligible
investment and either reinvested the proceeds for the purpose
of earning business income or distributed them to shareholders,
the ineligible investment tax was refunded. A number of
ineligible investments were expressly excluded from the special
refundable tax such as cash on deposit, shares and debt
obligations in Canadian-controlled private corporations
controlled by the purchaser, and interest on accounts receivable
and conditional sales contracts arising from normal business
operations. Presumably, these investments were excluded
because they were considered to be either reasonably incidental
221. Income Tax Act, S.C. 1970-71-72, c. 63, s.125(2 , as amended by S.C.
1974-75-76, c. 26, s.81(1); S.C. 1976-77, e. 4, e.49(1); and S.C. 1980-81-
82-83, c. 140, s.86(1).
222. Ibid. The 'total business limit' was repealed in 1985. Income Tax Act,
S.C. 1984, c. 45, 8.40.
223. Income Tax Act, S.C. 1970-71-72, c. 63, s.125-6(b).
224. Id., s.125(1).
225. Income Tax Act, S.C. 1970-71-72, c. 63, es.188-89 ('Part V').
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to the active business operations of the corporate or short-term
investments that could be liquidated for the purchase of
additional capital property.
Finally, the dual rate benefited even foreign controlled
firms. In order to remedy this, the tax credit was restricted to
Canadian-controlled private corporations.2 26  Obviously, the
policy implicit in this change did not relate to assisting small
businesses but instead related to the more general policy of
discouraging foreign domination of the Canadian economy.2
Moreover, in furtherance of this policy, if a firm that had
benefited from the credit was sold to non-residents, a special
tax was imposed that had the effect of recapturing the small
business credit.2
Although the small business credit was generally a well
designed subsidy, two obvious criticisms could be made of it,
given its objectives. First, it did not apply to unincorporated
small businesses. Clearly there was no reason in principle for
not extending it to unincorporated businesses and indeed this
was a criticism of the credit made by both the Royal
Commission on Taxation and the White Paper. However, the
government suggested that the credit had to be restricted to
incorporated firms for administrative reasons. The 1971
budget speech introducing the tax reform changes noted:
It had been my hope that a system might be developed to
aid unincorporated as well as incorporated business. A
great deal of time and effort has been spent towards
achieving this goal both inside and outside government.
Unfortunately, all the proposals were found to be
unworkable. Accordingly, we reluctantly decided to restrict
the small business incentive to incorporated business.22 9
A second criticism that could be made of the subsidy was
that only firms with taxable income received it: It was a
226. Ibid., s.125(1).
227. In justifying this limitation the Minister of Finance stated: 'We intend that
the small business incentive be available only to Canadians and that it
encourage Canadian ownership of our expanding businesses'. Canada, House
of Commons Debates, 18 June 1971, at 6897 (per Hon. E.J. Benson). This
restriction was criticised in the House of Commons: 'If the government
intends to restrict the sale of Canadian companies to foreign countries,
which is synonymous with America, they are going about it in a heavy-
handed way. Whatever we may decide about American capital in Canada,
this particular device of preventing the sale of Canadian industry does not
seem valuable ... I would suggest that the various restrictions to tax relief
for small businesses are so confirming that they defeat the purpose of
furthering business incentive in a substantial way.' Canada, House of
Commons Debates, 12 October 1971, at 8610 (per G. Ritchie). Later this
same member explained 'This required refund of the small business
deduction tax savings is likely to depress the price a non-resident is willing
to pay for the shares of the corporation...' Id., 18 October 1971, at 8795.
228. Income Tax Act, S.C. 1970-71-72, c. 63, ss.190, 191 ('Part VI').
229. Canada, House of Commons Debates, 18 June 1971, at 6897.
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success-related subsidy. However, start-up or other firms with
no taxable income are presumably as much in need of the
subsidy as firms with taxable profits. Indeed start-up firms
are the most risky and most difficult to finance and therefore
arguably have a greater claim to the credit than on-going,
stable firms with taxable income.
1972 TO 1986: THE DEMISE OF THE SMALL BUSINESS
CREDIT AND THE RETURN TO THE LOWER RATE OF
TAX
Although the small business credit appeared to be a well
designed tax subsidy, it soon began to unwind. By 1986 it acts
as little more than a lower rate of tax. The following is a
brief description of the demise of the small business credit as a
well targeted subsidy.
The most fatal blow to the credit was struck the year
following its enactment. In 1973, the special refundable tax on
'ineligible investments' was repealed retroactively." It appears
that it was abolished because it was too restrictive," too
complex, 3 and unnecessary since, as the Minister of Finance
explained, 'I believe that these small corporations which enjoy
the benefit of the lower rate of tax will, in fact, use these tax
savings to expand their businesses, to improve their technology
and to create more jobs for Canadians'.2 33 With this design
feature of the credit gone, other aspects of the credit became
unstable. In particular, it meant that even businesses that did
not normally reinvest their earnings would attempt to qualify
for the credit.
The second blow to the credit was struck by the courts.
They gave a very broad interpretation to the phrase 'active
business income'. That concept was used in the provision to
target the credit to firms that were likely to contribute to
employment, innovation and productivity gains. However, the
courts construed virtually any profit making activity as a
230. Supra note 225, retroactively repealed in Income Tax Act, S.C. 1973-74, c.
14, s.60(1)(2).
231. A member of Parliament complained that it had caused a 'serious lack of
liquid assets in Canadian small business', Canada, House of Commons
Debates, 28 February 1973, at 1761 (per Yves Demers). It is difficult to
see why this shold be the case since there was a liberal exemption for
short-term investments; moreover the tax was refundable so that when
retentions were subsequently used in the business the tax was refunded to
the corporation.
232. See Canada, House of Commons Debates, 19 February 1973, at 1433 (per
Finance Minister, Hon. J. Turner); Id., 26 February 1973, at 1660 (per G.
Clermont). It is difficult to see why this should be the case since
corporations would presumably record the value of these assets on their
balance sheets and concepts such as the 'preferred rate amount', which were
used in the provision, were also used elsewhere in the Act.
233. Canada, House of Commons Debates, 19 February 1973, at 1433 (per
Finance Minister, Hon. J. Turner), subsequent events proved him wrong.
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business and any effort on the part of the taxpayer as carrying
it on actively. Virtually all service corporations and all decent
sized investment corporations were held to qualify for the
credit."
A third event that led to the demise of the credit was the
enrichment of the dividend tax credit in 1977." In that year
the dividend tax credit was increased from 33.3 to 50 per cent
of dividends received.236  This increase in the dividend tax
credit meant that there was over-integration of tax on income
flowing through corporations entitled to the small business
credit. Even though a corporation entitled to the small
business credit paid tax at a rate of 25 per cent, or lower,
when dividends were paid out shareholders were compensated
by the dividend tax credit on the assumption that the
corporation had paid tax at a rate of 33.3 per cent. This meant
that anyone's total tax liability could be reduced if their
income was earned through a corporation and distributed as a
dividend instead of being earned personally. A taxpayer could
save up to $4500 in taxes on income of $50 000 by merely
channelling it through a corporation.2"
With over-integration, and the fact that income that could
qualify for the small business credit had been increased to
$150 000 annually by 1977, there was an enormous incentive
for taxpayers to incorporate their income-earning activities.
The government tolerated this situation for two years, then in
1979 and again in 1981 it introduced a series of complex
measures designed to once again target the credit and to
remove the unjustified over-integration that had been
introduced in 1977.
In 1979 legislation was passed denying the small business
credit, and thus the advantages of deferral and over-
integration, to certain specified non-qualifying businesses and
to corporations carrying on primarily an investment business.
234. See K.A. Lahey, '"Active Business" as a Technique of Source Discrimination
in the Formulation of Corporate Tax Policy' (1978) 16 Osgoode Hall Law
Journal 35.
235. Income Taz Act, S.C. 1977-78, c. 1, s.58, amending S.C. 1970-71-72, c.
63, s.121.
236. The government increased the dividend tax credit for two reasons primarily:
first, to increase investments in Canadian entities by Canadian residents;
second, to establish a closer 'tax neutrality' with regard to the taxation of
capital gains. After the changes a taxpayer in the 50 per cent tax bracket
paid tax on both dividends and capital gains at an effective rate of about
25 per cent. This latter effect allowed the Act to be considerably simplified
by abolishing the surplus-stripping rules. After the change the government
was essentially indifferent as to whether a taxpayer extracted corporate
surplus in the form of a capital gain or dividend. See Budget Speech, Hon.
D.S. McDonald in Canada, House of Commons Debates, 31 March 1977, at
4536.
237. Not surprisingly total dividends paid by Canadian-controlled private
corporations quadrupled from 1977 to 1979. See Shinder, supra note 215,
at 17.
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The following is a brief description of this legislation and the
kinds of corporations at which it was directed."8
Incorporated Employees
After 1977 many individuals who would otherwise provide
their services directly to an employer formed corporations and
provided such services to their employer through their personal
corporation. This practice became particularly prevalent
amongst high-income earners such as athletes, executives and
life insurance salespersons. To deny the credit to these kinds
of corporations, the legislation provided that a corporation
would not qualify for the small business credit if more than
two-thirds of its gross revenue was derived from the business
of providing services and (i) was derived from services
provided to one 'entity' and (ii) could reasonably be attributed
to the services performed by persons who were 'specified'
shareholders of the corporation of related persons. A
corporation was not treated as carrying on a non-qualifying
business, even if the above conditions were met, if it employed
in the business more than five full-time employees who were
not specified shareholders of the corporation or related
persons.
Incorporated Professionals
In some provinces professional associations were placing
pressure on provincial legislatures to allow them to incorporate
in order to reap the tax advantages. The new tax legislation
singled out some professions - accountants, dentists, lawyers,
medical doctors, veterinarians and chiropractors - and provided
that income from these professional practices would not qualify
for the small business credit. These professions were singled
out because they do not face the same business risks as
encountered in most other businesses because of a relatively
fixed demand for their services and the restrictions of entry
into them, and because they are not a material source of
productivity growth and job opportunities. Moreover, in some
238. Income Tax Act, S.C. 1979, c. 5, s.38. For a discussion of these changes
see R.A. Friesen, 'A Perspective on Recent Changes to the Small Business
Deduction and the Refundable Tax Provisions', in Canadian Tax
Foundation, Report of the Thirty-First Tax Conference, 1979 (Toronto:
Canadian Tax Foundation, 1980) 66; H.J. Kellough, 'Review and Analysis of
the 1979 Amendments to the Small Business Deduction', in Canadian Tax
Foundation, Report of the Thirty-First Tax Conference, 1979 (Toronto:
Canadian Tax Foundation, 1980) 79; R.B. Goodwin, 'Corporate Partnerships
and the 1980 Draft Amendments to the Income Tax Act', in Canadian Tax
Foundation, Report of the Thirty-Second Tax Conference, 1980 (Toronto:
Canadian Tax Foundation, 1981) 225; D.P. Jones, 'Further Reflections on
Integration: The Modified Small Business Deduction, Non-qualifying
Businesses, Specified Investment Income, Corporate Partnerships, and
Personal Service Corporations' (1982) 30 Canadian Tax Journal 1.
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provinces some of these professionals could incorporate but in
others they could not. Thus if the small business credit were
available to them there would be a large tax differential
between identical taxpayers who resided in different provinces.
Management Service Corporations
Professionals who could not incorporate their practice because
of relevant provincial law frequently established a management
service corporation to provide managerial, financial,
administrative and similar types of services to their
professional proprietorship or partnership. The management
service corporation would mark up the cost of providing these
services by 15 to 20 per cent, thus a significant amount of
professional income would be converted into income qualifying
for the small business credit. The new legislation provided
that income of a 'management service corporation' derived
from a business that was 'connected' with it did not qualify for
the small business credit.
As initially proposed in the budget of 16 November 1978 all
three of these businesses were to be defined as 'non-qualifying
businesses' and were not to be entitled to any special corporate
tax credit. However, these proposals died on the order paper
in the spring of 1979 when a federal election was called. In
October 1979, the newly elected Conservative government,
relenting to pressure from the professional community in
particular, re-introduced the provisions defining these
businesses, but extended them a special corporate tax credit of
12.6 per cent.239 This had the effect of reducing the effective
corporate tax rate on such income to 33.3 per cent so that
when dividends were paid the corporate and shareholder tax
would be integrated. But, of course, so long as the income was
retained in the corporation there was a substantial deferral
advantage if the individual's personal marginal tax rate was
greater than 33.3 per cent.
Specified Investment Business
Another type of income that the courts had held was 'active
business income', and that the government wished to deny the
small business credit to, was income earned essentially from
passive investment. Thus, in 1979 the concept of a 'specified
investment business' was also introduced into the Act.24  If the
239. Income Taz Act, S.C. 1979, c. 5, s.38(3), adding s.125(1.1) to S.C. 1970-
71-72, c. 63.
240. Income Taz A ct, S.C. 1979 c. 5, s.38(6), amending s.125(6)(h) to S.C.1970-71-72, c. 63, now numbered s.125(7e).
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'principal purpose' of a business was 'to derive income from
property' then (with some exceptions) it was denied entitlement
to any credit. The income would be taxed at the normal
corporate rate of 50 per cent. However, like all other forms of
income from property, the corporation would be entitled to a
dividend refund of 16.6 per cent when the income was paid
out in the form of a dividend. Thus, the effective corporate
tax on these distributed earnings would be reduced to 33.3 per
cent, and since this was the corporate rate that the dividend
tax credit compensated for there would be complete integration
upon distribution.
In the federal budget of 11 December 1979 another tax
planning technique that involved what the government
considered an abuse of the small business credit was also dealt
with. All jurisdictions that have a low corporate tax rate must
also have a concept of 'associated' corporations to ensure that
individuals do not multiply the availability of the low rate by
establishing multiple corporations to carry on their business or
businesses. The concept is based on the premise that each
individual should be entitled to receive the benefit of the low
rate for only one corporation and business. However, in
Canada, prior to 1979, these rules did not prevent two
unrelated individuals who were carrying on a business from
qualifying business income of twice the annual business limit
for the small business credit by the simple expedient of each
incorporating a corporation and then carrying on the business
as corporate partners. Consequently, in 1979 the concept of
'specified partnership income' was introduced into the Act. 24 '
Where a business is carried on by corporate partners these rules
have the effect of imposing the annual business limit at the
partnership level. Thus, only $200 000 of income (which is the
current annual business limit) from each business will receive
the small business credit no matter how many corporate
242partners carry it on.
In the 12 November 1981 budget, three more changes were
proposed, and subsequently enacted, in an effort to make the
small business credit more target efficient. 243  First,
241. Income Tax Act, S.C. 1979, c. 5, s.38(10), amending Income Tax Act, S.C.
1970-71-72, .. 63, s.125(1)(a)(ii).
242. As enacted these rules were dreadfully complex because they tried to deal in
detail not only with the case of a simple partnership but also the case of
where the business was carried on by several partnerships under common
control. In 1985 these rules were 'simplified' by repealing the detailed rules
and introducing a general discretionary anti-avoidance provision. Income
Tax Act, s.127(6).
243. See generally T.E. McDonnell, 'The Taxation of Investment Income of
Private Corporations and Personal Services Business Income' in Canadian
Tax Foundation, Report of the Thirty-Fourth Tax Conference, 1982
(Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 1983) 103; M.A. Denega, 'Tax Breaks
and Grabs: Part II Tax and Owner-Manager Salary/Dividend Mix', in
Canadian Tax Foundation, Report of the Thirty-Fourth Tax Conference,
1982 (Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 1983) 87.
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corporations were prohibited from refreshing' their cumulative
deduction account by paying out dividends. " Thus, once a
corporation had earned $1 million (the total business limit) that
had benefited from the small business credit it lost its
entitlement to the credit whether or not it had paid out this
amount, or any part of it, as dividends. It is not clear that this
change was consistent with the rationale for the small business
credit as it was enacted in 1972. It appears that originally the
government was prepared to allow all small businesses, earning
less than the annual business limit, full integration (if they
paid out dividends). That is, so long as the corporation's
annual income was less than the annual business limit, and the
corporate-source income was distributed and taxed at the
individual's marginal tax rates, the government was not
concerned about collecting 'double' tax. However, with this
change, once a corporation had earned over $1 million then,
since it lost the small business credit, there would be 'double'
taxation even though all the earnings were distributed. The
government justified the change in the following terms:
The ability of small businesses to maintain their eligibility
for the low tax rate by paying out dividends had led to
certain anomalies. One problem is that small businesses
can avoid this limit by paying out dividends to shareholders
who then loan the funds back to the company. As a result,
corporations continue to qualify for the low rate long after
they have exceeded any reasonable definition of a small
business. As well, small business owners can stay under the
$750,000 limit by paying out dividends to themselves for
their personal use; the funds are thus not used for business
expansion, yet the business can continue to qualify for the
low tax rate. To target the benefits of this important
incentive to growing small businesses and businesses in their
start up phase, dividends paid out after December 31, 1981
will no longer regenerate the firms entitlement to the small
business deduction.245
The second change announced in the 12 November 1981
budget was that the 12.6 per cent credit for non-qualifying
small businesses would be denied on income earned by a
corporation from a 'personal service business'. A 'personal
service business'2" is defined as a corporation's service
business where the individual providing the services on behalf
244. Income Tax Act, S.C. 1980-81-82-83, c. 140, s.86(5)(6), amending Income
Tax Act, 1970-71-72, c. 63, s.125(6)(b).
245. Canada, Hon. A.J. MacEachen, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of
Finance, Badget Papers (12 November 1981) (Ottawa: Department of
Finance, 1981), at 33-4.
246. Income Tax Act, S.C. 1980-81-82-83, c. 140, a. 86(7)-(9).
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of the corporation, or a related person, is a 'specified'
shareholder of the corporation (basically a person who owns at
least 10 per cent of the shares), and, if he or she were not
employed by the corporation and had been personally paid for
providing the services, the individual could reasonably be
regarded as an officer or employee of the person for whom the
services are performed.4 A corporation that employs
throughout the year more than five full-time employees who
are not specified shareholders are excluded from the definition
of personal service business. 4  This provision prevents
individuals from converting employment income into business
income and thus qualifying for the small business credit.249
Although there was considerable overlap, the 'personal service
business' provision applied to a slightly narrower range of
businesses than those defined in the 'incorporated employee'
provision enacted in 1979 and that were eligible for the 12.6
per cent non-qualifying small business credit.
A third change announced in the 12 November 1981 budget
was that the over-integration of corporate and shareholder tax,
which occurred because the small business credit brought the
effective corporate tax rate down to 25 per cent and the
dividend tax credit compensated for corporate tax of 33.3 per
cent, was to be removed. This was done by the imposition of
a 12.5 per cent tax on distributions by corporations that had
retained earnings that had benefited from the small business
credit. 2 o This 12.5 per cent tax on dividends brought the
effective corporate tax rate on distributed active business
income up to 33.3 per cent. The government explained the
change in the following terms:
Unfortunately, the mechanics of this integration system are
now defective. Rather than the tax being neutral between
income flowed through a private corporation or received
directly, it results in less tax on small business corporate
income than on income from wages or salaries or from an
unincorporated business. This occurs because the dividend
tax credit given to shareholders of a small corporation
consistently exceeds the tax paid by the corporation. The
result is that up to $10 000 in taxes can be saved annually.
This defect in the tax system is leading to serious inequities
247. Income Tax Act, s.125(7)(d).
248. Income Tax Act, s.125(7)(d)(iii).
249. Further, to ensure that individuals who channel their employment income
through a personal service corporation do not receive any tax advantage not
available to an individual employee, such a corporation is unable to claim
expenses for the personal service business that would not normally be
deductible in calculating income from employment: Income Tax Act,
e.18(1)(i).
250. Income Tax Act, S.C. 1980-81-82, c. 140, s.109, adding s.181-183 ('Part
II') to Income Tax Act, S.C. 1970-71-72, c. 63.
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and unnecessary distortions including incorporations solely
for the purpose of obtaining these tax savings. These tax
benefits have generally gone to owner-managers and other
senior employees of small businesses, many of whom are in
the higher-income groups.
The budget proposes to end these anomalies by imposing a
new 12.5 per cent tax on dividend distributions of small
business companies.2"'
Even though over-integration had caused small business
owners to artificially convert their wages into dividends to
obtain tax savings, there was considerable agitation from the
small business community because of the imposition of the
distributions tax. Many felt that imposing the tax unfairly
diluted an intended tax advantage for small businesses.
Although it was a major political issue in the debate
following the form of integration proposed both by the Carter
Commission and the White Paper, there has been very little
analytical discussion in Canada on the problems posed by tax
preferences in implementing a system of dividend relief.m
Although the issue is complicated, and was only considered in
Canada in 1981 in the context of small business credit, prima
facia there would appear to be a strong case for washing out
the tax advantages of the small business credit, as was done by
the 12.5 per cent distribution tax, instead of flowing its
advantages through to the shareholders. The credit is only
available to the corporate sector and thus not washing it out
exaggerates the inequities between those who are able to
incorporate their businesses and those who cannot.
Furthermore, the objectives of the credit are only achieved so
long as the earned income remains in corporate solution so that
it can be reinvested in the business.m5  Another reason for
imposing the 12.5 per cent distributions tax was that over-
integration created large compliance costs in operating a small
business since the optimal tax mix of dividends and salary
became extremely complicated.
The changes made in 1979 and 1981 resulted in the small
business credit being more targeted. However, they
considerably complicated the legislation and alienated a number
of powerful interest groups. In 1983 the government
announced that it was studying ways to simplify the rules
251. Canada, Hon. A.J. MacEachen, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of
Finance, The Budget in More Detail (Ottawa: Department of Finance, 1981),
at 45.
252. Yet as Warren has observed, their existence 'creates the greatest conceptual
problem in meshing integration with existing [tax provisions'. A. Warren,
'The Relations and Integration of Individual and Corporate Income Tax'(1981) 94 Harvard Law Review 719, at 784.
253. See generally, McLure supra note 36, at 131-5.
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relating to the small business credit.2" In the budget of
February 1984 the Department of Finance issued a discussion
paper on 'Simplifying Taxes for Small Business 255 in which a
number of important changes were suggested. First, it was
proposed that the $1 million total business limit on income
qualifying for the credit be eliminated. The government
suggested that this limitation had lead to considerable
legislative complexity in attempting to define a corporation's
cumulative income that had benefited from the tax credit (the
cumulative deduction account). In addition, the government
contended that the requirement to compute a 'cumulative
deduction account' imposed a burdensome accounting
requirement on many small firms.5 Moreover, the
government noted that it was almost impossible to ensure that
small corporations did not avoid the 'total business limit'
through various complex tax avoidance manoeuvers. *
As a second simplification measure the government
proposed to abolish the concept of non-qualifying business
income. Thus incorporated professional practices, some
personal service corporations, and corporations providing
administrative services to a related corporation would once
again be eligible for the full 21 per cent small business credit
instead of the smaller 12.6 per cent credit. The government
admitted that although these provisions affected a relatively
small number of firms (invariably high-income it might be
noted), they added 'much complexity to the legislation' and
required 'that professional advisers to small business - many of
whom are not themselves tax specialists - be familiar with the
provisions'. 5  Moreover, the government noted, when these
provisions were introduced there was over-integration with
respect to corporate-source income entitled to the small
business credit, but that with the enactment of the 12.5 per
cent tax on dividend distributions this was no longer the case.
Third, although the 'personal service business' and 'specified
investment business' rules would remain in the Act (thus
corporations falling within these categories would not be
entitled to the small business credit) they were to be
254. In the summer of 1983 the Canadian Tax Foundation held a symposium on
the subject, Symposium on the Simplification of the Small Business
Provisions of the Income Tax Act (Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation,
1983) [unpublished].
255. Canada, Hon. M. LaLonde, Minister of Finance Simplifying Taxes for Small
Business (Ottawa: Department of Finance, 1984).
256. Id., at 15-16.
257. After several attempts at enacting specific rules to deal with the problem of
taxpayers artifically extending their ability to claim the small business
credit, in 1983 the government had enacted a general anti-avoidance rule.
See D.A.G. Birnie, 'Capping the Small Business Deduction', in Canadian
Tax Foundation, Report of the Thirty -Fifth Tax Conference, 1983 (Toronto:
Canadian Tax Foundation, 1984) 13.
258. Simplifying Taxes for Small Business, supra note 255, at 16.
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simplified. In particular, under the law then in force a
corporation had to have more than five 'arm's length'
employees in order to escape this definition. The government
proposed to drop the 'arm's length' requirement since it
introduced 'unnecessary complexity'.
Fourth, the detailed, anti-avoidance corporate partnership
rules that were designed to prevent the use of multiple
partnerships to increase recourse to the small business credit
were to be replaced by a generally-worded anti-avoidance
provision.
Finally, the tax that was designed to recapture the benefits
of the small business credit if a Canadian-controlled private
corporation was sold to non-residents was to be repealed. The
government simply stated '[T]hese rules are unduly complex
and technically deficient'.219
Not unexpectedly, the business community, particularly
professionals, were excited about these proposed changes. The
government released draft legislation implementing the
proposed reform in August 1984. The legislation was passed
by the new Conservative government at the end of 1984. 0
A further amendment affecting the small business credit
was proposed in the February 1986 budget. The government
proposed to reduce the dividend tax credit from 50 to 33.3 per
cent of dividends received. Thus instead of compensating for
corporate tax of 33.3 per cent the credit will once again only
compensate for corporate tax of 25 per cent. One effect of
this reduction in the dividend tax credit will be to allow the
government to repeal the 12.5 per cent corporate distribution
tax that was imposed on distributed income that had benefited
from the small business credit.
After this series of amendments, Canada is back to almost
where it was prior to 1972. Essentially it has a lower rate
corporate tax. Some effort is made to target the credit by
denying it to public corporations and to private corporations
carrying on personal service or investment businesses, but
otherwise none of the objections to the dual rate so eloquently
expounded by the Carter Commission and in the White Paper
are met by the small business credit.
259. Id., at 17.
260. Income Tax Act, S.C. 1984, c. 45, s.40. On the simplification amendments
see H.L. Doane, 'The Cumulative Deduction Account and Part II Tax' in
Canadian Tax Foundation, Report of the Thirty-Sizth Tax Conference, 1984
(Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 1985) 156; H.A. Gordon, 'Management
Companies, Personal Service Businesses, Incorporated Professional, and
Specified Investment Businesses' in id., at 165; E.C. Harris, 'Associated
Corporations, Corporate Partnerships, and the Purchase of Closely-Held
Corporations' in id., at 183.
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Australia
Australia adopted a lower rate of corporate tax in 1948, eight
years after adopting a classical corporate tax system. This rate
was abolished in 1973, apparently without any strong
resistance. A partnership option for closely-held corporations
was proposed by the Asprey Committee and has been
recommended by a number of commentators, but has never
been enacted in Australia.
1915 TO 1940: THE INTEGRATED SYSTEM 261
The Australian Government adopted its first income tax in
1915.262 Although the method was different, like the
prevailing United Kingdom system, the double taxation of
corporate-source income was avoided. Corporations were
taxed only on their undistributed profits. Dividends out of
current income were deducted by the corporation in arriving at
taxable income, but were taxed in the hands of the
shareholders. If corporate distributions were made out of
profits previously taxed, shareholders received a rebate of tax
at the lesser of the company tax paid on the profits or their
own individual rate.
The system proved difficult to administer. It was necessary
to determine whether a dividend was paid out of current or
accumulated earnings. If a dividend was paid out of current
earnings, it was necessary to determine how much, if any, of
the income was exempt from corporate tax since if it was
exempt from tax it was tax-free to the shareholders. If the
dividend was paid out of accumulated earnings, it was
necessary to determine the rate of tax those earnings had borne
since the shareholders rebate was determined by the precise
amount of tax that the corporation had paid on the earnings
out of which the dividend was paid. Although in these
respects it was more complicated than the United Kingdom
system, unlike that system, dividends were not grossed up to
account for the corporate tax paid on the dividend. Thus
shareholders received a tax-free dividend equal to the amount
of the rebate. Furthermore, unlike the United Kingdom
system, a shareholder whose individual rate was less than the
company's rate did not receive a refund of tax.
261. This brief description of the early history of the Australian system is taken
largely from R.W. Parsons, 'An Australian View of Corporation Tax' 19671
British Tax Review 14; Australia, Department of the Treasury, Company
Income Tax Systems (Treasury Taxation Paper No. 9) (Canberra: AGPS,
1974) Appendix B; Australia, Royal Commission on Taxation, First Report
(Canberra: Comm. G.P., 1934); Australia, Commonwealth Committee on
Taxation (Ligertwood Committee), Report (Canberra: Comm. G.P., 1961),
chap. 1.
262. Income Tax Assessment Act, 1915 (Comm. of Austr.), Act No. 41 of 1915
and Income Tax Act, 1915, Act No. 48.
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In 1923 the tax treatment of corporations was changed in
order to reduce some of the administrative complexities and to
bring it into greater uniformity with the treatment in the
various Australian jurisdictions, all of which taxed corporations
on the whole of their profits. Basically, all company profits
were made subject to tax and the rebate system was extended
to all dividends. This system remained in effect until 1940.
However, in 1934, following the recommendations of a Royal
Commission of Taxation, changes were made in the details
for the scheme. Prior to 1934, if income was exempt in the
hands of the recipient corporation, it could be distributed tax
free to shareholders; moreover, the rebate that each shareholder
received depended in part on the tax that the corporation had
paid on the earnings out of which the dividend was paid.
Largely because of the administrative problems that this system
posed, it was amended to provide that all dividends were
taxable and that the shareholder rebate was the standard rate
payable by the corporation in the year in which the
shareholder was assessed on the dividend income.
It is not surprising that there was little concern for small
corporations under these regimes. The corporate rate of tax
was considerably lower than individual marginal rates265 and
double taxation was avoided on distribution. Indeed, the
preoccupation of Australian tax reformers during this period
was with preventing taxpayers from using corporations to
shelter income from the higher individual tax rates.2 6
1940 TO 1948: THE CLASSICAL SYSTEM
In 1940, in what was considered a temporary measure designed
to raise revenue by increasing the effective tax rate on
corporate-source income, and to reduce the administrative
costs of the tax system during wartime, the government
abolished the rebate of tax on dividends.6 At the same time
the corporate income tax rate was increased.
263. Supra note 261.
264. It is interesting that the Royal Commission was one of the first tax
inquiries to face the vexing question of whether tax preferences should be
washed out or flowed through in an integrated system. Id., at 16-22.
265. From 1922 to 1939 the corporate tax rate was one shilling per pound (five
per cent).
266. For a description of these efforts see Parsons, eupra note 261, at 18-21;
1934 Royal ommission on Taxation, esupra note 261, at 28-36.
267. In his Budget Speech of 1940-41, in introducing the measure, the Treasurer
said: 'A good deal could be said in favour of a complete rebate of all
company taxation, but consideration of revenue and of administrative
difficulties made that out of the question at the present time. It is
proposed as a war-time measure to discontinue the rebate with the hope of
reconsidering the whole question when the urgencies of our finance are
behind us.' As quoted in Company Income Tax Systems, supra note 261,
at 41.
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1948 TO 1973: THE LOWER RATE OF TAX
In 1948, as part of a general tax reduction, Australia adopted a
lower rate of corporate tax. The reduction was at a rate of Is
per pound (five per cent) on incomes up to 05000. Thus, at
this time, corporations paid tax at a rate of 5s per pound (25
per cent) on the first f5000 and 6s per pound (30 per cent) on
the remainder. In 1951 the lower rate was abolished for public
corporations, and the general corporate tax rate was increased
to 7s per pound (35 per cent). In 1952, the differential rate
was reintroduced for public companies; however, it was only Is
per pound (five per cent) less than the standard rate, while the
lower rate for private corporations remained at 2s per pound
(ten per cent) less.268
In 1950 a Commonwealth Committee on Taxation (Spooner
Committee) considered whether the pre-1940 rebate system
should be restored. It rejected this proposal on three grounds:
the revenue cost; the apparent incongruity of salary and wage
earners paying tax on all their personal income but not
shareholders; and, the fact that the classical system of
corporate tax had become well accepted, as evidenced by its
adoption in the United States (a number of members of the
Committee had toured the United States).
Another Commonwealth Committee on Taxation
(Ligertwood Committee)269 reported in 1961. It considered in
detail both the taxation of corporate distributions and the
lower rate of corporate tax. Following an extremely
conceptual analysis, the Committee reaffirmed the legitimacy
of taxing both corporations and shareholders on corporate-
source income.27 However, in view of the relatively heavier
tax on corporate source income compared to other sources of
income, the Committee did recommend that a rebate of 2s per
pound (ten per cent) should be granted to resident companies
in respect of dividends paid during the year. That is, the
Committee recommended a split-rate form of integration under
which retained earnings would be taxed at a rate of 40 per
cent and distributed earnings would be taxed at a rate of 30
per cent.271 This proposal was not adopted because the
Treasury felt that the principle of dividend relief represented
an unnecessary concession to the separate-entity theory of
corporations that had been widely accepted in Australia.
Furthermore, the Treasury objected that the system would
favour companies that distributed earnings over those that did
not and thus would bias the tax system against those
268. For a chart of the rates from 1940 to 1960, see 1961 Commonwealth
Committee on Taxation, supra note 261, at 12.
269. Ibid.
270. Id., at 2, para. 7.
271. Id., at 4, para. 17.
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corporations that used their retained earnings for
272reinvestment. Furthermore, if dividend relief was to be
provided, the Treasury did not think that it should be done by
a split-rate method as recommended by the Ligertwood
Committee. Such a method would provide unjustified relief to
tax-exempt shareholders and nonresidents, would provide relief
for corporate profits that might not have borne corporate tax,
and would encourage foreign controlled Australian corporations
to reduce their Australian tax payable by repatriating
273earnings.
The Ligertwood Committee also recommended that the
lower tax rate on corporate income under f5000 be
discontinued." The Committee noted that: the lower rate
benefited many corporations that were not small, even public
corporations;" that small private corporations did not need to
suffer from double tax since their earnings could usually be
paid out in the form of remuneration to working proprietors;
that small private corporations benefiting from the lower rate
might be owned by wealthy shareholders; and, finally, that the
lower rate lead to abuses by 'company splitting'.27 6 However,
the Committee recommended that private corporations should
be subject to a primary rate of tax that was Is per pound (five
per cent) less than public companies, largely because they
could be subject to the undistributed profits tax. 7  The
recommendation of the Committee to repeal the lower rate of
tax was not acted upon by the government.
The next noteworthy study of the Australian tax system was
undertaken in 1964 by four economists and sponsored by the
Social Science Research Council.278  They make a unique
proposal for corporate tax reform. Although the authors made
no special recommendation for small business, the effect of
their proposal would be to require all corporations to distribute
their earnings. Basically, the authors suggested that a flat rate
20 per cent tax should be levied on all corporate earnings.
Then to ensure corporations would not be used to shelter
income from the individual marginal tax rates a tax equal to
the highest individual marginal tax rate, 66.6 per cent at the
time, would be imposed on all retained earnings. 7
In 1965, when Australia switched from pound sterling to a
dollar monetary system, the taxable income subject to the
272. See Company Income Tax Systems, supra note 261, at 42.
273. Ibid.
274. Commonwealth Committee on Taxation, supra note 261, at 13, para. 55.
275. Id., at 13, para. 53.
276. Id., at 13, para. 54.
277. Id., at 14-15, para. 60.
278. See R.I. Downing, H.W. Ardnt, A.H. Boxer, R.L. Mathews, Taxation in
Australia: Agenda for Reform (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press,
1964).
279. Id., at chap. 9.
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lower rate was changed to $10 000.2"0 The difference between
the primary corporate rate and the lower rate remained at
about ten percentage points; however, in 1970-71 this gap was
narrowed to five percentage points. Then in 1973, in their
first budget, the newly elected Labor government abolished the
lower rate of corporate tax. In the budget speech, Mr. Crean,
Treasurer, noted:
The general public company tax rate is 47.5 per cent, but
private companies, life insurance companies and certain
other companies pay less on some or all of their income.
The differentials arose on no grounds of principle - indeed,
there are no reasons why private and public companies
should not be treated alike so far as the company rate is
concerned.281
There appeared to be surprisingly little objection to the
repeal of the lower rate. Liberal members in the House of
Representatives suggested that it would stultify the expansion
of private business enterprise;28 2 however, their attacks were
not sustained. The Liberal Party has remained committed to
the low rate of tax for small businesses and in both the 1982
and 1984 election campaigns promised to reintroduce it,28 3 but
the pressure for its reintroduction does not seem great.
1973 TO 1986: PRESSURES FOR REFORM
In the late 1960s and early 1970s a number of authors called
for repeal of the classical system of taxation.2 84  In 1972 the
government appointed The Taxation Review Committee
(Asprey Committee) which undertook a comprehensive
examination of the tax system and published a final report in
1975.285 With respect to the general issue of the taxation of
corporate distributions, the Committee concluded that ideally
corporations would be required to allocate their profits to
shareholders each year. However, largely because of practical
difficulties, in particular the problem of determining the
280. The following is largely taken from B.L. Johns, W.C. Dunlop and W.J.
Sheehan, 'Taxation and the Small Firm in Australia' in Australia, Taxation
Review Committee, Commissioned Studies (Study No. 9) (Canberra: AGPS,
1975) 223, at 255-6.
281. Australia, House of Representatives Debates, 21 August 1973, at 44.
282. See, for example, Australia, House of Representatives Debates, 12 September
1973, at 882-3 (per P.S. Fisher).
283. See P.D. Groenewegen, Everyone's Guide to Taxation in Australia (Sydney:
Allen & Unwin, 1985), at 175.
284. See P.D. Groenewegen, Australian Taxation Policy: Survey 1965-1980
Sydney: The Taxation Institute Research and Education Trust, 1981), at
285. Australia, Taxation Review Committee, Full Report (Chairperson: K.W.
Asprey) (Canberra: AGPS, 1975).
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correct allocation of profits where there were different classes
of shares, and the problem of taxing non-resident shareholders,
they did not recommend such a change." Instead they
recommended the adoption, in stages, of a system of full
imputation.28' Even though the Commission recommended the
eventual adoption of a system of full imputation, they also
recommended that small corporations should be allowed to
elect to be taxed as partnerships. The Committee reasoned that
since this was the ideal treatment of corporations, and could
not be achieved for some corporations only because of
administrative reasons, there was no reason why it should not
be available in those situations where the practical problems
could be surmounted." The Committee went on to consider
some of the details of such an election.28 9  Essentially, they
recommended that the election be available to a corporation
irrespective of its income,29 o contrary to the recommendation
of the Carter Commission in Canada. Also, unlike the United
States provisions, they recommended that the election should
be available even though the corporation was deriving a
substantial amount of its income from investment income or
foreign sources. 2 91 They also recommended that it be restricted
to corporations with less than ten shareholders, only one class
of shares292 and in which all shareholders were individuals.2 11
These restrictions were to be imposed largely to minimise the
compliance and administrative costs of the system. As
experience was gained with the election, it was contemplated
that these requirements would be liberalised.
The Committee also considered the appropriateness of re-
introducing a lower rate of corporate tax in order to assist
small businesses. 9  They recommended against its adoption on
the grounds that 'an election by shareholders to be taxed as a
partnership ... is sufficient to afford protection to shareholders
in a small enterprise from any element of over-taxation'.
Furthermore, they noted that if assistance was to be provided
to small enterprises it should be offered in a form which
benefited both incorporated and unincorporated businesses.2 96
The issue of the taxation of corporations arose again during
the course of hearings on the Australian Financial System
Inquiry (Campbell Committee). Numerous submissions to the
286. Id., at 228, paras 16.22-16.26.
287. Id., at 233-4, paras 16.52-16.61.
288. Id., at 239, para. 16.80.
289. Id., at 239-40, paras 16.84-16.96.
290. Id., at 239-40, para. 16.85.
291. Id., at 240, paras 16.86, 16.87.
292. Id., at 240, para. 16.88.
293. Id., at 240, para. 16.89.
294. Id., at 241-2, paras 16.97-16.101.
295. Id., at 242, para. 16.101.
296. Ibid.
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Campbell Committee raised the problem of the 'double'
taxation of corporate source income. In response, the
Committee organised a seminar on business taxation in which
the form of company taxation became the central issue. Two
of the commissioned papers, which provided the basis for the
seminar, argued that full integration ought to be adopted for
all corporations." In spite of reservations expressed about
these recommendations,2 8  they were endorsed by the
Committee. Basically, the Campbell Committee recommended
that a 46 per cent withholding tax be levied on corporations
and that all company profits be notionally distributed to
shareholders and taxed at their appropriate marginal tax
rates.299
Even though it suggested a fully integrated tax system for
all corporations, the Campbell Committee also suggested a
partnership option for small corporations.soo To prevent misuse
of this option, the Committee recommended that the
restrictions suggested by Asprey upon such an election should
apply.301 It is not clear whether the Committee envisaged that
the partnership option would be available after full integration
was adopted or if it saw it as an interim or alternative
measure, should full integration not be adopted. In justifying
the recommendations the Inquiry said:
The Committee is however concerned that under the
existing provisions some lower income shareholders,
particularly those whose incomes consist solely or
substantially of dividends from a private company, may be
relatively disadvantaged compared to individuals in an
unincorporated enterprise situation, this may have the effect
of discouraging share participation in private companies.302
297. P.L. Swan, 'Is There a Case for Complete Integration of Corporate and
Personnel Income Tax', in Committee of Inquiry into the Australian
Financial System, Commissioned Studies and Selected Papers, Part 3:
Business Taxation and the Financing of Industry (Chairperson: J.K.
Campbell) (Canberra: AGPS, 1982), at 1; R.R. Officer, 'Company Tax and
Company Financing' in id., at 101.
298. See generally, 'Commentary Papers on Business Taxation' in id., 160-255.
299. Committee of Inquiry into the Australian Financial System, Final Report
Chairperson: J.K. Campbell) (Canberra: AGPS, 1981), at 217, para. 14.41
ereinafter Campbell Committeel.
300. Id., at 223, para. 14.89.
301. Id., at 224, para. 14.91.
302. Id., at 223, para. 14.88. Since the Campbell Inquiry appeared to be relying
heavily upon its commissioned studies, it seems likely that the partnership
option was regarded as an alternative option. After making an argument
for full integration the author of one of the commissioned studies argued:
'If it is judged "inappropriate" to adopt a fully integrated tax system for
all companies a form of integrated tax should be considered for private
companies. This would involve allowing private companies to elect to be
taxed as partnerships, the current practice in the US for limited sized
private companies ... Such a system would continue to limit the benefits
afforded private company shareholders in the top tax bracket without
penalising those who did not belong in this bracket. It would be unwise to
457
458 AUSTRALIAN TAX FORUM
There are, of course, important differences between integration
and partnership taxation. For example, with a partnership
election presumably there would be no withholding of tax at
the corporate level, the character of the corporate income
would flow through to the shareholders, and, corporate losses
would flow through.
1986: FULL IMPUTATION
In the recent Australian tax reform exercise there was little
discussion of the need to make special provision for small
businesses. The Draft White Paper3 discussed generally the
possibility of integrating the company and personal income tax
systems, but implied that, at best, full or partial dividend relief
might be adopted.so4 There was no discussion of any special
provision being made for small businesses. At the Summit
following the publication of the White Paper, and in the tax
reform discussion generally, there appeared little pressure to
provide a partnership option for small businesses, or to provide
a low rate of corporate tax.303
The government is committed to introducing a full
imputation system with no special concessions for small
business. The proposed changes were reviewed favourably from
the point of view of small businesses in a paper prepared for
the Economic PlanninS Advisory Council by the Bureau of
Industry Economics.so Prior to the tax reform exercise,
however, some Australian commentators had suggested that a
partnership election for small businesses should be
considered.307
force all private companies to be taxed as partnerships and at the same
time allow public companies to be taxed under a classical system since this
would discriminate against those private com any shareholders in the top
tax bracket relative to this class of sharehol ers in the public companies .
Officer, supra note 297, at 135-6.
303. Australia, Reform of the Australian Taz System: Draft White Paper
(Canberra: AGPS, 1985).
304. Id., chap. 17, at 199, para. 17.33.
305. A quick perusal of the Summit proceedings revealed that only one group
suggested that small business might be given a partnership option. See Ms.
Perel, President, Australian Federation of Business and Professional Women,
in Australia National Tazation Summit: Record of Proceedings (Canberra:
AGPS, 1985), at 191.
306. See Economic Planning Advisory Council, Some Features of Small Business
and Its Policy Environment (Council Paper No. 12) (Canberra: EPAC,
1986), at 13-16.
307. See B.L. Johns, W.C. Dunlop and W.J. Sheehan, Small Business in
Australia: Problems & Prospects, 2nd ed. (Sydney: George Allen & Unwin,
1983), at 164. Also in its 1983 submission to the Treasury, the Taxation
Institute of Australia recommended that small corporations be allowed to
elect to be treated as partnerships. See 'Submission by the Taxation
Institute of Australia' (1983) 18 Tazation in Australia 551, at 555. See
also, for earlier suggestion for a partnership election, Parsons supra note
238, at 39; and B. Andrew, 'The Reform of Private Company Taxation'(1978) Australian Taz Review 169.
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The Case for a Partnership Election for
Closely-Held Corporations
The case for a partnership election for closely-held
corporations rests upon two premises. First, no theoretical
reason justifies treating corporations as separate taxpaying
entities, and the administrative reasons for doing so do not
apply to at least some types of closely-held corporations.
Second, the economic benefits and equity gains of providing a
partnership election outweigh the increased complexity costs of
doing so. After reviewing these two premises, I also argue
more generally that a tax system should not treat some entities
using a pass-through model and other entities using a separate-
entity model on the basis of their legal form; that is, whether
they are constituted in private law as partnerships or
corporations, for example. Instead, in categorising entities for
tax purposes, tax-relevant criteria should be used. In this
context, entities should be subject to separate-entity taxation
only when the administrative reasons for imposing the separate
tax are thought to outweigh the economic and equity costs of
doing so, irrespective of the legal form of the entity.
THE THEORETICAL CASE FOR A PARTNERSHIP
ELECTION
With respect to the first premise, the arguments about the
theoretical inappropriateness of the corporate tax will not be
reviewed here; this proposition is now widely accepted. 08
Indeed, the last time that anyone has seriously tried to make a
case for the corporate tax on theoretical grounds was probably
in 1961 by the Ligertwood Committee.0o However, to
illustrate the case for pass-through taxation of all entities in its
simplest terms, imagine the most straightforward case. If two
persons are conducting separate businesses and they decide to
combine their resources, but their incomes do not change, it
seems obvious that their tax positions should not change. If
the two partners each contribute 50 per cent of the capital and
50 per cent of the labour and agree to share all profits and
losses 50/50, their respective share of all income, deductions,
credits and losses should be passed through to each. There is
no theoretical reason why the character of the income they
receive or the deductions and credits that they are entitled to
should change simply because they decide to pool their
resources. However, for ease of administration and to prevent
abuses, the partnership entity might have to be recognised for
some tax purposes. This becomes more obvious when instead
308. See generally, Krever and McLure, supra note 1.
309. Commonwealth Committee on Taxation, supra note 261.
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of only two members the partnership has ten members and
each has a different economic interest in the partnership
property and income and each has agreed to assume a different
degree of risk. However, the basic point is that no theoretical
tax principle would require the partnership entity to be
recognised for tax purposes.
If the partners decide to carry on their business as a
corporation instead of a partnership, then in private law
normally their business entity will have different
characteristics. Most notably, it will have continuity of life,
centralisation of management, limited liability and interests in
it will be freely transferable. But again, in terms of tax
principles, why should these characteristics be of any
significance? Of what importance is it in a tax system
designed to measure economic power that a person's liability
for an investment in an income source is limited, or that the
investment has potentially an unlimited life, or that it is freely
transferable? Moreover, under most modern company law
statutes shareholders of closely-held corporations are able to
elect a set of rules to govern their relationships that provide
them with many of the characteristics of a partnership, for
example, decentralised management and restrictions on the
transfer of shares. Thus, it seems obvious that the only
possible reason for not extending pass-through treatment to
corporations is administrative. I will not analyse here the
alleged administrative problems with pass-through taxation for
corporations;s 0 however, even accepting that they foreclose
such treatment for widely-held corporations,s1  the United
States experience with its S Corporation rules reveals that it is
possible to draft rules that restrict the election for partnership
treatment to those corporations in which the taxpayer and the
tax department can cope with the administrative problems.
The above first premise for a partnership election for
closely-held corporations seems uncontentious. The more
difficult question is whether the benefits of providing such an
election outweigh the costs of increased complexity and the
opportunities for abuse.
THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF PROVIDING A
PARTNERSHIP ELECTION
The major benefit of allowing closely-held corporations to
elect to be taxed as partnerships is that such an election would
310. For a summary see McLure, supra note 36, at 232-3.
311. Compare Swan and Officer, esupra note 297 (arguing that full integration of
the corporate and shareholder tax is administratively possible) with R.
Vann, 'Legal Implications of Reform of Business Taxation' in D.J. Collins,
Reform of Business Taxation (Sydney: Australian Tax Research Foundation,
1985), at 167 (arguing that technical problems preclude a system of full
integration).
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increase the neutrality of the tax system. A separate corporate
tax necessarily creates a number of tax distortions. Moreover,
in the absence of a partnership election a separate corporate
tax leads to three distortions that affect small businesses in
particular: (a) It discourages some business people from
conducting their business in the corporate form. (b) It reduces
risk-taking by entrepreneurs. (c) It diminishes the value of tax
expenditures to small businesses. The seriousness of each of
these distortions will be discussed in turn.
Lessen the Tax Distortion Relating to the Choice of a
Business Form
Large businesses must incorporate. However, if the tax cost of
operating a small business in an incorporated form is greater
than the tax cost of operating it as a partnership, some
taxpayers will continue to conduct their business as a
partnership or a sole proprietorship even though there are good
business reasons for incorporating. The seriousness of this
distortion is speculative. It depends on how many people
might be lead to conduct their business as a partnership or sole
proprietorship because of the tax cost of incorporating, and the
economic consequences of businesses being conducted in an
unincorporated as opposed to an incorporated form.
The tax cost of incorporating, and therefore the number of
small business persons who will be deterred from
incorporating, will depend upon the details of the tax system
and therefore vary greatly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.
By way of illustration, it will depend upon the following
attributes of the tax system: the relation of the individual
marginal rates to the corporate rate (the lower the individual
marginal rates in relation to the corporate rate the greater the
tax cost of incorporating); the ability of employees to withdraw
amounts as salaries or interest payments from closely-held
corporations (if the tax system places few hurdles in the way
of shareholders withdrawing corporate surplus in the form of
salaries and interest payments, there will only be an additional
cost to incorporating if the corporation has non-employee
equity investors); and, the tax advantages that incorporation
might provide by permitting more generous tax treatment of
pension plans or other fringe benefits and by providing
increased opportunities for tax planning in the form of income
splitting and estate freezing.
Although it is impossible to generalise about the tax cost of
incorporating across jurisdictions as individual marginal rates
are lowered, which appears to be the trend in most countries,
the tax cost of incorporating will become greater. In the
United States, for example, where the top marginal rate is now
about equal to the flat corporate rate, and where individual
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rates under the Tax Reform Act of 1986 will for the first time
in history fall below the corporate rate, there is evidence that
the partnership option will become increasingly popular.s 2
Even if the tax cost of incorporating causes some business
people to operate their businesses in an unincorporated form,
in assessing the need for a partnership election it is necessary
to estimate the seriousness of any resulting economic distortion.
The most significant effect of the use of the corporate form is
that by providing for unlimited liability it might lead business
people to take greater risks. In small enterprises this might not
be a significant factor since invariably the entrepreneur will
have to assume personal liability for advances of credit even if
incorporated. However, if the business is in need of outside
equity capital, then limited liability might be important.
Although unincorporated forms such as limited partnerships
and trusts can sometimes be used to provide outside equity
investors with limited liability, the corporate form has many
business advantages over these other forms. So, although the
efficiency loss of imposing a tax cost on small business people
is impossible to quantify, it likely exists.
Increase Risk-Taking
The second distortion caused by a separate tax on closely-held
corporations is more serious. Individuals who start new
ventures in partnership form are able to deduct their start-up
costs and business losses from their personal income. Thus, if
the person has other income, the government becomes (through
the tax system) a partner in the venture, sharing in potential
profits and losses. With a uniform sharing in gains and losses,
taxes do not distort risk-taking. However, if the business
person incorporates, the government, although it shares in
future profits, no longer bears an equal burden for losses. If
the business suffers losses they cannot be attributed to the
shareholders to be deducted from their personal income but
must instead be carried forward to be offset against future
corporate income, if any. Since most new, risky business
ventures must be incorporated, one can assume that this
restriction upon the deductibility of corporate losses distorts
the allocation of investment funds away from risky investment
in new ventures.
Most income tax systems contain, a variety of restrictions
on the effective deductibility of losses, all of which operate to
reduce risk-taking. For example, invariably, capital losses can
be deducted only from capital gains in order to prevent
taxpayers from realising capital losses each year while accruing
312. See R.A. Kessler and G.L. Richmond, 'Has Congress Made the C
Corporation Obsolete for the Small Business?' (1984) Corporation Law
Review 293.
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their gains. Because of the obvious bias this introduces against
risk taking, most tax systems provide an exception to this rule
to encourage investment in small businesses.3 I For example,
in the United States a loss realised on 's.1244 stock' (stock
issued by a 'small business corporation') issued to an individual
or to a partnership which would otherwise constitute a capital
loss is treated as an ordinary loss. The express purpose of
s.1244, which was enacted in the same year as Subchapter S,
was to encourage the flow of new funds into small businesses.
Many tax systems have rules analogous to this. However,
under these rules normally a loss can only be taken when the
business has been terminated or when the shareholders sell
their stock so as to wind up their interest in the business. A
partnership election goes further and permits individual
shareholders to offset business losses from their other income
in the same year that the loss is incurred by the corporation.
To this extent, it is a far greater incentive for investment in
small businesses, and could materially increase the flow of
equity available to small businesses. Of course, the effects of a
partnership election on risk-taking should not be exaggerated.
It will increase risk-taking only in those cases where the
business could not otherwise be carried on in a partnership
form and where the investor has an independent source of
income with which to offset business losses.
Increase Small Business Access to Tax Expenditures
A partnership election could remove another tax distortion that
impinges in particular on small businesses. It is well
documented that corporate tax expenditures benefit large and
highly diversified corporations more than small corporations.
There would appear to be two important reasons for this.
First, most tax expenditures reduce the after-tax cost of new
capital goods; large firms tend to be more capital intensive
than small firms. Second, since most tax expenditures are in
the form of a tax deduction or non-refundable tax credit a
firm has to have taxable income in order to obtain full benefit
from them. Small start-up firms are less likely than large
diversified firms to have sufficient taxable income to utilise
the full deduction provided by tax incentives.
The bias of tax expenditures in favour of large firms
further increases the riskiness of new ventures. The
313. See generally, Moore and Sorlien, 'Adventures in Subchapter S and Section
1244' (1959) 14 Taz Law Review 453.
314. Canada's experience is typical. Because of the effect of tax expenditures, in
1982 corporations with assets under $1 million paid tax at an effective rate
of 34 per cent, corporations with assets over $25 million paid tax at an
effective rate of only 24 per cent. Statistics Canada, Corporation Taxation
Statistics, 1982 (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1984), at 25,
Table 3. See Generally, A.L. Feld, Tax Policy and Corporate Concentration
(Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1982), at 24-38.
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partnership election would in part correct this bias by allowing
corporate tax incentives to be offset against the shareholders'
personal incomes.
Assessment
The above three benefits of providing a partnership election
for closely-held corporations must be balanced against the
increased cost of complexity such an election would impose on
the tax system and the possibilities for abuse it might give rise
to. In the United States some commentators have questioned
whether the benefits of the Subchapter S rules outweigh these
costs. 3 " However, judging from the United States experience
it would seem that there are a sufficient number of situations
in which a partnership election is helpful to warrant its
presence in an income tax act. The number of firms electing
Subchapter S treatment has increased gradually over the years
until by 1982 there were approximately 565 000 firms utilising
the Subchapter S form. This was about 20 per cent of the total
corporate tax-filing population.1 6  Of course, there are
economies of scale to be realised in tax administration, and
rules that can be effectively administered in a large
jurisdiction like the United States might be too costly to
administer in Australia or Canada. On the other hand, the
United States S Corporation rules could be considerably
simplified if they only applied to new firms. A good deal of
the complexity of their rules is necessary to prevent existing
corporations taking the election and then avoiding shareholder
level tax on accumulated earnings and profits.sa
In a tax system providing for some form of dividend relief,
the tax cost of incorporating can be considerably decreased.
Therefore, it might be argued that a partnership election is
unnecessary in a tax jurisdiction like Australia that provides
for full imputation of the corporate tax upon the distribution
of corporate surplus. However, even in such systems, if there
is an advanced corporate tax, for example, a partnership
election might alleviate liquidity problems faced by small
firms. Much more significantly, the strongest arguments for a
partnership election - the ability to pass-through losses and tax
preferences - are still present. Thus, it would still serve to
reduce some of the tax system's biases against small firms.
There are two further incidental advantages of introducing
a partnership election for closely-held corporations. First, it
should relieve the pressures to deal on a more ad hoc basis
with some of the problems posed by the corporate tax for
315. See supra note 105.
316. See Department of Treasury, IRS, Statistics of Income - Corporation Tax
Returns (Washington, DC: GPS, 1984).
317. See supra note 113.
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small businesses. Second, it could provide the experience
necessary to eventually move to the full integration of the
corporate tax.
Virtually every recent tax reform study in the United
Kingdom, Canada and Australia has recommended the adoption
of a partnership election for closely-held corporations. In view
of this overwhelming endorsement, and the strong case in
principle, for the measure, the fact that none of these
countries have adopted a partnership election requires
explanation. In Canada and the United Kingdom the lower
rate of tax for small corporations undoubtedly relieved a
considerable amount of pressure for the partnership election.
In Canada, for example, the lower rate of corporate tax has
resulted in small businesses almost invariably paying less taxes
if they are incorporated. In Australia, the pressure for a
partnership election has presumably not been great since most
small businesses have been able to avoid the separate corporate
tax by conducting their businesses through trusts. Also, in all
of these tax jurisdictions the double taxation of corporate-
source income could normally be avoided by paying out
salaries. The partnership election would enable incorporated
entrepreneurs to deduct business losses against personal income.
However, provision for the deductibility of losses, even though
justified in tax policy terms, does not appear to have the same
political appeal as provision for more direct tax concessions,
even though not justified in tax policy terms.
Whether a partnership election is adopted in the United
Kingdom, Australia or Canada will depend in part on the
future relation of personal and corporate tax rates. If the top
personal rates fall below the top corporate rates, as appears to
be the case in the United States, there might be increasing
pressure for such a move. Indeed, if the rates move in this
direction there will undoubtedly be resumed consideration of
partnership treatment for all corporations.
GENERAL: THE CLASSIFICATION OF LEGAL ENTITIES
FOR TAX PURPOSES
The question of whether corporations should be given a
partnership election raises a more fundamental tax policy issue
that I will not discuss in any detail, but only raise here. The
only point I wish to make is that providing a partnership
election for closely-held corporations can be seen more
generally as a step in the direction of developing a more
rational system for classifying legal entities for tax purposes.
Assume a tax system provides two techniques for taxing legal
entities, the pass-through model and the separate-entity model,
which correspond roughly to the way partnerships and
corporations are now taxed. The fundamental tax policy issue
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is, on what basis should particular legal entities be assigned to
one category or the other?s"s
One obvious way to classify entities is simply by reference
to their name in private law. Entities referred to as
partnerships in private law would be provided with pass-
through tax treatment. Entities referred to as corporations
would be taxed on a separate entity basis. This is essentially
the Canadian and Australian approach. The problems with this
system are obvious. Tax policy considerations have been
surrendered to the whims of private law-makers. Normally,
the application of tax laws should depend upon the rights and
liabilities formed under private law, not upon the
characterisation placed upon them by private law-makers. A
jurisdiction might change its corporate laws so that closely-
held corporations can elect to have characteristics analogous to
partnerships, or its partnership laws so that limited
partnerships have characteristics more analogous to
corporations than traditional partnerships. Also, as apparent in
so many areas of tax policy, private law categories can usually
be manipulated to achieve virtually any economic result the
parties wish. Thus a country whose tax laws rely on private
law categories has really lost control of its tax system. This is
evidenced in Australia where on a massive scale taxpayers have
done an end run around the classical corporate tax system by
using trusts.
Another way to classify entities is to look at the legal rights
and obligations the parties have created and then classify the
entity on the basis of these, regardless of the legal form the
parties use in creating these legal rights and obligations. Thus
if the taxpayers create an entity that has the characteristics
normally associated with a partnership, it will be classified as a
partnership. If the parties create an entity that has the
characteristics normally associated with a corporation, it will
be taxed as a corporation. This is essentially the American
approach.319
In the United States a corporation is defined as follows:
'The term "corporation" includes associations, joint-stock
companies, and insurance companies'.320 In distinguishing
between 'associations' that will be treated as corporations from
others, the regulations list six major characteristics that are
'ordinarily found in a pure corporation': (i) associates, (ii) an
318. This question arises with respect to both domestic and foreign entities.
Only the problem of classifying domestic entities will be discussed here.
Criteria for classifying foreign entities must accommodate a wider range of
interests. For a discussion of relevant considerations, see New York State
Bar Association, Tax Section, 'Report on Foreign Equity Characterisation
for Federal Income Tax Purposes' (1980) 35 Tax Law Review 167.
319. See B.I. Bittker and J.S. Eustice, Federal Taxation of Corporations and
Shareholders, 4th ed. (Boston: Warren, Gorham & Lamont, 1979), chap. 2.
320. IRC, s.7701(a)(3).
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objective to carry on business and divide the gains therefrom,
(iii) continuity of life, (iv) centralisation of management, (v)
liability of corporate debts limited to corporate property, and
(vi) free transferability of interests." Since the last four of
these characteristics are common to both trusts and
corporations 'the determination of whether a trust ... is to be
treated for tax purposes as a trust or as an association depends
upon whether there are associates and an objective to carry on
business and divide the gains therefrom'.3 2 2 Under this test,
virtually all trusts carrying on a business are classified as
corporations.323 Partnerships generally have associates and an
objective to carry on business for joint profit; therefore, when
attempting to distinguish between a partnership and an
association taxable as a corporation, the decision is made by
reference to the other four characteristics. To characterise a
partnership as a corporation it is necessary to find three out of
the four other characteristics: continuity of life, centralised
management, limited liability and free transferability of
interests.' 24 Under this test, partnerships, even publicly traded
limited partnerships, have generally been held not to be
325
corporations.
Although generally for tax law purposes the actual rights
and obligations created by the parties should determine tax
consequences, and not the private law characterisations, in this
area this approach does not lead to satisfactory results. First,
given the large number of factors that may vary from one legal
entity to another, a 'resemblance test' is almost impossible to
apply consistently. Answers to such questions as what features
should be looked at, how they should be weighed, and whether
a particular number of features should be required before an
association is classified as a corporation, for example, will all
necessarily be arbitrary. Although some United States
commentators have suggested that a more realistic resemblance
test than at present applied in the United States could be
developed,"2 it is doubtful if any meaningful test could be
applied. For example, even in large general partnerships like
law and accounting firms, continuity of life is realistically
321. Reg. 301.7701-2(a)(l).
322. Reg. 301.7701-2(a)(2).
323. See generally, J.V. Karlinsky, 'Tax Classification of Trusts: The Howard
Case and Other Current Developments' (1986) 19 LoYola of Los Angeles
Law Review 803; C.J. Doolin, 'Determining the Taxable Status of Trusts
That Run Businesses' (1985) 70 Cornell Law Review 1143.
324. Reg. 301.7701-2(a)(3).
325. See generally, E.W. Hecker, Jr., 'The Tax Classification of Limited
Partnerships Revisited' (1983) Commercial Law Review 537; F.W. Peel
'Definition of a Partnership: New Suggestions on an Old Issue', 1979
Wisconsin Law Review 989; R. Hall, 'Tax Classification of Limite
Partnerships: Opportunity for Reform' (1977) 30 Rutgers Law Review 1260;
Note, 'Tax Classification of Limited Partnerships' (1977) Harvard Law
Review 745.
326. See supra note 325.
468 AUSTRALIAN TAX FORUM
present. Also, through managing partner agreements partners
of such firms enjoy the benefits of centralised management.
On the other hand, many closely-held corporations have
restraints on the transferability of shares, and limited liability
for the owners is not an economic reality.
More fundamentally, the resemblance test is flawed because
the characteristics of an entity that are used in classifying it
have no significance in tax policy. Tax policy analysts, in
rejecting the case for a separate tax on corporations, have been
unanimous in agreeing that legal characteristics such as limited
liability, free transferability of interests and centralised
management are irrelevant facts in tax policy terms. If this is
so, why should they be resorted to in classifying legal entities
for tax purposes? Thus, one reason why a satisfactory
resemblance test has never been developed in the United States
is that the courts and the IRS have been faced with the task of
formulating standards for distinguishing among businesses
without knowing the precise goals their line-drawing is to
serve.327
The history of the regulations on entity classification in the
United States illustrate the arbitrariness that arises when clear
policy reasons do not underlie the categorisation.3 2 8  In the
1950s statutory changes made it desirable for professionals, in
particular, to have their organisations classified as corporations
in order to take advantage of lower corporate income tax rates
and deferred compensation arrangements available to corporate
employees. After losing an important case, 2  the IRS
promulgated entity-classification regulations in 1960 that were
pro-partnership in order to deny these tax benefits to
professionals. However, after a protracted struggle on this
issue, and in the face of state laws allowing professionals to
incorporate and judicial hostility to the IRS's apparent
arbitrariness in drafting the new regulations, the IRS conceded
defeat in the late 1960s. No sooner had the IRS lost its battle
against professional organisations, than it faced the problem
that the business community began using the pro-partnership
regulations to form tax shelters using limited partnerships. Tax
shelter limited partnerships afforded investors the business
advantages of the corporate form without losing the tax
advantages of partnerships, most notably the flow through of
losses. Because of the promulgation of its earlier pro-
partnership regulations, throughout the 1970s the IRS was
largely unsuccessful in having these limited partnerships
classified as corporations.
327. For an insightful discussion of this point see M.B. Hyman and P.M.
Hoffman, 'Partnership and "Associations": A Policy Critique of the
Morrissey Regulations' (1976) 3 Journal of Real Estate Tazation 377.
328. See articles cited in supra note 325.
329. United States v. Kinter, 216 F. 2d 418 (9th Cir. 1954).
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In the absence of any compelling tax policy for
distinguishing between legal entities, the only sensible way to
classify them into the pass-through or separate-entity taxation
models is by taxpayer election. The two distinct regimes of
taxation for entities should be provided in the act and
taxpayers allowed to elect which regime they wish to be taxed
under, regardless of the legal form of their legal entity or the
rights and obligations it created. Some taxpayers would
undoubtedly find it advantageous to be taxed at their
individual rates. Others would find it advantageous to pay the
separate tax at the entity level and defer paying tax at the
individual level. Essentially immediate taxation at high
individual rates or deferral at lower corporate rates would be
seen as an acceptable trade-off.
One might ask, if there are no tax policy justifications for
distinguishing between partnerships and corporations why
bother with an elective system? Why not simply put all legal
entities on a pass-through basis? The election is premised on
the assumption that there are administrative difficulties with
placing some large entities on a pass-through basis. Providing
taxpayers with an election enable those entities for whom pass-
through taxation would pose high compliance costs to elect to
be taxed as a separate-entity. If it was felt that pass-through
taxation by some entities might pose high administrative costs
on the tax department, then the characteristics of entities that
give rise to administrative problems when pass-through
taxation is used might be identified and entities classified on
the basis of the presence or absence of these characteristics.
By way of example, one characteristic of entities that is alleged
to give rise to problems for pass-through taxation is the free
transferability of interests. If the interests in the entity are
sold frequently during the year, allegedly this gives rise to
problems in establishing a record date for allocation purposes
and can give rise to tax audit problems. Another characteristic
of entities that gives rise to administrative problems in a
system of pass-through taxation is the existence of complex
and multiple interests. It is often difficult to allocate an
entity's profits, in the absence of an actual distribution, if the
parties with an interest in the entity have different rights,
some of which might be contingent on future events. If these
are the characteristics of business entities that give rise to
administrative problems in a pass-through model, it would
make sense to restrict pass-through taxation to those business
entities in which, for example, the interests cannot be publicly
traded and in which the economic interests are straightforward.
Obviously, this is not the place to work out the details of such
a regime, but my point is that under it entities would be
classified for tax purposes regardless of the term used to
identify the legal entity or even of the legal rights and
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obligations created. Instead classification would be based upon
tax-relevant factors.
There are two obvious arguments against an elective system
or one that divides entities according to the administrative
difficulties of providing for pass-through taxation. First, it
might be argued that the present Canadian and Australian
systems are effectively elective systems. If taxpayers wish
pass-through taxation they can operate their business as a
partnership or trust. If they wish separate-entity taxation they
can operate their business as a corporation. Moreover, the
legal concept of a partnership acts as a good surrogate for an
entity whose interests are not frequently traded and whose
economic interests are straightforward, whereas the legal
concept of a corporation acts as a surrogate for an entity with
the opposite characteristics.
However, a system that requires taxpayers to elect, in
effect, how to be taxed by operating their business as either a
partnership, trust or corporation, depending upon the election
they wish to make, is highly inefficient. In order to make the
tax election they wish, taxpayers might be required to operate
their business in a legal form that is unsuited to their business
needs. Moreover, as surrogates for the characteristics of legal
entities to which pass-through taxation is or is not easy to
apply, these two legal categories are far from perfect. By way
of example, closely-held corporations are obviously closer to
partnerships in this respect than they are to publicly-traded
corporations and limited partnerships can be more like publicly
traded corporations than general partnerships.
Another objection to permitting taxpayers to elect whether
legal entities owned by them will be taxed on a pass-through
or separate-entity basis might be that the tax department loses
some control over the claiming of artificial tax losses. This is
indeed the context in which the classification issue has arisen
in the United States in the last number of years. Because each
partner is allowed to deduct his share of any partnership losses,
partnerships are an effective means for joint participation in
tax shelters. Limited partnership interests can be used to
protect investors from loss in excess of their investment and to
enable them to freely transfer their interest. Thus by using
limited partnerships investors can achieve the tax advantages of
partnership treatment, but the legal advantages of the corporate
form.330 For this reason, a number of tax reform proposals in
the United States have suggested that limited partnership s
should be treated as corporations for tax purposes.
330. See 'Publicly Traded Limited Partnerships: An Emerging Financial
Alternative to the Public Corporation' (1984) 39 Business Lawyer 709, 710.
331. Department of Treasury, The President's 1978 Tax Program (Washington,
DC: GPO, 1978), at 117-31; Treasury Department, Taz Reform for
Fairness, Simplicity and Economic Growth (Washington, DC: GPO, 1984),
vol. 2, chap. 7.03.
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However, instead of using entity-classification rules to limit
the pass-through of losses, a better approach is simply to limit
loss flow-through on particular investments directly. Thus, for
example, if the government is concerned about widespread
exploitation of the tax advantages that can often be realised by
investing in real estate, instead of attacking the vehicles used
for such investments (by classifying certain limited partnerhips
as corporations) the better approach is simply to limit the
amounts deductible from such investments to the income
earned from them. 3
In conclusion, in this general section on the classification of
legal entities for tax purposes I have argued that if for
administrative reasons all legal entities cannot be put on a
pass-through basis for tax purposes, then taxpayers should be
allowed to elect pass-through or separate-entity taxation or
legal entities ought to be classified by reference to tax-relevant
criteria. The more narrow point I wish to make is simply that
a partnership election for closely-held corporations can be
justified as a move in that direction.
The Case Against the Lower Rate of
Corporate Tax
A lower rate of tax for closely-held corporations is usually
justified by reference both to tax objectives - it increases the
equity and neutrality of the tax system - and to budgetary
objectives - it is a good policy instrument for providing
financial assistance to small business.353  Each of the rationales
will be discussed in turn.
332. When an effort is made to limit the accessibility to tax expenditures by
attacking limited partnerships for example, the benefits of the tax shelter
are only effectively denied to middle-income investors. High-income
taxpayers generally do not have to invest in limited partnerships to invest
in tax shelters. They can often simply invest directly. Of course, any
indirect rule limiting tax shelter activity will create inequities. For example,
none of the indirect rules limiting tax shelter activity will distinguish real
economic losses from tax losses. Also, the broader the category of
investments to be restricted, the larger the group of investors who will
continue to benefit from the tax rules. A rule limiting the loss from rental
property to related income will not, for example, impinge upon the investor
with a large, diversified rental property portfolio. There seems little way
around this problem. But the point here is simply that limitation of
artificial loss rules are invariably more effective in limiting accessibility to
tax expenditures than entity-classification rules.
333. Controlling corporate monopoly or bigness is another justification sometimes
put forward for graduated corporate tax rates. This justification would
suggest that all low- and middle-income and even some large corporations
should pay at the same rate, but that truly large corporations should pay
at a higher rate. Using corporate tax rates to control corporate monopoly
has been discussed from time to time, but it is never propounded seriously
since a firm's market share is obviously unrelated to its income. Some
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TECHNICAL TAX POLICY ANALYSIS OF THE LOWER
RATE OF CORPORATE TAX
The following two tax policy considerations have been put
forward from time to time as justifying the lower rate of
corporate tax: large corporations have greater ability to pay
than smaller corporations; and, by reducing the tax burden on
small corporations, a lower rate of tax mitigates the tax cost of
incorporating for the typical partnership or proprietorship and
thus increases the neutrality of the tax system.
Many jurisdictions that adopted graduated corporate tax
rates in the first half of the century did so because of a belief
that large corporations had more ability to pay than small
ones. 3, The intuitive appeal of this justification is obvious:
industries can be dominated by relatively small firms, in others even giant
firms may not dominate. See A.G. Buehler, 'Should the Tax System Be
Used to Check Monopoly?' in R.G. Blakey, How Should Corporations Be
Tazed? (New York: Tax Institute Inc., 1946), at 91; R.A. Musgrave and
P.B. Musgrave, Public Finance in Theory and Practice, 4th ed. (New York:
McGraw-Hill, 1984), at 389; and, A.L. Feld, Tax Policy and Corporate
Concentration (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1982), at 139-42. This
defect could be remedied by levying a progressive corporate tax based on
market shares. See W.G. Shepherd, The Treatment of Market Power:
Antitrust, Regulation, and Public Enterprise (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1975), at 196-300. However, aside from any other consideration, the
administrative problems with such a tax appear to be almost
insurmountable. A more serious but related justification for progressive
corporate tax rates is to curb corporate bigness. If economic power leads
to political and social power, reducing the size of a country's business
corporations might lead to a more equal distribution of political and social
rights. This justification for progressive corporate tax rates has been put
forward by numerous commentators, most recently by J.L. Simon. Simon
suggests, based on 1968 income levels, a tax of 75 per cent on all corporate
income in excess of $80 million annually. J.L. Simon, 'Antitrust and the
"Size" Problem: The "Graduated" Corporate Income Tax as an Anti-
Bigness Device' (1972-73) 6 Antitrust Law and Economics Review 53. See
also, S.M. Loescher, 'Limiting Corporate Power' (1979) 13 Journal of
Economic Issues 557. But, although high corporate tax rates appear to be
a better instrument to curb bigness than monopoly power, they are an ill-
suited instrument even for this purpose. Once corporations reach a
particular size, their income might be more a measure of their profitablilty
than their bigness in any other sense, for example, asset size. And yet, a
corporation with a large asset size might have more political or social power
than a corporation with a large income. Thus, if a tax is to be designed
to mitigate the problems posed by corporate bigness, it is unclear that its
base should be income. Moreover, such a tax would be difficult to enforce.
For example, somewhat ironically, if it were based on taxable income it
could be avoided so long as the firm continued to expand by acquiring new
depreciable assets. Tax deductions generated by such purchases would keep
a firm's taxable income low. Also, it would be extremely difficult to
formulate rules to associate the income of related corporations for purposes
of the tax. Large public corporations can often be controlled by one
individual or a related group of individuals with a small shareholding.
334. See M. Newcomer 'European Taxation of Business' in How Shall Business be
Tazed? (New York: Tax Policy League, Inc., 1937), at 69 (in 22 countries
levying the corporate tax, 11 used progressive rates); R. Blough, 'Flat
versus Graduated Rates for Business Net Income Taxes' id., at 74; E.G.
Keith, 'Flat Rate Corporation Tax vs. Present Tax' in H.M. Groves et al.,
Reappraisal of Business Tazation (Princeton: Tax Institute, 1962) 175. In
the United States, the greater ability-to-pay of large corporations was one
of the justifications given for imposing graduated corporate rates in 1935.
See A.G. Buehler, The Undistributed Profits Tax (New York: McGraw-Hill,
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large corporations have greater resources than small
corporations. However, tax theoreticians are now unanimous
in agreeing that corporations do not have ability to pay as that
concept is normally used in tax theory."' Although the
concept lacks precision, it is normally assumed to call for some
sort of equality of sacrifice. Legal constructs, such as
corporations, cannot suffer the kind of psychological pain that
the concept contemplates.336
In individual taxation the concept of ability to pay when
used to justify progressive rates sometimes refers not to
notions of marginal sacrifice but to the idea that it is fair to
use the tax system to redistribute income. But even in this
sense the concept cannot be used to justify progressive
corporate tax rates. Ultimately, the corporate tax must be
borne by individuals. It must reduce the income of
shareholders, all capitalists, consumers or employees. If the
corporate tax is borne by consumers in the form of higher
prices, or employees in the form of lower wages, it would be
regressive, whether the rates were flat or progressive. If the
corporate tax reduces corporate profits, and therefore in the
short-run is borne by shareholders, it increases the
1937), at 235. In 1941, in noting that six states had imposed progressive
tax rates on corporations, J.R. Sundelson stated 'there is every evidence
that the ability-to-pay concept was considered to be as pertinent to the
income of corporations as it is to the income of the individuals'. 'Taxation
of Corporate Income at Progressive Rates: The State and Federal
Experience Compared' (1941) 26 Bulletin of the National Tax Association
167, at 171. The ability-to-pay rationale appears to have had the support
of at least some early tax theoreticians. For example, Sir Josiah Stamp,
although admitting several difficulties with the argument, noted that
progressive taxation 'has been justified on the "production" side by reference
to the fact that the larger the income the greater its power on being
focused or grouped for the production of further income, and therefore, the
more it can be tapped without hurt'. The Fundamental Principles of
Taxation (London: McMillan, 1929), at 41.
335. See R.M. Bird, Taxing Corporations (Montreal, Institute for Research on
Public Policy, 1980), at 12-15; R. Goode, The Corporation Income Tax
(New York: Wiley and Sons, 1951), at 32-7 (but suggesting that a tax on
corporations might be justified if ability to pay is interpreted as 'the
capacity of paying with minimum interference with socially approved aims');
R.A. Musgrave and P.B. Musgrave, Public Finance in Theory and Practice,
4th ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1984), at 388; J.A. Pechman, Federal
Tax Policy, 3rd ed. (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1977), at
128; and J.R. Petrie, The Taxation of Corporate Income in Canada
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1952), at 102-5.
336. Economists, uneasy with the subjective nature of the traditional ability to
pay concept, often attempt to convert it into a more objective sounding
concept. Frequently, its application is said to depend upon the distinction
between non-discretionary and discretiona income. For example, in
arguing against a progressive rate structure for corporations, the authors of
the United States Treasury report on tax simplification and reform reasoned,
'The progressive rate structure for individuals is premised on the ability-
to-pay concept, which in turn reflects an assumption that additional
amounts of income are increasingly available for discretionary, nonessential
consumption. These concepts have no relevance to corporate income, all of
which is either distributed, or used to produce additional income'. United
States, Treasury Department, Tax Reform for Fairness, Simplicity, and
Economic Growth (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1984), at 127.
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progressivity of the tax system since shares are held
disproportionately by high-income individuals. However, even
if the corporate tax could be justified on this ground, a
progressive corporate tax could not be since there is no
relationship between the size of a corporation and the net
income of its owners. Many small corporations (which would
benefit most from graduated rates) are owned by high-income
individuals and many middle- and low-income individuals own
shares in large corporations.
A tax system should be neutral between the various legal
forms taxpayers may use in carrying on their businesses. A
flat-rate corporate tax, since it must be set at a rate about
equal to the highest individual marginal rate to prevent undue
deferral advantages when a business is carried on in an
incorporated form, will invariably impose a substantial tax cost
on the incorporation of businesses operated by middle- and
low-income individuals. Some jurisdictions have, therefore,
adopted graduated corporate tax rates as a way of increasing
the neutrality of the tax system.m Graduated corporate tax
rates that closely parallel the graduated individual rates ensure
that middle- and low-income individuals who incorporate their
businesses do not experience an abrupt increase in their tax
liabilities. This rationale for graduated corporate tax rates is
unconvincing for two reasons. First, graduated rates achieve
this objective at too high a cost. Graduated corporate rates
allow high-income individuals to use corporations to split their
income between two sets of income tax brackets. Second, the
additional tax cost of incorporating can in most tax systems be
easily avoided by a business person by simply withdrawing
corporate source income as salary. To the extent that the tax
cannot be avoided, the sensible policy response is a partnership
election for small corporations not graduated corporate tax
rates.
Thus, the lower rate of corporate tax cannot be justified as
a technical tax measure. Since the corporate tax is not based
on the concept of ability to pay, graduated rates do not further
the equity of the tax system. Although graduated corporate
rates might increase the neutrality of the tax system, they do
so only marginally, at a considerable revenue cost, and by
making the tax system less equitable.
337. This was one of the reasons that graduated corporate tax rates were
adopted by a number of states in the United States. See J.R. Sundelson,
'Taxation of Corporate Income at Progressive Rates: The State and Federal
Experience Compared' 26 Bulletin of the National Tax Asesociation 167, at
171 ('It was believed ... that a flat rate tax on corporations would be
discriminatory and that it was undesirable to tax the small unincorporated
business more heavily than the small incorporated concern.') Also, in 1978,
when the generosity of the graduated corporate rates was increased in the
United States, both the House on Ways and Means Committee and the
Senate Finance Committee gave this as one of the justifications for doing
so. See infra note 349.
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IS A LOWER RATE OF CORPORATE TAX A TAX
EXPENDITURE?
Many countries now account for the tax expenditures in their
tax systems.338  The question of whether a lower rate of
corporate tax is a technical tax measure or a subsidy for small
business has thus arisen in this context: Should the reduced
tax liability, due to a lower rate of corporate tax or graduated
corporate tax rates, be included in a country's tax expenditure
account? Therefore, before examining the small-business-
subsidy case for a lower corporate tax rate, I will review the
debate over the purpose of the lower corporate rate as it has
arisen in the context of deciding whether to include it in a tax
expenditure account.
Recently, the United States Office of the Management and
Budget has removed the lower rate of corporate tax from its
list of tax expenditures. The debate surrounding the removal
of this and other tax provisions from this list of tax
expenditures sheds some light both on the purposes of the
lower rate of tax and the nature of the tax expenditure
concept. Therefore, in addition to reviewing the treatment of
the lower rate of a corporate tax in tax expenditure lists, I will
make a more general comment about the tax expenditure
concept.
In most tax expenditure analysis the lower rate of tax has
been treated as a tax expenditure. In Canada, the small
business credit has been treated as a tax expenditure by the
federal government in its tax expenditure account,"" and by
most commentators.3 40  The income of Canadian-controlled
private corporations that qualifies for the federal small
business credit is also eligible for a lower rate of provincial
tax. Most commonly, the general provincial corporate tax rate
is about 15 per cent and the small business rate is about 10 per
cent. All of those provinces that have published an account of
their tax expenditures have included in it the revenue lost
because of this lower rate of tax. 4
338. See generally, S.S. Surrey and P.R. McDaniel, International Aspects of Tax
Expenditures: A Comparative Study (Deventer, Netherlands: Kluwer, 1985).
339. Department of Finance, Account of the Cost of Selective Tax Measures
(Ottawa: Department of Finance, 1985), at 122 (cost estimated to be $1.4
illion in 1982).
340. See, for example, R.S. Smith, Tax Expenditures: An Examination of Tax
Incentives and Tax Preferences in the Canadian Federal Income Tax System
(Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 1979), at 95; and, K. Lahey, 'The
Small Business Credit: A Tax Expenditure Analysis' (1979) 1 Canadian
Taxation (No. 2) 29.
341. See Ministry of Finance, Province of British Columbia, Background Papers
to the 1982 Budget (1981), at 32, (estimated cost for 1982-83, $82.1
million); Hon. Eugene Kostyra, Minister of Finance, Manitoba Budget
Address, 1986 (Queen's Printer), at C-9 (estimated cost for 1986, $14.4
million); Ministry of Treasury and Economics, Ontario Tax Ezpenditures
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The United Kingdom does not have an official tax
expenditure list. However, the small companies reduced rate
of corporate tax is listed as a tax relief in the government's
annual Public Expenditure White Paper.34 ' The reduced rate
was not included as a tax expenditure (without discussion) in
the leadin treatise on tax expenditures in the United
Kingdom."
In the United States, until 1978, graduated corporate tax
rates took the following form. The permanent corporate
income tax consisted of a normal tax rate of 22 per cent and a
surtax of 26 per cent, for a total tax rate of 48 per cent. The
first $25 000 of profits were exempt from the surtax. In 1975,
temporary provisions reduced the normal tax rate to 20 per
cent on the first $25 000 of profits and 22 per cent on the next
$25 000 of profits, and raised the exemption from the surtax to$50 000. All three government agencies that prepare tax
expenditure lists - the Office of Management and Budget(OMB),3 4 4 the Congressional Budget Office (CBO)3" and the
Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation (JCT)3 46 -
treated the exemption from the surtax as a tax expenditure.
The Revenue Act of 1978 repealed the normal corporate tax
and surtax and in their place imposed a five-step tax rate
structure on corporate income. The rates ranged from 17 per
cent on the first $25 000 or taxable corporate income to 46 per
cent on income over $100 000. In passing the new graduated
rate schedule, both the House Ways and Means Committee and
the Senate Finance Committee stated that they did not consider
the new tax structure to be a tax expenditure.4 Neither
(1986), at 13, (estimated cost for 1984-85, $210 million); and, Hon. J.
ary Lane, Minister of Finance, Saskatchewan, Budget Address, 1986, at 54
(estimated cost for 1986, $18.8 million).
342. See The Government's Expenditure Plans 1979-80 to 1982-83 Cmnd 7439
(London: HMSO, 1979), at 25. There is no attempt in this list to identify
the reliefs that should be considered tax expenditures and no effort to link
them to particular spending programmes.
343. See J.R. Willis and P.J.W. Hardwick, Tax Expenditures in the United
Kingdom (London: Heinemann Educational Books, 1978), chap. 7.
344. See Executive Office of the President and Office of Management and
Budget, Special Analysis, Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal
Year 1987 (Washington: GPO, 1986), Special Analysis G. This special
analysis is undertaken pursuant to the Congressional Budget Act of 1974,
Public Law 93-344, which requires a listing of tax expenditures in the
Budget.
345. See Congressional Budget Office, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., Tax Expenditures:
Budget Control Options and Five-Year Budget Projections for Fiscal Years
1983-1987 (1982). The CBO is required by the Congressional Budget Act
of 1974, Public aw 93-344, to issue a report each year that projects tax
expenditures for each of the next five fiscal years.
346. See Joint Committee on Taxation, 98th Cong., 1st Sess Estimates of
Federal Tax Expenditures for Fiscal Years 1983-88 (1983). The Joint
Committee has since 1971 submitted this data on a regular basis to the
House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate Finance Committee.
347. House Ways and Means Committee, Revenue Act of 1978, H.R. Rept. 1445,95th Cong., 2d Sess. (Washington: GPO, 1978), at 143; Senate Finance
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committee gave any reason for this approach. The Senate
Finance Committee for example, simply noted, 'The Committee
believes that the graduated tax rate becomes part of the normal
tax structure, departures from which are considered as tax
expenditures'.' In giving reasons for the increased generosity
of the tax relief for small businesses both committees gave
both a tax expenditure and a tax structure argument. For
example, the House Ways and Means Committee report stated,
'the committee believes that ... the application of graduated
rates to corporations will encourage growth in small business
and provide tax relief to those companies ... Moreover,
application of the graduated rates to corporations should
reduce the impact of tax laws in the selection of a form of
organisation for operation of a small business'.3" Nothing
came of the committees' suggested change in treatment of the
lower corporate tax rates for small business. Both committees
noted that the Congressional Budget Office did not agree with
their position that the graduated corporate tax rate structure
should not be treated as a tax expenditure,3 5 0 and the tables on
changes in the cost of tax expenditures which accompanied the
committee reports included the increased cost of the lower
graduated corporate tax rates.351
However, in 1983, the Office of Management and Budget
changed its method of classifying tax expenditures. This
resulted in a number of tax provisions, including graduated
corporate tax rates, no longer being treated as a tax
expenditure in Special Analysis G of the Budget. Prior to
1983, the OMB, like the JCT and the CBO, defined tax
expenditures as deviations from a 'normal' income tax
determined by reference to the Haig-Simons definition of
income. In 1983 the OMB changed its approach so that only
those tax provisions that were comparable in design to direct
subsidy programmes would be labelled as tax expenditures."
Consequently, if deviations from the 'normal' tax structure
were general they would not be classified as tax expenditures.
A two-step procedure for identifying tax expenditures was
proposed. To be classified as a tax expenditure both of the
following two questions in relation to a provision has to be
answered in the affirmative. First, if the provision in question
Committee, Revenue Act of 1978, S. kept. 1263, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.(Washington: GPO, 1978), at 253.
348. S. Rept. 1263, supra note 347.
349. H.R. Rept. 1445, supra note 347, at 110.
350. Supra note 347.
351. H.R. Rept. 1445, supra note 347, at 144; S. Rept. 1263, supra note 347, at
262.
352. For the development of the definition of tax expenditures in the United
States see S.S. Surrey and P.R. McDaniel, 'The Tax Expenditure Concept
and the Budget Reform Act of 1974' (1976) 17 Boston College Industrial
and Commercial Law Review 679, at 682-8.
353. See supra note 344.
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did not exist, does the enacted tax law (the 'reference law')
provide a generally applicable rule by which taxpayers could
determine their tax liability? 3 " Second, does the provision in
question apply to only a narrow class of transactions, or
taxpayers, so that its differential effects on particular market
prices and quantities can be identified and measured? 5"
Under these criteria, graduated corporate tax rates are not tax
expenditures: there is no general provision to which they are
an exception,"' and the rates do not apply to a narrow class of
taxpayers.
This method of determining tax expenditures appears
nonsensical. Aside from other criticisms, most notably that
it is not obvious what purpose such a definition serves, it leads
to two perverse results: First, by accepting the existing tax law
as the 'reference law' it provides no standard by which that
law can be evaluated. Second, by labelling only tax provisions
that apply to a narrow class of transactions or taxpayers as tax
expenditures, it fails to identify as spending programs those
provisions of the tax system that are designed to achieve
particular social or economic objectives but that are general in
their application and therefore are the most poorly targeted
subsidy programs.
The only possible explanation for the change in the
approach by the OMB is that the Treasury wished to obscure
the nature of a number of expensive and ineffective tax
expenditures that the government introduced in 1981, such as
the expansion of the investment tax credit and the accelerated
cost recovery system of depreciation through the device of
'safe harbour leasing'. In 1985, the OMB, noting the lack of
uniformity between its tax expenditure list and those of the
CBO and JCT, began providing revenue estimates for both
those items classified as a tax expenditure under its 'reference
tax' approach and those items that would be so classified under
the 'normal tax' approach."5
Because tax expenditure analysis is central to my criticism
of the lower rate of tax, and because there appears to be a
considerable amount of confusion in the literature over its
uses, if not its validity, I will digress slightly here to clarify
the nature of the concept. Some of the most interesting
literature in tax policy has been devoted to attempting to
define, or to point out the difficulties of defining, a
354. This question, in theory, removes any normative content from the question
of whether a provision is a tax expenditure.
355. This question ensures that only tax provisions for which a comparable
subsidy programme could be designed are classified as tax expenditures.
356. Unless the top rate could be considered the general rule.
357. See S.S. Surrey and P.R. McDaniel, Tax Ezpenditures (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1985), at 194-6.
358. For fiscal year 1986, the cost of the reduced rates on the first $100 000 of
corporate income was estimated to be $9.8 billion. See supra note 340.
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comprehensive tax base.359 Many of the authors critical of the
comprehensive tax base, and therefore the tax expenditure
concept, argue that it is necessarily a normative concept and
therefore of little value unless its normative premises can be
agreed upon. The comprehensive tax base (and therefore any
concept that purports to identify deviations from it) is
unquestionably a normative concept. Any tax base must be
defined in relation to the policy objectives that it is designed
to serve. However, the tax expenditure concept has value even
though the definition of a comprehensive tax base cannot be
agreed upon.
The real value of the tax expenditure concept has been to
clarify the analysis of tax provisions. Basically, the concept
makes clear that two distinct types of criteria must be used to
evaluate tax measures: just tax criteria such as equity,
neutrality and simplicity and, second, budgetary criteria such
as cost-effectiveness and the degree of government control
over and accountability for the measure. Thus, the concept
suggests that if the lower rate of corporate tax is defended
upon the grounds that it promotes the neutrality of the tax
system then it should be analysed by applying this and other
tax criteria. However, if it is defended upon the grounds that
it promotes small business, it should be analysed as a spending
program, using budgetary criteria. That is, if a tax provision
is justified as serving some particular government social or
economic objective it is always fair to ask: (a) Whether the
objective is a legitimate and priority concern of government?
(b) Whether some other policy instrument might better achieve
the objective? and, (c) By comparison to a spending program,
whether the tax provision could be better designed? It has
only been in the last twenty years, since the popularisation of
the tax expenditure concept, that tax analysts have fully
appreciated the need, and have developed the sophistication
needed, for answering these types of questions. In these terms,
so long as the type of analysis called for is understood, at the
end of the day whether a measure is labelled a tax expenditure
is insignificant. Furthermore, the concept will have served its
purpose of clarifying the analysis of tax provisions even
though no agreement has been reached upon the design of the
normal tax structure.
Of course, for some purposes it is necessary to prepare a list
of tax expenditures, to integrate tax provisions into the
budgetary process, for example. However, since the purpose
of most tax expenditure lists is purely informational, there
would appear to be little danger in including in the list all
those provisions for which spending-type arguments might
conceivably be made. Some commentators have expressed the
359. See, for example, B.I. Bittker et al., A Comprehensive Tax Base?
(Brandford, Conn.: Federal Tax Press, 1968).
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fear that including a tax provision in a tax expenditure budget
or list might result in the measure being repealed on the
grounds that it is not an effective spending measure when in
fact there were good tax policy reasons for it. That is, they
fear that including a provision in the tax expenditure list might
squelch serious exploration of its tax policy rationale.
However, this danger could be met simply by inserting a
footnote in the tax expenditure list explaining the tax policy
arguments that could be made on behalf of the provision.
Moreover, the same argument could be turned on its head. If
a measure for which there is a respectable spending argument
is not included in the list, the measure might be repealed on
the ground that it is a bad tax measure without sufficient
regard to its spending justifications. But the fundamental
point I wish to make is that to serve its purpose of clarifying
analysis the tax expenditure concept does require the tax act to
be unambiguously divided into 'normal' and special
provisions.
This confusion - that the tax expenditure concept requires
the classification of each tax provision - was apparent in a
series of Canadian articles on the small business credit in
which the authors argued that the Canadian small business
credit is not a tax expenditure.s6 ' They suggested that the
credit serves the technical tax policy purpose of achieving the
integration of corporate and shareholder tax in small
businesses. It reduces the corporate tax to 25 per cent, and
this is the amount of corporate tax for which the gross-up and
dividend tax credit compensates upon the distribution of
earnings. However, this argument ignores the fact that the
360. See for an insightful discussion of this point, M.J. McIntyre, 'A Solution to
the Problem of Defining a Tax Expenditure' (1980) 14 University of
California Davis Law Review 79. Stanley Surrey, the originator of the
concept of tax expenditures, usually refused to be drawn into debates over
the 'normal' tax structure by insisting there was wide agreement upon its
general contours. However, at least when he initially formulated the
concept he appears to have always insisted that a judgment about the
design of the normative tax structure was important to sustaining the
usefulness of the tax expenditure concept. S.S. Surrey, Pathways to Tax
Expenditure Reform: The Concept of Tax Expenditures (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1973), at 7. More recently, however, he and a co-author
have suggested that in classifying a given tax provision as a tax expenditure
the only really important question is whether non-tax arguments are
advanced in its support. P.R. McDaniel and S.S. Surrey, eds International
Aspects of Tax Expenditures: A Co parative Study (Deventer, the
Netherlands: Kluwer, 1985), at 10-11. ('To classify properly a given
provision as a tax expenditure or as part of the normative structure
requires resort not only to tax theory, but also to the legislative history of
existing provisions, to the reasons offered by proponents of a new tax
proposal, and to the defenses relied upon for rules that are proposed to be
modified or terminated ... [if the] arguments are spending arguments, not
tax structure arguments ... classification of the items as a tax expenditure is
appropriate.')
361. See J.E. Hersfield, 'Is an Unintegrated Corporate Tax Regime a Small
Business Subsidy' (1979) 1 Canadian Taxation (No. 4) 51; D. Jones, 'Is the
Small Business Credit a Tax Expenditure' (1970) 1 Canadian Taxation (No.
4) 53.
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small business credit, by reducing the effective corporate tax
rate to 25 per cent, provides a large tax reduction or deferral
(whether measured in relation to the normal corporate tax rate
or the marginal rate of individual shareholders) to shareholders
of eligible corporations. This deferral has been justified by
the government and others by reference to the need to
subsidise small business. If the government only wished to
increase the neutrality of the corporate tax system by
integrating the corporate and shareholder tax of small business,
it could do so technically in a way that did not at the same
time provide a large implicit subsidy for shareholders of
qualifying corporations. Therefore, not subjecting the measure
to tax expenditure analysis would seriously distort evaluation
of the provisions.
Finally, to conclude this digression, although I have argued
that any tax provision for which spending-type arguments
might be made should be treated as a tax expenditure, it is
true that spending-type arguments are often made for broad
tax rate changes. For example, reducing corporate tax rates,
increasing an investment tax credit, or enacting a broad-based
direct spending program are often analysed as alternative
instruments for spurring the economy by stimulating capital
formation. But that does not make it useful to think about a
general reduction of the corporate tax rates, or any rate
structure less than 100 per cent, as a tax expenditure. It
simply does not clarify thinking about this issue to refer to
them as such. To construe the concept so broadly would rob it
of its usefulness.m
TAX EXPENDITURE ANALYSIS OF THE LOWER RATE OF
CORPORATE TAX
Tax expenditure analysis, that is, the evaluation of tax
provisions using criteria normally applied to direct subsidy
programs, suggests that at least three broad questions should be
asked about each tax expenditure: (a) What government
objective is being served by the tax measure, and does this
objective have a sufficiently high priority to justify the
expenditure of government funds? (b) Is a tax expenditure an
appropriate instrument for achieving the particular objective or
would some other instrument be more cost-efficient or more
362. For an argument that the term subsidy is a purely normative concept and
is simply 'a tax which is too small' see M. Ricketts, 'The Subsidy as a
Purely Normative Concept' (1985) 5 Journal of Public Policy 401. At one
level this argument is undoubtedly sound. There are similarities in the
arguments made to support a reduction in the corporate tax rate, for
example, or to support the provision of an investment tax credit. However,
if the term subsidy (or tax expenditure) is going to be of any use if our
language, it seems sensible to restrict it to government intervention covering
a narrower range of activity than that covered by a general tax rate
reduction.
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nearly satisfy other important budgetary criteria? (c) If a tax
expenditure is an appropriate instrument, is the particular tax
provision a well designed spending program.
I will briefly review each of these questions in relation to a
lower rate of corporate tax. The main point I wish to make
with respect to the first question is that there is no case for
subsidising small business generally. Whatever the
justifications for subsidisation, they only apply to some types
of small businesses. Therefore, any subsidy program for small
business should be structured po that it can be targeted on
these types. Next I will review the several types of
instruments that can be used to subsidise small business. The
policy instruments implemented by the Canadian federal and
provincial governments will be used to illustrate these. Here
the object is not to do a serious evaluation of each of these
instruments, but only to illustrate that there are a broad range
of instruments available for subsidising small businesses.
Finally, using criteria traditionally used in evaluating spending
programs, I will show why the small business credit is such a
badly designed policy instrument.
My conclusion that a lower rate of corporate tax should not
be used to finance small business is not novel. This conclusion
has been reached by virtually every tax law reform body that
has studied the issue.3 m However, because of the persistence
of the use of the lower rate of corporate tax, repeating the
arguments seems worthwhile. Also the tax expenditure analysis
used here clarifies some of the arguments. I will also use this
analysis, and particularly the experience in Canada with
attempts to target a small business tax credit, to illustrate why
the tax system is almost always an inappropriate instrument for
delivering government largess.
Is There a Need to Subsidise Small Business?
Normally the market is assumed to achieve an optimal
allocation of resources. Unrestrained capital markets,
therefore, should ensure that savings are channelled into their
most productive use. If government interferes with the
allocation of capital, capital will not flow to its highest rate of
363. For reports in United Kingdom, see supra note 27, 41 and 50; for report in
United States, see supra note 116; for reports in Canada see supra note 164
and 195; for reports in Australia, see supra note 274 and 294; for New
Zealand, see Taxation Review Committee, Taxation in New Zealand
(Wellington: G.P., 1967), at 151 ('On the grounds of efficiency, equity, the
prevention of tax avoidance, and ease of administration, the Committee
concludes that company income should bear tax at a single flat rate.'); for
Ireland, see Commission on Taxation, First Report: Direct Taxation (Dublin:
S.O., 1982), at 373 ('If the furthering of economic growth is thought to
justify tax concessions or other financial incentives to small enterprises, we
believe that they should be confined to specifc sectors and offered
irrespective of the form of business organisation.'
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pre-tax return, the GNP will be lowered, and everyone will be
worse off. However, two kinds of market failure, it is alleged,
warrant government intervention in financial markets in favour
of small business. First, obstacles to the proper functioning of
the financial markets themselves result in an 'equity gap' for
small businesses. Second, small businesses generate
externalities; that is, in addition to the benefits received by the
individual entrepreneur, small businesses benefit society at
large by furthering national goals. Since the lower rate of tax
must be evaluated in terms of how well it achieves the specific
government objective it is aimed at, each of these justifications
for government intervention in the market flow of capital to
small businesses will be discussed. The discussion will be
brief. Probably few other subjects have received more
attention in the past decade than the financial needs of small
businesses."'
The Equity Gap
The most common argument for government intervention in
favour of small businesses is that there are biases in financial
markets against them that must be compensated for. Although
a number of factors are said to result in an 'equity gap',' only
two categories of capital market imperfections will be reviewed
here: the high information and transaction costs necessary in
extending equity to small firms and the government-induced
distortions that cause the small business equity market to clear
at a price in excess of the opportunity cost of capital.
Financial markets will only allocate capital to its most
productive use if investors are fully informed about the returns
and risks of all available investments. However, information
about small businesses is often difficult and expensive for
investors to acquire. Moreover, transaction costs relating to
extending equity to small businesses are likely to be higher
364. For example, in Australia alone see Australian Academy of Technological
Sciences (Chairperson: Sir Frank Espie), Develo ing High Technology
Enterprises for Australia (Canberra: AGPS, 1983; Bureau of Industry
Economics, Small Business Research Unit, Small Business Review 1984
(Canberra: AGPS, 1985); Committee of Inquiry on the Australian Financial
System (Chairperson: J.K. Campbell), Final Report (Canberra: AGPS, 1981);
Department of Industry and Commerce, Report of the Finance Committee,
Small Business Advisory Council, Finance for Small Business (Canberra:
AGPS, 1980); Department of Science and Technology, Proceedings of a
Conference, Finance for Technology Ventures: Courses of Action (Canberra:
AGPS, 1983); Office of the Economic Planning Advisory Council, Some
Features of Small Business and Its Policy Environment Council Paper No.
12 (Canberra: Office of EPAC, 1986); K.M. Renfrew, W.J. Sheehan and
W.C. Dunlop, Financing and Growth of Small Businesses in Australia,
Bureau of Industry Economics Contribute Paper 2 (Canberra: AGPS, 1985);
Review Group into the Australian Financial System (Chairperson: V.E.
Martin), Report of the Review Group into the Australian Financial System
(Canberra: AGPS, 1984).
365. Generally, there appears to be no bias against small firms in debt markets,
see ibid.
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than for larger businesses since most transaction costs are
independent of the size of the loan, resulting in economies of
scale for larger loans. Larger firms also have more collateral
to offer and generally have a record of success which provides
clues to their prospects, thus further reducing the need for,
and the cost of, acquiring information about their prospects.
Consequently, it is frequently suggested that small businesses
are denied equity on terms and conditions commensurate with
those available to other groups with a comparable credit risk.
Various forms of government intervention in the financial
marketplace also accounts, in part, for the 'equity gap' within
which small business falls. Most countries, including Australia,
have recently reformed their direct regulation of financial
institutions - by removing interest rate controls, allowing the
licensing of foreign banks, and placing greater reliance on
open market operations for regulating the money supply - to
reduce the adverse impact of credit restrictions on small firms.
However, most tax systems continue to divert the market flow
of financial capital away from small businesses: (1) Generally,
corporate tax systems, even partially integrated systems, tend
to favour corporate retentions over distributions. Although this
may increase overall investment in the economy, existing firms
that can finance expansion out of retained earnings are
favoured over new firms that must raise capital from external
sources. Also, existing large corporations that are able to
retain more earnings in absolute dollars derive a greater benefit
from this policy bias than existing small corporations. (2) The
numerous tax expenditures that encourage individuals to save
through life insurance policies and pension funds divert funds
from small businesses. Invariably these savings institutions are
more conservative in their investment policies by law and
custom than individual investors. (3) More generally, since
aggregate savings in the economy are limited, any measure that
is successful in directing savings into a certain area will result
in a lower level of financing available to other uses. Thus, for
example, the exemption of principal residences from the
capital gains tax undoubtedly results in a considerable amount
of capital being diverted from small business investment to
residential housing. (4) Some of the special rules relating to
the taxation of financial institutions themselves might also
introduce biases against extending credit to small firms. In
Canada, for example, banks, trust companies and credit unions
are allowed to deduct an amount for bad debts from their
taxable income, but the permissible deduction is related more
closely to the volume of loans outstanding than the portfolio
risk. Thus to the extent that such institutions invest in low-
risk investments they obtain a windfall deduction. (5) Tax
systems are also normally biased against risk investment, and
small businesses in particular, because of the various
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restrictions they impose on the deductibility of losses. Losses
are never refundable. Instead, if business losses exceed income
they can normally only be carried back a couple of years then
forward several. Larger firms are advantaged in two ways
under these rules. First, larger firms are usually diversified,
therefore, they will have other lines of business income against
which the losses from any one line can be offset. Second,
even if that is not the case, larger established firms will often
have sufficient income in prior years to fully utilise the loss
carryback provision. Smaller firms are more likely to have to
resort to the less valuable (because of discounting) carry-
forward allowance. And, if the firm has a number of
successive years of losses, it may not be able to offset all of its
net operating losses. (6) Finally, tax incentives provided in
most tax systems for the purchase of capital property, such as
investment tax credits and accelerated capital cost allowances,
will invariably benefit large firms more than small ones.
Compared to large firms, small firms will less often have
sufficient tax payable to offset the tax savings provided by
these incentive measures. Also, larger firms are generally more
capital intensive than small firms and thus benefit more from
subsidies for capital purchases. If the tax incentive measures
increase the profits of larger firms they will have the effect of
increasing the rate of return in large firms compared to small
firms. On the other hand, if competition requires large firms
to pass some or all of the benefits of tax incentives forward to
purchasers of their goods and services in the form of lower
prices then in some cases the incentives might actually result in
small competitors being squeezed out of an industry altogether.
There is a considerable amount of disagreement over
whether there is in fact an 'equity gap' in financial markets.
However, for purposes of this paper, the important point is
that even accepting this rationale for subsidising small
business, the rationale would suggest that only a small number
of the firms in the small business sector should be subsidised;
namely, those small firms that wish to raise capital to expand
their operations and that wish to do so by means of equity
financing.
Positive Externalities
Even if there is no bias in the equity market against small
firms, it is frequently argued that there will still be an
insufficient allocation of financial resources to them. This is
because, in addition to the rate of return that an individual
investor receives from a small business, small businesses yield a
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social rate of return. They contribute to the achievement of
national goals.
The arguments that are often advanced with respect to the
social contribution of small businesses and their owner-
entrepreneurs appear to be constrained only by the limits of
the imagination of their proponents. For example, it is
frequently alleged that small businesses develop a range of
personal qualities that ultimately benefit the community, such
as entrepreneurial ability, self-reliance, stability and so on;
provide a means of reducing alienation and social tension; and,
contribute to the cohesiveness and quality of life in local
communities.
These arguments might support a broad-based subsidy for
all small businesses in order to induce more employees to
become entrepreneurs and thus enrich the lives of all of us.
Indeed, these and similar arguments were propounded with
great eloquence in Canada during the debate over the small
business credit.6  However, since these arguments are
unquantifiable and rest upon contentious value judgments, they
pose a serious problem for the policy analyst. Would
employees be prepared to transfer income from themselves to
self-employed persons (the effect of the lower rate of
corporate tax) on these grounds? And, if so, why wouldn't
their preference be manifested in a willingness to pay slightly
more for the goods and services of local independents?
Fortunately, the case for the positive externalities of small
business does not have to rest exclusively on 'closer to God'
arguments. Small business is alleged to serve a number of
other national goals: (1) Small firms have lower
implementation costs and owner-managers have a longer time
horizon and are more driven by high relative pay-offs than
professional managers and engineers. Therefore, small firms
contribute disproportionately to invention, innovation and non-
technological research and development. (2) Small businesses
tend to locate in economically depressed areas or rural areas
where larger businesses would not locate. Therefore, they
further government policies in supporting local communities,
decentralising employment and removing regional economic
disparities. (3) Small firms tend to further government
employment goals. They are more labour intensive than large
firms, grow faster once established, and often hire workers
who might not be hired by larger firms.
The extent to which small business furthers these national
goals is contentious. For example, referring only to the role of
small business in job creation, the evidence is mixed. Some
well-known studies have reported that small businesses are
366. See for example, Canada, House of Commons Debates, 6 December 1969, at
784-5.
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responsible for most of the job creation over the last decade.367
However, recently a number of re-evaluations of the numbers
has thrown some doubt on this conclusion.368 Moreover, any
program designed to increase long-term employment should be
concerned with the quality of the jobs created. Studies in the
United States have found some evidence that job quality is not
as high among small firms as it is among large firms: wages
tend to be lower, fringe benefits such as health insurance plans
less prevalent, and )ob security more precarious in small firms
than in large firms. o
But, more importantly, in terms of designing an instrument
to subsidise small business, the additional employment
generated in the small business sector appears to have been
created by only 12 to 15 per cent of the firms .370  The same
point could be made about the other externalities generated by
small businesses. A small percentage of small businesses are
involved in research and development or locate in economically
depressed areas. A policy instrument designed to further these
objectives but aimed at the small business sector generally
would be grossly over-inclusive. Consequently, if the
government wishes to increase employment, innovation, or
reduce regional disparities it ought to fashion instruments that
reward these activities directly. To the extent that small
businesses further these national goals they will benefit
disproportionately from such programs.
Policy Instruments Available for Subsidising Small Businesses
A number of well accepted criteria are used in guiding the
choice of policy instruments. However, the first principle is
that the instrument should be directed as closely as possible at
the cause of the problem that prompted the intervention. If
the cause of the problem is mis-diagnosed, the policy response
will be ineffective. The lower rate of corporate tax, and the
alternative instruments that will be reviewed below, assume
that the equity gap for small business is a problem on the
'supply-side'. However, before reviewing these policy
instruments, it should be noted that the perceived equity
capital problem may not be caused exclusively or even
primarily by a lack of venture capital funds. The cause of
the problem of small business might be on the 'demand-side'.
367. The leading and much-cited study is D.L. Birch, The Job Generation
Process (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Program on Neighborhood and Regional
Change, 1978).
368. See studies cited in Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development, OECD Employment Outlooks (Paris: OECD, 1985) and US
Small B usiness Administration, The State of Small Business: A Report of the
President (Washington: GPO, 1983), chap. 3.
369. See The State of Small Business, ibid.
370. Id., at 67.
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There is little point in subsidising venture capital if there is no
demand for it. A critical mass of entrepreneurs and people
with managerial skills that can put venture capital to
productive use is an obvious prerequisite to a high level of
small business activity. This involves educating potential small
business persons, coaxing entrepreneurial talent out of large
companies and into their own firms, creating an awareness of
the availability and role of venture capital, and encouraging
entrepreneurs to share their enterprises with others and to
accept financial managerial and marketing assistance from
external sources. 1 A firm's lack of managerial skills might
manifest itself in the capital market through higher financing
costs and refusals for the advancement of equity capital.
However, intervention to provide such a firm with funds
would not alleviate its basic problems.
As another example of the importance of determining the
cause of the problem, to the extent there appears to be a
problem with the level of equity capital for small businesses it
might simply be a symptom of economy-wide factors, not a
cause of them. Thus the best way to deal with the problem
might be through initiatives directed at improving a country's
general economic performance, its industrial structure, its
competitiveness, the returns from research and development
and so on. For example, lowering general interest rates by a
few percentage points might be much more likely to cause
success in stimulating venture investments than more
specifically targeted instruments.
On the assumption that there is an equity gap, and that it is
a problem on the supply side, what policy instruments should
be chosen to deal with it? The wide range of instruments that
could be used as alternatives to the lower rate of corporate tax
will not be evaluated in depth here. However, to place the
discussion of the small business credit in a wider context, to
illustrate the substantial subsidies received at present by small
business through the tax system, and to indicate the alternative
instruments available, the provisions in the Canadian Income
Tax Act and some of the tax provisions that have been enacted
by provincial legislatures in Canada, that favour small
businesses, will be briefly mentioned. Practically all of these
provisions have parallels in other jurisdictions. Indeed, the
extent to which western industrialised countries borrow ideas
from one another in this area is quite surprising. In part, this
is no doubt due to the fact that small business interest groups
in each country remain in close contact with one another.
371. There is a substantial and growing body of literature on the encouragement
of entrepreneurship. See D.W. Conklin, 'Entrepreneurships, Innovation and
Economic Change', in D. Laidler, ed., Re# onse, to Economic Change
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1986 ;R. Ronstadt et al., eds.,
Frontiers of Entrepreneurship Research 1986 Wellesley, Mass.: Center for
Entrepreneurial Studies, Babson College, 1986).
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Exemption from Corporate Surtax"
Frequently, the federal government enacts a temporary
corporate surtax. For example, for income earned after 30
June 1985 and before 1987 the surtax is five per cent. Almost
invariably income eligible for the small business credit is
exempt from the corporate surtax.
Capital Gains Exemption3
In 1985 the government introduced a personal lifetime
$500 000 exemption for capital gains. This exemption was
intended to encourage individual Canadians to invest in new or
growing enterprises.
Full Offset of Capital Losses on Sale of Securities of Small
Business Corporations374
Ordinarily, a taxpayer can offset allowable capital losses
against taxable capital gains only. However, an allowable
capital loss realised on the sale of security of a small business
corporation is treated as a business loss and can be offset
against any income.
Employee Stock Options"
If employees receive an option to purchase shares in their
corporate-employer, the difference between the amount they
have to pay for the shares when they exercise the option and
the fair market value of the shares has to be included in their
income as a taxable employment benefit. If employees of
Canadian-controlled private corporations exercise such an
option, the employment benefit does not have to be included
in their income until the shares are sold. Furthermore, under
the general rule, if the shares are held for two years, one-half
of the employment benefit can be deducted from income but
only if certain conditions are met. One of these conditions,
that the exercise price must not be less than the fair market
value of the shares covered by the option at the time the
option is granted, does not apply to Canadian-controlled
private corporations.
372. Section 123.1.
373. Section 110.6.
374. Sections 3(d) and 39(1)(c).
375. Section 7(1.1).
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Non-taxation of Provincial Assistance for Venture
Investments3 7 6
Normally, when a taxpayer receives provincial assistance in
relation to the purchase of capital property the cost of the
property must be reduced by the amount of the assistance.
Thus when the property is sold the amount of the assistance is
taxed as a capital gain. However, if the taxpayer receives the
assistance in relation to the purchase of shares in a prescribed
provincial venture capital program (for example, in Ontario a
taxpayer investing in a 'Small Business Development
Corporation' receives a 25 or 30 per cent cash grant), the cost
of the shares is not reduced by the amount of any grant. The
377grant is income tax free.
Labour-sponsored Venture Capital Investment37 8
The Quebec Federation of Labour established a 'Solidarity
Fund' for the purpose of investing in small and medium-sized
Quebec businesses and thus creating new jobs in the province.
The Quebec Government provides a tax incentive for
individuals investing in the fund. The federal government
provides a complimentary tax credit of up to 20 per cent of
the net cost of the shares acquired in the Quebec Solidarity
Fund or similar funds established in other provinces. To be
eligible, funds must be set up under provincial legislation, be
managed by labour, and invest in small and medium-sized
businesses.
Refund of Investment Tax Credit3
The Canadian investment tax credit is partially refundable. If
the credit exceeds the taxpayer's tax liability for a year, up to
20 per cent of the credit may be refunded. For small
Canadian-controlled private corporations, 40 per cent of the
credit is refundable.
376. Section 53(2)(k)(i)(C).
377. Two other less significant federal income tax concessions benefit provincial
venture capital corporations. First, normally if a corporation is controlled
by one or more public corporations it is not eligible for the small business
credit. However, this disqualification does not apply if the public
corporation is a 'prescribed venture capital corporation'. Section 125(7)(b).
Second, normally when a private or controlled public corporation receives an
inter-corporate dividend a special refundable tax is imposed on the dividend
to prevent investors from obtaining a tax deferral advantage by holding
their investments in a corporation. However, if the private or controlled
public corporation is a 'prescribed venture capital corporation' it is exempt
from this tax. Section 186.1.
378. Section 127.4.
379. Section 125.1.
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Small Business Development Bonds380
Small businesses are able to obtain 'after-tax financing' by
issuing Small Business Development Bonds (SBDBs). Normally,
the issue of a bond deducts the interest expense from income
and the recipient includes it in income. However, if a small
business is in financial difficulty it can issue a SBDB in which
the interest payment is treated as a dividend for tax purposes.
Because inter-corporate dividends are tax-exempt to the
recipient, financial institutions which purchase these bonds are
able to offer reduced rates of interest to eligible small business
borrowers. The issuer of the SBDB is not permitted to deduct
the interest expense from its income, but if the issuer does not
have taxable income or a high rate of tax this is of little
concern.
Small Business Capital Investment by Pension Funds381
The Income Tax Act and regulations were recently amended to
encourage pension funds to invest in equity capital of small
and medium-sized businesses. Under the previous law, the
statutory retirement plans provided for in the Act generally
could not invest in small businesses and could only invest 10
per cent of their assets in foreign securities. Although the new
rules are complex, basically they allow registered retirement
savings plans (plans established largely by the self-employed)
to invest in shares of eligible small businesses. Registered
savings plans (retirement plans established by employers) are
allowed to invest in shares of eligible small businesses either
through wholly owned small business investment corporations
or through independent investment limited partnerships or
trusts established to facilitate new investment in small and
developing businesses. To encourage pension funds to invest
in eligible small businesses directly or through the provided for
investment vehicles, for every $1 a pension plan invests in
qualifying investments the plan's foreign property investment
limit is increased by $3.
380. Sections 15.1 and 15.2.
381. See in particular, s.5100 of the Regulations. For a critical assessment of the
proposed legislation see M. MacDonald and J. Perry, Pension Funds and
venture Capital: The Critical Links Between Savings, Investment,
Technology, and Folio, Discussion Paper prepared for the Science Council of
Canada (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1985). The proposed
legislation was changed slightly prior to enactment in light of this and
similar studies.
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Tax Exemption for New Corporations38 2
In 1984, the Ontario Government introduced a three-year
corporate income tax exemption for companies starting up in
Ontario. Four other provinces have since followed this lead.
Basically, to qualify, a company must be privately controlled
by Canadians, and unrelated to any other company.
Stock Savings Plans"3
In 1979, the province of Quebec enacted the Quebec Stock
Savings Plan Act. The plan allows taxpayers residing in
Quebec to claim an income tax deduction of up to $15 000
annually for purchases of new equity issues of Quebec-based
companies. Although the generosity of the tax deduction was
reduced slightly in 1986, for large corporations the deduction
was 50 per cent of the value of the shares, for medium-sized
firms the deduction was 100 per cent and for small firms the
tax write-off was 150 per cent. Judged by the number of
subsidised stock issues, the Quebec plan is overwhelmingly
successful. Some commentators have claimed that this tax
scheme has been responsible, in fact, for fundamentally
transforming Quebec society into one that is more
entrepreneurial and incentive oriented." Other provinces have
recently copied the Quebec Stock Savings Plan. However, in
the other provinces the subsidy takes the form of a tax credit
instead of a deduction. For example, under the Alberta Stock
Savings Plan Act, which came in force in 1986, taxpayers can
claim a tax credit of 30, 15 or 10 per cent depending upon the
assets and revenues of the corporation, up to a yearly
maximum of $3000. Saskatchewan has similar legislation.
Nova Scotia, British Columbia and Ontario have all proposed
similar plans.
Venture Capital Corporations385
Recognising that a successful private program of financing
small business must bring together all the principal participants
in venture capital activities - entrepreneurs, venture capital
firms (involved in the middle-person role or arranging and
monitoring start-up investments), and investors - small
business investment companies are used in many jurisdictions
as a mechanism for providing for the formation of pools of
382. Ontario, Corporations Tax Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 97, s.33.
383. Quebec, Taxation Act, R.S.Q., c. 1-3, s.965.
384. See T.J. Courchene, 'Market Nationalism' [October, 19861 Policy Option 16.
385. See S.M. Badali, J.A.C. Dolan and C.H. Evans, Venture Capital Investments:
Ontario-Quebec-Nova Scotia (Toronto: CCH Canadian Ltd., 1983);
Clarkson & Gordon, An Evaluation of the Small Business Development
Corporations Program (Toronto: Clarkson & Gordon, 1984).
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private risk capital. The United States pioneered the use of
this policy instrument for mobilising venture capital in 1958
when it established small business corporations. After a failed
attempt at establishing a Venture Investment Corporation
program, in 1979 the Ontario Government established a
program for investment vehicles called Small Business
Development Corporations (SBDCs). They must invest most of
their funds in new eligible small businesses. Individuals
purchasing shares of SBDCs received a cash grant equal to 25
per cent of the cost of new equity investment made by the
SBDC (30 per cent if the investment is made in northern or
eastern Ontario); investing corporations receive an equivalent
tax credit. Quebec, Nova Scotia, and Alberta have adopted
similar programs.386
In addition to these tax-based programs the Canadian
Government has virtually countless specific direct programs for
small business which are engaged in innovative projects or
which might contribute to national goals such as regional
development. Two of the more general programs might be
mentioned here since they have a parallel in most jurisdictions.
An obvious instrument the government might use in
financing small businesses is the direct provision of venture
capital. In Canada, the Federal Business Development Bank
was originally established to provide loans or loan guarantees
to Canadian business where credit was not otherwise available
to the business on reasonable terms. In 1983 it established an
Investment Banking Division as a result of a revised mandate it
received from the government to mobilise risk capital in
Canada. The Division is funded by equity from the
government (current total $48 million), which is used to invest,
and to serve as a catalyst for private sector investment, in
small and medium companies with high growth potential. The
Bank performs this role by full syndication of private sources
of equity financing, by underwriting a compan 's stock issue,
and by investing jointly with the private sector.
As an alternative to supplementing the private credit market
directly, the government might endeavour to offset the costs of
extending credit to small firms through insurance or
guarantees. In Canada, under the Small Business Loans Act
the government guarantees loans made by private lending
institutions to small businesses.388  Basically, only small
386. The federal government has from time to time considered adopting such aprogram, but never has. See Canada Minister of State for Small Business,
Improving the Equity Financing Environment for Small Business in
Canada', a discussion paper (Ottawa: Minister of State for Small Business,1978).
387. See Canada, Federal Business Development Bank, Annual Report 1986
(Ottawa: Federal Business Development Bank, 1986).
388. Small Business Loans Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. S-10. See generally J. Hatch, L.
Wynant and M.J. Grant, Government Loan Guarantee Programs for Small
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businesses with gross revenues of under $2 million qualify; the
government guarantees only 85 per cent of the loan; the
maximum loan is $100 000; the loan rate is a maximum of
prime plus one per cent; the loan proceeds can be used to
purchase or improve equipment or business premises or buy
land; and, the aggregate principal amount of loans is limited to
$2.5 billion.
Evaluation of the Lower Rate of Corporate Tax as a Spending
Program
In the following evaluation of the lower rate of corporate tax I
want to make both a specific and a general point. Specifically,
I will argue that the lower rate of corporate tax is a badly
designed subsidy program. I will use a methodology that has
now become commonplace in evaluating tax expenditures;
namely, to convert the tax expenditure into an analogous direct
spending program and then to evaluate it using the traditional
criteria used in evaluating government spending programs.
Business people often seem to turn instinctively to the tax
system as a method of receiving subsidies. The appeal of this
instrument to them is obvious: They can receive their subsidy
without the interference of government bureaucrats, the
programs have a low visibility and they seem compatible with
the free market economy. For these same reasons, and others,
tax reformers have traditionally opposed the use of the tax
system to deliver subsidies. Particularly since the mid-1960s,
buoyed up by the insights of the tax expenditure analysis, tax
policy analysts have been almost unanimous in agreeing that
the tax system is an inequitable and cost-inefficient instrument
for delivering subsidies. Writing in the 1970s, Stanley Surrey
seemed opposed to all tax expenditures. In his classic treatise,
Pathways to Tax Reform, he said, 'Most of the tax expenditure
programs should either be scrapped because the federal
financial assistance they provide is not warranted by the
nation's priorities or be replaced by direct assistance measures
that can readily be devised'." At a conference in Canada on
tax expenditures, he reiterated at this point, '... I do have some
difficulties in finding programs I would run, if I were running
a government, through the tax system rather than as direct
programs'.390  However, in a more recent analysis Professor
Surrey and his frequent co-author on tax expenditure analysis,
Paul McDaniel, appear to have moderated this position
somewhat. They now appear to be of the view that the
Business (London: School of Business Administration, University of Western
Ontario, 1985).
389. S.S. Surrey, Pathways to Tax Reform: The Concept of Tax Ezpenditures(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1973), at 209.
390. 'Tax Expenditure Analysis: A Reply by Professor Surrey and Discussion'(1979) 1 Canadian Tazation (No. 2) 26.
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significant issue in tax expenditure analysis is not the question
of whether a subsidy should be in the form of tax expenditure
or a direct program, but instead how government subsidy
programs should be designed. They state that, '[m]ost
perceived differences between tax and direct expenditure
programs are not inherent in the two approaches. Instead they
generally reflect differences in program design'.39 Thus, they
seem to suggest that if a subsidy program is properly designed,
whether it is delivered directly or through the tax system is a
matter of indifference. It is undoubtedly true that a spending
program of any design can be delivered directly or placed in
the tax system and delivered as a tax expenditure; however, a
general point that I will make below is that the tax system
imposes severe constraints on the design of a program that can
be delivered effectively through it. Moreover, I will argue
that the fundamental purpose of the tax system is threatened
when it is used to deliver specific subsidy programs. For both
of these reasons, the tax system is in almost all cases a bad
instrument for delivering a spending program. In illustrating
the inherent characteristics of the tax system that impose
severe constraints on program design, I will refer, in
particular, to Canada's experience in attempting to target the
small business credit during the 1970s.
An application of all of the following spending criteria
reveal the lower rate of corporate tax to be a badly designed
subsidy. Although some of its faulty features could be
corrected by redesigning the subsidy, because of the inherent
characteristics of the tax system most could not be.
Equity
Given the purpose of the lower rate of corporate tax, there is
no reason why, in otherwise similar cases, persons with high-
income should receive a greater subsidy than persons with low-
income. Yet this is precisely the effect of a lower rate of
corporate tax: the greater the business person's income the
greater the subsidy. The cost of the lower rate of corporate
tax is frequently calculated in tax expenditure accounts as
being the revenue lost because corporate-source income is
taxed at the lower instead of the higher corporate rate. 9
However, since the owner of an incorporated small business
will normally have the option of withdrawing all the corporate
profits as a salary, or of operating the business as a sole
proprietorship, a more realistic estimate of the amount of
subsidy implicit in the lower rate of tax would be obtained by
comparing the difference between the lower rate of corporate
391. S.S. Surrey and P.R. McDaniel, Tax Expenditures (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1985), at 114.
392. See supra note 339, at 29.
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tax and the owner's personal rates. Thus, if the lower rate of
corporate tax is 25 per cent, low-income owners of small
businesses, whose personal marginal rates are below 25 per
cent, derive no benefit from the subsidy program. On the
other hand, high-income owners whose marginal rates are 50
per cent receive a substantial subsidy. So long as their
corporate-source earnings are retained they are taxed at 25
instead of 50 per cent.
This perverse distributional pattern of benefits is
characteristic of most tax expenditures and where it is present
it should be fatal to their use. In some cases it can be
corrected by delivering the tax expenditure in the form of a
taxable, refundable tax credit. However, when the subsidy is
given at the corporate level, and the amount of the subsidy is
fairly determined by comparing the corporate tax rate paid
with the owner's marginal rates, there would appear to be no
393obvious way to remove the inequity.
Another at least peculiar distributional effect of the lower
rate of tax is that the more owners there are of a business,
automatically the less subsidy each receives. For example,
under the Canadian provision where the small business tax
credit is 21 per cent of the business's first $200 000 of income,
if only one individual owns a business that individual can
defer paying tax on a maximum of $42 000 a year (assuming
they are in the 50 per cent marginal tax bracket). But if five
individuals co-own the business, each will only be able to
receive a maximum interest-free loan of $8400.
Target -efficiency
In order for a governing instrument to be cost-efficient, it
should provide benefits to all those units that come within its
rationale, but provide no benefits to those units that do not.
One of the most serious flaws of the lower rate of tax is that it
is grossly over- and under-inclusive of its intended target. On
the one hand, most of its benefits go to firms that do not
further its objectives. On the other hand, it does not extend
393. It is sometimes argued that the lower rate of corporate tax is also
inequitable since shareholders of small corporations likely enjoy higher
incomes than the average taxpayer, and thus by providing a tax
expenditure to these people the credit blunts the progressivity of the
individual income tax rates. However, this argument would appear to
confuse tax with spending criteria. If small business owners tend to be
wealthier than the average taxpayer, any subsidy to small firms will have
the distributional consequence of making the rich richer. Although this
should be a matter of concern, if the tax system is vertically equitable,
these distributional consequences should not be a matter of grave concern.
The purpose of every subsidy program cannot be to redistribute income.
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any benefits to a large number of firms to whom its rationale
obviously applies.
Two types of small businesses that the credit does not
benefit, but many of which come squarely within the rationale
of the subsidy, are those that are unincorporated and those
without taxable income. A lower rate of corporate tax
obviously does not benefit unincorporated firms. Yet, in
Canada, substantially less than one-half of all active small
businesses are incorporated."' Admittedly, the seriousness of
this under-inclusiveness of the credit can be overstated. Most
unincorporated firms are likely static not expanding firms, and
most will be able to incorporate to take advantage of the
increased after-tax cash flow provided by the lower rate of tax
if it is to their advantage. Firms that might be prejudiced
would include those operated by the unsophisticated and those
that are anticipating making a loss in a year, and therefore
remain unincorporated, but in fact make a profit that could
have been sheltered by the small business credit. However, the
Canadian Government in designing the small business credit,
stated that it was administratively not feasible to provide it to
3961unincorporated firms.
The lower rate of tax is more seriously under-inclusive in
that it provides no benefits to firms without taxable income.
The subsidy is 'success-related' - only a firm with taxable
income receives it, and up to the cut-off point, the more
profit a firm has the greater the subsidy it receives. This type
of success-related subsidy might make sense if there were a
correlation between a firm's profits and its need for funds for
expansion. However, a firm might have no profits, and in
particular no taxable income, because, for example, it is a
start-up firm. Almost invariably start-up firms, because they
will have a substantial capital investment that they will be
writing-off, will have no taxable income. The irony of this is
that these are the very firms that would appear to have the
strongest claim on the subsidy. Normally a firm has the most
difficulty obtaining equity financing in its initial years.
More serious than its under-inclusiveness, the lower rate of
corporate tax is grossly over-inclusive. It provides a
substantial subsidy to a great number of firms that do not
come within its rationale. The most obvious way in which a
lower rate of tax is over-inclusive is that, if it is implemented
394. See D.G. McFetridge, 'Small Business, Economic Development and Tax
Policy', in Canadian Tax Foundation, Symposium on the Simplification of
the Small Business Provisions of the Income Tax Act (Toronto: unpublished,
1983), Tab. 3, at 4. (In a survey of active businesses in Canada, excluding
such business as farmers, professionals, real estate operators, it was found
that of firms with annual sales under $100 000, about 75 per cent were
unincorporated, of the firms with sales between $100 000 and $30 million,
about 30 per cent were unincorporated.)
395. Supra note 229.
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simply by making the corporate tax rate progressive, it benefits
all firms regardless of size. Of course the subsidy will be
much less significant to large firms than to small firms since as
a percentage of their income it will be trivial, nevertheless this
over-inclusiveness substantially increases the cost of the
measure. This kind of over-inclusiveness can be corrected. In
Canada, in 1972 the subsidy was restricted to private
corporations and to corporations which only had a certain
amount of retained earnings that had benefited from the
credit.9 6 However, this latter restriction led to a considerable
amount of complexity and was repealed 97 so that now the
Canadian small business credit benefits all private corporations.
Of course, in some sense, the criticism of the low rate of
tax on the grounds that it benefits large corporations might be
taken as an observation on the corporate rate structure as much
as a criticism of the low rate. The purpose of the low rate of
tax is simply to change the relative burden between low- and
high-income corporations. If it is concluded that high-income
corporations should bear more of the corporate tax burden this
could be done simply by increasing the normal corporate tax
rate. Indeed, when the low corporate rate was introduced in
Canada in 1949 the normal corporate tax rate was increased by
three per cent in order to pay for the concession. Thus, even
though the low rate applied to the income of all firms, as the
Minister of Finance explained at the time, the changes resulted
in a decreased tax burden on the corporations whose profits
were less than $77 000, and an increased burden on those with
greater profits.398 Thus, all the low rate of tax does is make
the corporate rate structure progressive. If it is seen as
reducing the burden on high-income corporations too greatly,
this can be compensated for by raising the higher corporate tax
rates.
Ostensibly, to remove the benefit of the lower rate from
large firms, the United Kingdom, and more recently the
United States, tax back the benefits of the low rate from large
firms. The United States Tax Reform Act of 1984, for
example, imposed an additional five per cent tax on a
corporation's taxable income in excess of $1 million. The
additional tax had a ceiling of $20 250, which was the
maximum amount of benefit provided by the progressive rate
structure. The effect of the tax was to phase-out the benefit
of the lower rates of tax for corporations having taxable
incomes between $1 million and $1 425 000. However, the
only difference between a corporate tax rate structure in which
the lower rate is explicitly taxed back and one in which the
normal corporate tax rate is higher than it would be in the
396. Supra note 222.
397. Supra note 255.
398. Supra note 153.
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absence of the low rate is that the former is progressive only
over income ranges up to the level at which the tax back rate
phases out, while the latter is progressive over all income
ranges. The question of whether the tax break provided by the
lower rate of tax should be recovered from large firms by
simply raising the higher rates slightly, or taxing it back over a
particular income range, depends upon a consideration of
whether the marginal rates of all corporations should be
increased slightly or the marginal rates of medium-sized firms
only (those within the tax bracket ranges) increased slightly
more. In 1985, when Canada abandoned its attempt to target
the lower rate of tax at small firms, it considered and rejected
the imposition of a phase-out rate on the grounds that it would
complicate the Act and introduce adverse incentive effects
because of the higher marginal rates within the phase-out
range of income.
The subsidy is also over-inclusive because, even if it is
phased out for high-income firms, taxable income is not a
good measure of 'smallness'. The definition of smallness
should relate in a logical manner to the objectives that the
definition is being asked to serve. In this case the definition is
being used to identify those firms for which there might be an
equity market bias. Any one of a number of measures such as
asset size, number of employees, or gross receipts would appear
to be a better indication of 'smallness' for this purpose than
income. Most subsidy programs for small businesses do not
use as a measure of smallness only one index, and in particular
they do not use income.
Accepting that income or gross receipts is to be used as an
exclusive measure of smallness, 'taxable income' is a
particularly inappropriate measure. A corporation with
substantial accounting profits may report only a small
percentage of that amount as taxable income because of the
availability of other tax expenditures. Thus, a corporation that
may qualify as a 'small' business when measured by taxable
income may actually have considerable economic income.
Taxable income is also a poor indication of smallness since it is
based on an annual assessment. Thus the previous income
history of the corporation is ignored (except for the effect of
loss carry-forwards and carry-backs). In a particular year, two
corporations having the same amount of qualifying income
would receive the same assistance, regardless of whether one
corporation consistently had low income while the other, with
the exception of the particular year, consistently had high
income. A consistently high-income corporation might have
low income in a year for reasons that do not indicate the need
for state assistance because of equity market biases.
The rationale for the subsidy would suggest that it should
be granted to those small firms that are using their retained
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earnings for expansion; that can contribute to export
development, innovation or productivity gains; and, that are
having difficulty raising equity capital. It is difficult to obtain
precise numbers about the nature of the economic activities
engaged in by small firms, however, recent studies in Canada
reveal that small firms with these characteristics constitute a
small percentage of the total universe of small firms benefiting
from the small business credit.soo These studies found that
most firms in the small business sector were small because they
serve local markets or because the businesses required the
detailed participation of an individual who was also a major
equity holder.' Thus for most of these firms there is little
possibility of expansion. This is not to say that the activities
in which these firms are engaged are unimportant. It is simply
that it is difficult to make a case for the type of tax
advantages which would encourage resources to flow into these
sectors rather than to other sectors.
It would of course be possible to try to target the lower rate
of corporate tax on those small firms to whom the subsidy
might legitimately be given, but the Canadian experience with
trying to target its small business credit reveals a number of
inherent limitations in attempting to target tax expenditures.
One important characteristic of the tax system is that because
of its self-assessment nature private parties must claim
subsidies delivered through it before their entitlement is
reviewed by a government agency. Therefore, the conditions
that must be satisfied in order to claim the subsidies must be
simple and easy to apply. The government conducts audits to
ensure that individuals have only claimed those subsidies to
which they were entitled, but it can only audit a small number
of returns. The whole system depends upon the great majority
of taxpayers declaring and reporting their correct amount of
tax payable.401  When the Canadian small business credit was
introduced in 1972, for example, the tax was to be recaptured
unless the taxpayer invested in eligible investments. This
concept proved too difficult for accountants to administer. It
made it difficult for them to ascertain a small business person's
399. See McFetridge supra note 394.
400. The author of one of the studies in Canada concluded that '75 per cent of
the small business community is ... small because the personal nature of the
business in which they are engaged demand it'. Ibid.
401. It is possible to have a system of administrative review and approval before
a tax subsidy is paid. In some cases Canadian tax expenditures have been
conditioned on approval from a government agency other than the revenue
department. For example, in order to claim the accelerated capital cost
allowance for a film investment or for pollution control equipment, the
taxpayer had to obtain a certificate from the appropriate government
department. However, if such a procedure were used for a more general
subsidy like the small business credit there would appear to be little
advantage in delivering the subsidy through the tax system as an offset
against tax liability.
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tax liability. Thus it was repealed. 402  Later the government
tried to target the credit by excluding professional
corporations, some management firms, and service
corporations. In order to ensure that these kinds of
corporations could be identified with certainty the rules were
extremely detailed. Eventually, the rules were repealed
because they were perceived as being too arbitrary and
complex.403
A second characteristic of the tax system that makes
targeting a subsidy delivered through it difficult is that if the
legislation is cast in general terms, or if there is any ambiguity
about its application, the responsibility to develop a matrix of
more detailed rules, or to resolve the ambiguity, is delegated to
the courts. The courts are normally not an appropriate forum
for resolving these kinds of policy issues because of their
institutional characteristics and because of the inexpertise of
the judges. Again, as an illustration, in Canada in an effort to
target the small business credit the legislators restricted it in
1972 to 'active businesses'. Presumably, they intended to
exclude from the ambit of the provision essentially personal
service corporations and investment corporations. However,
the courts threw their hands up at this expression once they
could see that they would have to resolve literally hundreds of
cases along its borderline. They in effect held that any profit-
404making activity was an active business. Both the inexpertise
of the judges and the nature of judicial adjudication made this
an impossible concept for the courts to apply.408
Finally, the lower rate of corporate tax functions bluntly in
that it benefits many firms that have no shortage of capital, or
would have no difficulty raising it, because the owners have
high-incomes or are wealthy. Low corporate income does not
mean that the company is owned by low-income shareholders.
Distorting Effects
Policy instruments should be designed so that they have as few
unintended distorting effects as possible. In addition to the
distortions caused by its target inefficiency, the low rate of
corporate tax has the unfortunate effect of discouraging
consolidations. So long as small businesses remain separate
each can qualify for the subsidy implicit in the lower rate of
tax. If they merge, then only one subsidy will be received. In
402. Supra note 230.
403. Supra note 258.
404. Supra note 234.
405. Some of the problems caused by asking the courts to develop detailed rules
on policy issues such as this could be solved by giving the Finance
Department the authority to draft interpretive regulations, as can be done
in the United States. See B.I. Bittker, Federal Taxation of Income, Estate*
and Gifts (Boston: Warren, Gorham and Lamont, 1981), vol. 4, s.110.4.
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Canada, if three owner-operators each have a business that is
qualifying for the maximum credit, if they merge or form a
partnership the tax cost would be $84 000. Thus, the lower
rate of tax, which is designed to encourage small businesses to
expand into more productive units, can have just the opposite
effect. Also, where a number of individuals are operating a
business the small business credit encourages them to break it
up into smaller units. This would appear to be an undesirable
distortion in a country such as Canada in which in other
respects the government attempts to encourage efficiency
through increased scale of operations.
Administrative Costs
One of the frequently asserted advantages of tax expenditures
is that the administrative costs of delivering programs through
the tax system are lower than other spending alternatives.
When the tax system is used to deliver a spending program no
new forms have to be filed, no new reports have to be written,
and no new bureaucracy has to be created. However, none of
these administrative savings are inherent in the use of the tax
system; instead, they relate to the basic design of the spending
program. The lower rate of corporate tax is an inexpensive
subsidy to deliver only because it is essentially an automatic
cheque-writing program. Once the business person files a tax
form claiming that the business is incorporated and has taxable
income, the corporation qualifies for the credit. If this same
program were delivered as a direct subsidy it would be as
inexpensive to deliver. A government official would
essentially write cheques to business owners upon evidence that
a business was incorporated and upon receipt of the business's
financial statements.
When people assert that using the tax system imposes fewer
administrative costs in delivering a program, they are usually
comparing a simple program delivered through the tax system
with a complicated, discretionary program delivered directly.
While unfair, the natural tendency to make this comparison is
understandable. If a program equivalent to the lower rate of
tax were delivered directly (by a civil servant simply writing
cheques to corporations that applied and filed a statement of
their income), almost inevitably people would insist that the
government distinguish between certain corporations.
Furthermore, there would be pressure for the government to
audit each individual application, instead of the one or two per
cent that would normally be audited if the program were
delivered through the tax system. Thus the program would
likely end up being more expensive to deliver than the lower
rate of tax. However, this increased cost is not an argument in
favour of the lower rate of tax, indeed it is precisely the
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opposite. If the legislature would not adopt a direct spending
program without providing the necessary conditions to ensure
that it was efficient and properly administered, why should it
eliminate these safeguards when the same money is spent
through the tax system? But the basic point I wish to make, is
that in selecting a tax or direct instrument it is important that
instruments with a similar design are being compared. It is
meaningless to compare the administrative cost of the lower
rate of corporate tax and a discretionary loan program
delivered by a government investment bank and then argue
that the tax instrument is preferred to the direct instrument
since the administrative costs are lower. This is an argument
that goes to program design, not to whether the program
should be in the tax system or not.
Moreover, even with tax expenditures that have the
appearance of automatic-cheque writing programs, often the
administrative costs are fairly high. However, they are
obscured because they are borne by the private sector. For
example, when Canada attempted to target its small business
credit the legislation became extremely complex. Although the
government's administrative costs may not have increased, high
legal and accounting fees were incurred by taxpayers in
attempting to qualify for the credit. Therefore, often the only
difference between a direct subsidy and a tax expenditure is
that with a tax expenditure more administrative costs are borne
by the private sector in complying with the legislation and
fewer costs are borne directly by the government. However,
whether the costs are incurred in the government sector or the
private sector they are still a deadweight loss to the economy.
Indeed, an advantage of having them borne by the government
sector is that they can be more equitably distributed.
Government Control
The lower rate of corporate tax is an open-ended form of
government spending. Every small business that incorporates
and earns taxable income qualifies. Thus government revenues
can be eroded by events beyond its control. Normally, the
government should be able to control its spending to ensure
that its expenditures reflect government priorities. Some direct
government spending programs, such as entitlement programs
like unemployment insurance or welfare payments, are
necessarily open-ended forms of government spending;
however, normally the government designs spending
instruments that enable it to budget how much it is prepared to
spend in one spending area as opposed to another.
The open-endedness of a program is arguably not so serious
if the government can predict how much revenue will be spent
each year since it can fashion the instrument to take account
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of its spending priority. However, it is difficult to think of
any reason why a subsidy program for small businesses should
be open-ended, and none of the direct spending programs for
assistance to small businesses are. In Canada, and presumably
in other countries as well, the government even limits the
amount of loans it is prepared to guarantee each year under its
loan guarantee programs for small business. 0 s
Implementation
In recent years it has been increasingly recognised in public
policy literature that the implementation of a program is as
important as its design. Three unique aspects of the tax system
affect the implementation of programs embedded in it, and
render it in most cases an inappropriate spending instrument.
First, when a subsidy program is delivered through the tax
system it is administered not by an expert bureaucracy (expert,
that is, in the subject area of the program), but by the tax
department and the courts. So long as the subsidy is simple
and its administration does not depend upon the exercise of
judgment, this does not pose any serious problems. However,
if matters of judgment are involved in the dispensation of the
subsidy the lack of expertise of these implementing
bureaucracies can create difficulties. 0 7
A second implementation problem that arises when spending
programs are delivered through the tax system is that people
do not view the abuse of tax subsidies in the same way that
they view the abuse of direct subsidies. Most people take the
maximum advantage of tax subsidies, always giving themselves
the benefit of any doubt with respect to their entitlement.
Moreover, the use of any scheme, no matter how artificial or
complex, in order to increase access to tax subsidies appears to
be sanctioned by public opinion. In short, unlike the
deliberate and contrived abuse of direct spending programs, no
moral opprobrium attaches in most social circles to tax
avoidance. Therefore, when a program is implemented
through the tax system invariably a great deal more abuse must
be tolerated in its delivery than otherwise would be the case.
A third characteristic of delivering a spending program
through the tax system, and one that appears to create
insurmountable problems for its fair implementation, is that
tax lawyers and accountants become involved in its
406. Supra note 388.
407. An illustration of these difficulties is provided by the attempt in Canada to
target the small business credit by making it available only to small
businesses earning 'active business income'. A sympathetic interpretation of
this phrase by a bureaucracy that understood the rationale of the credit
might have gone a long way in preventing abuses of the credit. However,
the courts proved incapable of giving the term . sensible meaning. See
supra note 234.
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administration. This group consists invariably of a country's
most dedicated and highly paid individuals. One of their main
societal functions is, by their own admission, to find ways to
abuse tax programs for clients. In Canada, the complex
schemes that they concocted to abuse the small business credit
are a monument to their ingenuity. Indeed, one reason why
Parliament eventually had to abandon efforts to try to target
the small business credit and return to essentially a lower rate
of corporate tax is that the government discovered it did not
have the resources (any medium sized accounting firm in the
country would be likely to have more tax specialists than the
whole of the Department of Finance) to match wits with the
408tax advising community in attempting to prevent abuses.
The phenomena of tax incentives with an initially narrow
focus being turned into abusive tax shelters is a recurrent one
in the tax systems of most countries.
Political Accountability
Tax expenditures are not subject to the same budgetary or
review processes as other forms of government spending. Thus
generally government is much less accountable for them. This
was recently dramatically illustrated in Canada. In 1984 the
newly elected Conservative government established a task force
to examine all of the government's spending programs with a
view to rationalising them and suggesting ways that they might
be made more cost-effective. In the area of small business
assistance the task force recommended changes in the
government's direct spending programs, but failed even to
examine the most costly and cost-inefficient program, namely,
the small business tax credit.'"
Of course the budgetary process could be changed and tax
expenditures could be more closely co-ordinated with related
direct spending programs. But this task is more difficult than
commonly appreciated and in spite of numerous attempts has
not been accomplished in Canada or any other country so far
as I am aware. The importance of reforming the 'tax' reform
process cannot be over-stated. Meaningful tax reform is
ultimately dependent upon it. In particular, ways must be
found to ensure that the trade-offs between increasing one tax
expenditure and cutting back on another or a related direct
subsidy program are made explicit. New tax expenditures
should not always be financed out of general revenue. For
example, in Canada in 1985 when the small business credit was
extended to professional and other small firms," 0 that
408. Supra note 257.
409. See Canada, Task Force on Program Review, 'Introduction to the Process of
Program Review' (Ottawa: the Task Force, 1986).
410. Supra note 258.
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extension should have been financed by cutting back other
programs to small business (or an explicit budgetary decision
made to increase the financing of the small business sector). If
a trade-off between the financing of different small business
policy instruments could have been made explicit, then other
interest groups in the small business sector would have
appreciated their stake in the cost-efficient delivery of the
small business credit. They very likely would have opposed its
extension to professionals. Until tax expenditures are
integrated into the government budgetary programs so that the
government is more accountable for them, they should be used
sparingly.
Tax System Considerations
A final consideration that must be weighed before a subsidy is
placed in the tax system is the effect it will have on the tax
system's ability to achieve its primary goal of raising revenue
equitably. Tax expenditures impair the tax system's ability to
achieve its primary goal in a number of ways.
First, tax expenditures must be co-ordinated with the
technical provisions in the tax act, otherwise they might make
changes to the technical tax system difficult. When the small
business credit was enacted in Canada in 1972 it was directly
related to the dividend tax credit. The small business credit
reduced the corporate tax to 25 per cent, and this was the rate
of corporate tax for which the dividend tax credit
compensated. Thus there was complete integration for business
income earned through small corporations. In 1977, for
reasons unrelated to the taxation of small businesses, the
government decided to increase the dividend tax credit so that
it compensated for corporate tax of 33.3 per cent.'"
Consequently, the combination of the new enriched dividend
tax credit and the small business credit, which for political
reasons the government did not reduce, resulted in over-
integration of business income flowing through a small
business. Although small corporations would only pay tax at
an effective rate of 25 per cent at most, upon the payment of
dividends the dividend tax credit compensated shareholders for
a corporate tax rate of 33.3 per cent. Needless to say the rate
of incorporation and the rate of dividend payments increased
dramatically.
Tax expenditures not only affect and must be co-ordinated
with technical tax provisions, but they often have peculiar
interactive effects with other tax expenditure provisions. One
effect of a lower rate of corporate tax is to reduce the value to
small corporations of all other tax expenditures provided in the
411. Supra note 235.
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form of tax deductions. To illustrate, a tax expenditure that
takes the form of a $100 tax deduction will provide a $50
subsidy to a large corporation that is paying tax at a rate of 50
per cent, but only a $25 subsidy to a small business that is
paying tax at a lower rate of 25 per cent. If the lower rate of
tax were converted to a direct subsidy program it would not
have this peculiar interactive effect.
A third effect that tax expenditures have on the tax system
is that they enormously complicate it. It is true that if the
spending program implicit in a tax expenditure were converted
into direct spending programs no overall simplicity would be
gained. However, even though there would be no overall
increase in simplicity, at least for those applying for the
subsidy, there is some value in reducing the complexity of the
tax system. Each tax expenditure adds to the enormity of the
income tax law, requires a separate line on the tax return, and
increases the information required to explain the tax system to
taxpayers. Tax expenditures not only make filing a tax return
more difficult, even though the expenditures might not affect
each taxpayer, but also they give the whole system the
perception of complexity. Thus they increase taxpayer's
feelings of alienation.
Tax expenditures also normally increase complexity
generally in government regulation since tax rules must be to a
large degree self-executing. Thus if a spending program is
placed in the tax system it often requires detailed and complex
rules to prevent avoidance. With respect to the lower rate of
corporate tax, for example, complex rules are necessary to
ensure that taxpayers do not use multiple corporations in order
to increase their entitlement to the subsidy. These rules are
invariably arbitrary, give rise to a substantial amount of
litigation, and are often a trap for the unwary. Moreover, like
all anti-avoidance rules, they place a high premium on tax
planning. If the tax expenditure were simply converted into a
direct automatic cheque-writing program presumably these
same complex rules would be needed. However, invariably if
the program were converted into a direct spending program a
form of bureaucratic discretion that would be less arbitrary
and ultimately simpler would replace these detailed rules.
Finally, tax expenditures threaten the primary goal of the
tax system by creating a perception that the system is unfair.
If tax expenditures were simply converted into direct subsidy
programs, the total fiscal incidence of government activities,
and thus ultimately the fairness of government intervention in
the economy would be unchanged. However, direct subsidy
programs that are perceived as being unfair generally are
singled out for taxpayer wrath, whereas when the spending
programs are embedded in the tax system, the tax system
becomes tainted with unfairness - and ultimately in a self-
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assessment system the perception of tax fairness is paramount.
If the tax system loses its moral acceptability, the enforcement
of compliance becomes an impossible task.
Moreover, when spending programs are put in the tax
system, the need to ensure the perceived fairness of the tax
system can result in the programs having peculiar design
features. Thus, for example, in most tax systems the amount
of charitable contributions that a taxpayer can deduct is
limited to some percentage of the taxpayer's income. One
purpose of this limitation is to ensure that high-income
taxpayers cannot reduce their tax liability to zero and thus
threaten the perceived fairness of the tax system. Although
the limitation might make sense in these terms if the deduction
for charitable contributions is regarded as a schieme for
allocating government funds to voluntary organisations by
matching private donations, and if the matching were done
directly, surely no one would suggest this limitation should be
a feature of the program. The imposition of a minimum tax
on taxpayers who make extensive use of tax expenditures is a
similar illustration of the effect the need for tax fairness has
on the design of spending programs implemented through the
tax system. The minimum tax might be necessary to increase
the perceived fairness of the tax system, but in terms of
government spending policy, why should subsidies delivered
through the tax system be subject to this tax-back feature but
not subsidies delivered directly?
Conclusion
The lower rate of corporate tax is so flawed as a subsidy
program that it would be unthinkable that it would exist as a
direct grant program: it provides greater benefits to the well-
to-do than to lower-income business owners, it is grossly over-
and under-inclusive, it imposes high tax costs on small
business mergers, the government has no control over the
amount it spends through the program, it is administered by a
bureaucracy that is unfamiliar with the needs of small business
or the rationale of government support for the sector, and it is
a spending program for which the government is essentially not
accountable.
The lower rate of corporate tax could be redesigned in
order to make it more equitable and cost-efficient; however,
the Canadian experience with its small business credit points
up the extreme difficulty, if not impossibility, of attempting to
target a program delivered through the tax system. First, the
program must be designed to accommodate the structural
aspects of the tax system and to properly interact with other
expenditure programs in the tax system. Second, since the tax
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system is a self-assessment system the rules must be clear and
simple so that they can be applied by individual taxpayers and
administered by a bureaucracy not expert in the policy area.
Third, since for numerous reasons any spending program
implemented through the tax system will be subject to more
abuse than a program -delivered directly, it must be designed so
that it is virtually fool-proof. Fourth, because the government
is generally less accountable for tax expenditures than direct
spending programs, tax expenditures are especially vulnerable
to pressures from powerful interest groups. Finally, no matter
how well designed, in addition to being subject to these
constraints in program design, tax expenditures impair the tax
system's orimary function of raising revenue by increasing its
complexity and contributing to its perceived unfairness.

